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This thesis consists of three essays on corporate social and environmental 
performance. The first chapter explores how capital markets shape corporate 
environmental policies. The last two chapters study the determinants and implications 
of employee satisfaction and gender differences at work.  
The first chapter uses two quasi-natural experiments, brokerage closures and 
mergers, to explore the causal effect of analyst coverage on corporate environmental 
policies. I find firms significantly increase corporate pollution after an exogenous 
decrease in analyst coverage, suggesting that analyst monitoring plays a pivotal role 
in restricting environmentally harmful behaviors. This effect is more pronounced for 
firms with low initial analyst coverage, weaker corporate governance, less regulatory 
scrutiny, and incorporated in states where stakeholder constituency laws are not 
enacted. Reduced investment in pollution abatement, deteriorating environmental 
internal governance mechanisms, and a decreased role and influence of institutional 
investors are possible channels through which financial analysts influence corporate 
pollution. 
The second chapter investigates the gender satisfaction gap at work. Using 
Glassdoor employer reviews, I find that females are less satisfied at work than males. 
In particular, females care more about work-life balance, while this difference in 
workplace preference vanishes at the manager level, illustrating the role of selection.  
Exploring further implications, I show that family-friendly workplaces with small 
gender satisfaction gaps exhibit superior firm performance. This finding is stronger in 
industries relying more on female employees, firms with stronger corporate 
governance, and financially unconstrained firms.  
IV 
 
The third chapter studies the relation between financial conditions and 
employee satisfaction. Using Glassdoor data, this chapter documents employee 
satisfaction is substantially lower in financially constrained firms. Decomposing the 
employee ratings, I find financial constraints are negatively associated with 
employees’ assessments of work-life balance, career opportunity, and senior 
leadership. Further analysis suggests employee-friendly workplaces and cultures are 
beneficial for firm valuation. Overall, this chapter highlights that employee 
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Over recent decades, corporate social and environmental performance plays 
an increasingly important role in the business world. The determinants and 
implications of corporate social and environmental policies have received 
considerable attention from practitioners and academic researchers. This thesis 
consists of three essays exploring how corporate social and environmental 
performance (i.e., corporate environmental policies, gender gap, and employee 
satisfaction) can be shaped by corporate practices and capital markets, and the 
financial implications of socially responsible practices. The first chapter investigates 
the effect of capital markets on corporate pollution, while the last two chapters focus 
on the drivers and implications of employee satisfaction and gender differences at 
work.  
The first empirical chapter studies how financial analysts, a crucial component 
of capital markets, shape corporate environmental policies. A major challenge of this 
study is how to identify the casual effect of financial analysts on corporate 
environmental performance due to reverse causality and omitted variable bias. To 
tackle this challenge, I take advantage of two quasi-natural experiments of brokerage 
exits (i.e., brokerage closures and brokerage mergers) to capture an exogenous 
decrease in analyst coverage that does not directly influence corporate environmental 
performance. After an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, affected firms 
significantly increase toxic pollution as compared to control firms unaffected by 
brokerage exits. This finding supports the external monitoring hypothesis that analyst 
monitoring plays a pivotal role in restricting environmentally harmful behaviors (i.e., 
corporate pollution).  
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I further explore the monitoring role of financial analysts by studying how it 
interacts with alternative monitoring and governance mechanisms to influence 
corporate pollution. Specifically, the results are more pronounced for firms with poor 
corporate governance, facing less regulatory scrutiny, and incorporated in states 
where stakeholder constituency laws are not enacted. These results suggest that 
analyst monitoring acts as a substitute for traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms and regulatory oversight. Lastly, I investigate three non-mutually 
exclusive channels through which the changes in analyst coverage can shape corporate 
environmental policies. In particular, I document that decreases in analyst coverage 
lead to underinvestment in pollution abatement and green technologies, deteriorating 
environmental internal governance, and a decreased role and influence of institutional 
investors. Overall, this chapter highlights the important monitoring role financial 
analysts play in reducing negative externalities.  
The second empirical chapter uses a novel database from Glassdoor to 
examine the gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace preferences. Using 
Glassdoor employer reviews I show that, on average, females are less satisfied at work 
than males (i.e., gender satisfaction gap). Specifically, females have a significantly 
lower rating on overall satisfaction and other workplace attributes including career 
opportunity, work-life balance, senior leadership, and corporate culture. I find that 
work-life balance is the attribute that contributes most to the gender satisfaction gap. 
Moreover, I explore gender differences in workplace preferences by 
investigating the sensitivity of the overall satisfaction to each of the workplace 
attributes and find that females, relative to males, care more about work-life balance, 
senior leadership, and corporate culture, while care less about career opportunity and 
compensation benefits. Again, female and male employees differ most notably in their 
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preferences for work-life balance. Further, I study whether the pattern of gender 
differences in workplace preferences carries over among mid-level managers. While 
most of the gender gaps among rank-and-file employees continue to hold for 
managers, the gender preferences for work-life balance vanishes. This evidence 
suggests females do not care more about work-life balance than males conditional on 
becoming a mid-level manager, indicating the role of selection. Given their dual roles 
in the home and the labor market, females are less likely to choose a career path to the 
managerial position when they have to sacrifice work-life balance to be promoted. 
Finally, I find that a family-friendly workplace with a lower gender satisfaction gap 
in work-life balance is positively associated with firm valuation and stock returns. In 
addition, cross-sectional analyses show that firms in industries relying more on female 
employees, with stronger corporate governance, and with less financial constraints 
may benefit more from workplace family-friendliness than others.  
The third empirical chapter focuses on a key determinant of employee-friendly 
policy: corporate financing conditions. Specifically, I investigate the real effect of 
financial constraints on employee satisfaction using over 120,000 employee reviews 
collected by Glassdoor between 2008 and 2015. Financially constrained firms may 
have strong incentives to preserve internal cash flows through underinvestment in 
long-term projects (i.e., employee wellbeing) as the payoffs of such projects accrue 
slowly over time. Consistent with this view, I find an adverse impact of financial 
constraints on employee satisfaction. A one standard deviation increase in financial 
constraints reduces employee overall satisfaction by 3.3%.  
By decomposing overall ratings, I document that the lower employee 
satisfaction in financially constrained firms is mainly driven by employee 
dissatisfaction about work-life balance, senior leadership, and career opportunity as 
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those employees may be forced to work overtime and lose on-the-job perks, face 
increasing performance pressure from their superiors, and have a more uncertain 
career progression. Consequently, unsatisfied employees are reluctant to recommend 
their employer to others, hampering firms' competitiveness in the labor market. Lastly, 
I explore whether employee-friendly policies are beneficial for firms. Satisfied 
employees may be more motivated, productive, and loyal, which can improve firm 
performance. Indeed, I show a positive effect of employee-friendly workplaces, as 
measured by firm-level average employee satisfaction, on firm performance. This 
evidence suggests employee satisfaction is an important channel through which 




1 Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental 
Policies: Evidence from Two Quasi-natural Experiments 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, on average, approximately 3.8 billion pounds of toxic 
chemicals were released into the environment each year by U.S. registered plants 
(EPA, 2019). When inhaled by the human body, toxic pollution is likely to lead to 
serious consequences such as birth defects, neurodevelopment disorders, illnesses, 
and even death. Globally, more than one in six deaths is linked to pollution and over 
nine million deaths were pollution-related in 2015 (Landrigan et al., 2018). In addition 
to risks to human health, economic activities are also significantly influenced by toxic 
pollution. In particular, literature has extensively documented the negative economic 
externalities of toxic pollution such as decreased worker productivity (Chang et al., 
2016; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012), deterioration of labor supply (Hanna and Oliva, 
2015), and lower home prices (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Currie et al., 2015). 
Given the severe consequences of toxic pollution, increasing effort has been devoted 
to study the determinants of corporate environmental performance.1 In this chapter, I 
focus on the role of financial analysts in shaping corporate environmental policies.   
Financial analysts, as an important information intermediary and external 
monitor in capital markets, have real effects on a wide range of corporate policies 
(Bradshaw et al., 2017).2 Building upon previous literature, I propose two competing 
 
1 There is a small but fast-growing literature on how corporate environmental policy is determined by 
various firm characteristics such as organizational form (Akey and Appel, 2021), listed status (Shive 
and Forster, 2020), institutional ownership and activism (Akey and Appel, 2019; Chu and Zhao, 2019; 
Kim et al., 2019) and financing constraints (Goetz, 2019; Levine et al., 2018b; Xu and Kim, 2020).  
2  For instance, financial analysts could effectively reduce information asymmetry (Kelly and 
Ljungqvist, 2012) and earning management activities (Yu, 2008), mitigate agency problem (Chen et 
al., 2015), increase investment efficiency (Derrien and Kecskes, 2013), improve the quality of firm 
disclosure (Irani and Oesch, 2013), increase stock liquidity (Balakrishnan et al., 2014), and lead to 
more efficient investments in innovation (Guo et al., 2019), while the short-term pressure imposed by 
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hypotheses on how financial analysts shape corporate environmental policies. The 
first hypothesis is the external monitoring hypothesis predicting financial analysts 
have strong incentives to monitor corporate environmental behavior, resulting in 
lower toxic pollution. Firms in the U.S. are required to partially internalize 
environmental costs by allocating resources for environmental protection (Xu and 
Kim, 2020). Specifically, they are forced to allocate considerable attention and 
resources in pollution abatement activities such as resource reuse and recycling, 
updating and replacement of waste management facilities, and the development of 
green technologies. 3  More importantly, the payoffs of investments in pollution 
abatement accrue slowly over time and often sacrifice short-term performance. 
Therefore, the absence of external monitoring may induce managers to maximize 
short-term profit by avoiding or reducing the costs associated with pollution 
abatement and environmental protection. Indeed, managers are reluctant to invest in 
costly abatement processes and technologies to curb environmentally harmful 
behaviors if the detection probability is low (Hart and Zingales, 2016).  
From this perspective, financial analysts may have strong incentives to 
monitor and influence corporate environmental policies because environmental 
performance is crucial to the firms they follow. Environmentally harmful behaviors 
(i.e., excessive corporate pollution) are explicitly linked to greater litigation risk and 
penalties by the regulatory agency (e.g., EPA), difficulties in attracting and retaining 
executives (Levine et al., 2018a) and principal customers (Banerjee et al., 2014), 
higher financing cost (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Chava, 2014), and ultimately 
lower firm value (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Clarkson 
 
financial analysts impedes firm’s long-term projects such as innovation (He and Tian, 2013) and 
corporate social responsibility (Qian et al., 2019). 
3 For example, Clarkson et al. (2004) find the environmental capital expenditures of pulp and paper 
companies account for, on average, 9.77% of total capital expenditures. 
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et al., 2004; Karpoff et al., 2005). Given the importance of corporate environmental 
policies for firm performance, value-relevant environmental information has been 
increasingly incorporated in analyst reports (Jemel-Fornetty et al., 2011). For example, 
in 2013, there are approximately 27,000 financial analyst reports which include the 
analysis of corporate environmental performance (Dong et al., 2016). 
As well-trained professionals with rich industry background knowledge, 
financial analysts can collect information through both public and private channels 
(e.g., tracking the financial reports; visiting the plants; surveying the customers) and 
directly monitor corporate policies by raising their concerns in conference calls (Chen 
et al. 2015). Essentially, financial analysts are regarded as important “whistle blowers” 
who play a major role in detecting corporate misbehaviors (Dyck et al., 2010). In 
addition, financial analysts also provide an indirect monitoring role by disseminating 
information to the capital market and external investors via research reports and social 
media like TV programs and newspapers (Miller, 2006), which reduces the cost of 
other stakeholders (e.g., institutional investors) to monitor managerial behaviors 
(Chen et al., 2018).  
More importantly, direct and indirect monitoring by financial analysts not only 
increases the probability of detecting corporate environmental misbehaviors, but also 
the consequences of the misbehaviors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms’ 
environmental misbehaviors can lead analysts to issuing unfavorable stock 
recommendations and downgrades. For example, on January 27, 2020, an analyst at 
Zacks downgraded the recommendation of American Electric (NYSE: AEP) from 
“outperform” to “neutral”. The primary reason for the downgrade was AEP’s 
exposure to substantial environmental risks. Annually, 77 million tons of coal are 
burned by their plants, releasing large amounts of nitrogen, sulfur, mercury, and 
carbon dioxide into the air. Overall, the external monitoring hypothesis conjectures 
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that analyst monitoring can reduce firm toxic pollution by increasing the ex-ante 
expected cost of a firm’s environmentally harmful behaviors. 
In contrast, the short-termism hypothesis predicts financial analysts often 
create excessive pressure on managers (Dechow et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2005; He 
and Tian, 2013), leading to an increase in toxic pollution. Financial analysts usually 
make earnings forecasts and stock recommendations based on the short-term 
perspective of firms (e.g., 1-year EPS forecast). The pessimistic view (e.g., “Sale” 
recommendation) or failure to meet earnings forecasts by analysts may lead to 
negative stock market reactions (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002), lower managerial 
compensation (Matsunaga and Park, 2001), and even forced managerial turnovers 
(Hazarika et al., 2012). Managers are forced to sacrifice long-term projects (He and 
Tian, 2013) to improve short-term performance to meet the analysts’ forecasts (Irani 
and Oesch, 2016). Under the short-term pressure imposed by financial analysts, 
myopic managers are incentivized to reduce environmental-related investments or 
freeze current pollution abatement practices to increase short-term cash flows (Xu and 
Kim, 2020). Consequently, the short-termism hypothesis predicts an adverse impact 
of financial analysts on corporate environmental performance.  
The main empirical challenge of this study is the relation between financial 
analysts and corporate environmental performance could be biased by the endogeneity 
problem (e.g., reversal causality or omitted variables). For instance, financial analysts 
focus the firms with better environmental performance, this may lead to a negative 
relation between analyst coverage and toxic pollution (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; 
Luo et al., 2015). In addition, unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both 
analyst coverage and environmental performance may also bias the estimations. To 
alleviate this concern, I take advantage of two natural experiments of brokerage exits 
(i.e., brokerage closures and brokerage mergers) to capture a plausibly exogenous 
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decrease in analyst coverage (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 
2012; Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen et al., 2015).4  
These two experiments can directly capture a decrease in analyst coverage and 
are exogenous to corporate environmental policies and individual characteristics, 
which help establish the causality. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) show that brokerage 
closures, which lead to a reduction in the number of analysts covering a firm, are 
largely due to business considerations rather than the heterogeneous characteristics of 
the firms they cover. Similarly, Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) show that when two 
brokers merge, analysts are often made redundant due to culture clashes and for 
reasons unrelated to any firm-specific characteristics (i.e., environmental policies). 
Accordingly, I can explore the effect of an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage on 
corporate environmental policies through these two quasi-natural experiments. In total, 
I identify 35 staggered brokerage exits that occurred during 2000 and 2010. 
To investigate the environmental outcomes of analyst loss, I retain corporate 
firms that owned at least one plant in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database 
constructed by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The TRI dataset reports the 
quantity of toxic pollution released to the environment by each U.S. registered plant 
and is extensively employed in previous studies (e.g., King and Lenox, 2000; Currie 
and Schmieder, 2009; Currie et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2019; Shive and Forster, 2020; 
Akey and Appel, 2021). Based on this dataset, I construct a pollution variable to 
measure corporate pollution in each firm-year observation. Further, I define the 
treated firms as the firms affected by the event of broker closures or mergers and then 
use propensity score matching (PSM) to match treatment firms to similar control firms. 
 
4 The validity of the two quasi-natural experiments has been extensively validated by prior studies who 
investigate the relation between analyst coverage and analyst bias (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010), asset 
pricing (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012), firm investment (Derrien and Kecskes, 2013), innovation (He 
and Tian, 2013), and corporate governance (Chen et al., 2015) 
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To only capture the effect of analyst loss on corporate environmental performance, I 
construct a two-year estimation window to compare firm pollution in the one year 
before the brokerage exits with that in one year after. In total, my matching sample 
consists of 606 treatment (control) firm-year observations from 1999 to 2011.  
Using difference-in-differences tests, I find that an exogenous decrease in 
analyst coverage significantly increases corporate pollution. In terms of economic 
magnitude, the total nominal (output scaled) toxic pollution of treated firms increases 
by approximately 13% (12.6%) of standard deviation as compared to matched control 
firms. The estimation results are robust to controls for industry-year fixed effects, a 
battery of firm characteristics, different estimation windows and subsamples, and 
alternative matching criteria. This evidence supports the external monitoring 
hypothesis, suggesting financial analysts play a pivotal role in restraining 
environmentally harmful behaviors.  
I then investigate the effect of financial analysts on EPA violations. The 
external monitoring hypothesis argues that the absence of analyst monitoring may 
lead to more corporate environmentally harmful behaviors. From this perspective, I 
expect that firms affected by brokerage exits are more likely to violate EPA 
regulations. Consistent with my expectation, the number of EPA enforcements in 
treated firms increases by 7.3% after a decrease in analyst coverage, relative to control 
firms. Interestingly, this relation is mainly driven by an increase in non-judicial cases, 
while it is insignificant in the regression for judicial cases. It suggests managers 
strategically choose their environmental behaviors and only increase “their 
environmental misconduct” when there seems to be an absence of serious 
consequences for their career prospects and reputation (Aharony et al., 2015). 
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To sharpen my understanding of the monitoring hypothesis, I perform several 
cross-sectional tests to investigate how the monitoring role financial analysts play 
interacts with alternative monitoring mechanisms. Firstly, I find that the effect of an 
exogenous decrease in analyst coverage on corporate pollution is more pronounced in 
the subsample with low initial analyst coverage, as there is a relatively larger 
percentage drop in monitoring among such firms than those with high initial analyst 
coverage.  
Second, I investigate the role of corporate governance in the relation between 
analyst coverage and corporate pollution. I find that firms with weaker corporate 
governance (as proxied by weaker market competition and a higher managerial 
entrenchment index) emit more toxic pollution after an exogenous decrease in analyst 
coverage. Third, I find the treatment effect is stronger in firms subject to less stringent 
regulatory monitoring (geographically more distant from EPA offices). The results 
indicate that analyst monitoring can act as a substitute for traditional corporate 
governance mechanisms and regulatory oversight (Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen et al., 
2015).  
Fourth, I study whether the enactment of stakeholder constituency law can 
influence the results. Stakeholder constituency law requires the board of directors to 
consider the benefits of stakeholders when making corporate decisions. I find that 
firms incorporated in states without stakeholder constituency law tend to pollute more 
in the absence of analyst monitoring, suggesting analyst monitoring is particularly 
important in aligning shareholder-stakeholder conflicts over externalities caused by 
toxic pollution (Cheng et al., 2018).  
In the final part of this chapter, I investigate the underlying mechanisms 
through which financial analysts shape corporate environmental policies. Specifically, 
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I consider three non-mutually exclusive channels: (1) investments in pollution 
abatement; (2) environmental internal governance and; (3) role and influence of 
institutional investors. The first channel examines whether managers are incentivized 
to underinvest in pollution abatement and green technologies after an exogenous 
decrease in analyst coverage, leading to more corporate pollution. Since pollution 
abatement is costly, managers may be reluctant to allocate resources in abatement 
technologies or practices to curb environmental harmful behavior (Hart and Zingales, 
2016). To test this channel, I employ corporate environmental expenditures and green 
patents as the proxies for investments in pollution abatement. I find that after 
experiencing an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, the amount of environmental 
expenditures and the number of green patents in affected firms both significantly 
decrease relative to control firms. The underinvestment incentives consequently result 
in higher corporate pollution.  
The second channel is internal environmental governance, suggesting a 
decrease in analyst coverage leads to higher corporate pollution through deteriorating 
environmental internal governance mechanisms. To the extent that the absence of 
analyst monitoring decreases the detection probability and consequences of 
environmentally harmful behaviors, managers may have strong incentives to lessen 
internal governance mechanisms associated with corporate environmental 
performance as such mechanisms require considerable attention and resources. In 
support of this view, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage reduces 
the probability of containing “pay for environmental performance” in executive 
contracts and having a sustainability board committee. 
The last channel is the role and influence of institutional investors. Over recent 
years, an increasing number of institutional investors claim they monitor and 
13 
 
influence corporate social and environmental policies (Krueger et al., 2020; Bolton 
and Kacperczyk, 2021), which induces managers to improve corporate social 
performance (Kim et al., 2019; Dyck et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020).  However, the 
role and influence of institutional investors rely on the corporate information 
environment. In the course of their duties, analysts disseminate information on a 
firm’s environmental policies to capital markets (Miller, 2006). This reduces the 
monitoring cost for other stakeholders, in particular, institutional investors, when 
monitoring corporate behavior. Indeed, prior studies find that after decreases in 
analyst coverage, institutional investors are more likely to shy away from firms that 
become more opaque (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Chen et al., 2015). This weakens the 
role and influence of institutional shareholders in shaping corporate environmental 
policies, thereby incentivizing myopic managers to increase corporate pollution. 
Consistent with this view, I find a significant decrease in institutional ownership of 
affected firms after an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage. Further, I examine 
this channel across different institutional types. The decline in institutional ownership 
is mainly driven by the lower equity held by the quasi-indexers and public pension 
funds who have longer investment horizons and are under the pressure of social norms, 
thereby caring more about firm long-term performance and sustainability. 
 This chapter contributes to at least two strands of literature. First, this chapter 
contributes to the nascent but fast-growing literature on the determinants of corporate 
environmental policies. Previous studies have identified organizational form and 
ownership structure as crucial drivers of corporate pollution. For example, Akey and 
Appel (2021) present that the protection of limited liability leads to higher toxic 
emissions. Shive and Forster (2020) find that public firms tend to release more 
pollution than private firms. Kim et al. (2019) find that local institutional investor 
forces firms to reduce corporate pollution, while Akey and Appel (2019) and Chu and 
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Zhao (2019) document a positive relation between investor activism and target firms’ 
pollution. In addition, financial resources are regarded as another key factor in 
determining corporate environmental policies (Cohn and Deryugina, 2018; Xu and 
Kim, 2020; Bartram et al., 2021). For instance, Xu and Kim (2020) suggest that 
financially constrained firms are more likely to reduce investments in pollution 
abatement and thus release more pollution into the environment. This chapter 
complements this line of literature by highlighting the monitoring role of financial 
analysts in reducing corporate pollution. More importantly, I provide three plausible 
mechanisms through which financial analysts shape corporate environmental policies. 
Specifically, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage may decrease firms’ 
investments in pollution abatement, weaken the managerial incentives to establish 
internal environmental governance mechanisms, and reduce the monitoring role and 
influence of institutional investors.5  
Second, this chapter contributes to the debate on the bright and dark sides of 
financial analysts. As an important information intermediary and external monitor, 
financial analysts could reduce information asymmetry (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) 
and earnings management activities (Yu, 2008), mitigate agency problems (Chen et 
al., 2015), increase investment efficiency and stock liquidity (Derrien and Kecskes, 
2013; Balakrishnan et al., 2014), and improve the quality of firm disclosure (Irani and 
 
5 To the extent that toxic emissions are a function of corporate social responsibility (CSR), my study is 
also related to extensive literature on CSR (e.g., Masulis and Reza, 2015). Most directly related are 
studies on how analysts influence a firms’ CSR performance. However, the evidence is mixed on the 
effects of financial analysts on a firms’ CSR ratings. For instance, Qian et al. (2019) find a negative 
relation between analyst coverage and firm CSR performance, while Dong et al. (2017) documents the 
opposite. Unlike these studies focusing on binary measures of aggregate CSR performance from the 
KLD database, my study takes advantage of the continuous measures of firm environmental 
performance from the TRI database which provides detailed information about corporate pollution (e.g. 
the quantity of toxic pollution released each year). Importantly, Kim et al. (2019) point out that the 
correlation between firm-level TRI toxic pollution and the KLD environmental score is relatively small 
(-0.17) and as such, capture very different elements of a firm’s CSR. Therefore, my analysis allows me 
to more cleanly investigate an important aspect of CSR, corporate pollution, which has large negative 
externalities for society.  
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Oesch, 2013). Financial analysts, however, often impose short-term pressure on 
managers (Dechow et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2005), thereby forcing them to sacrifice 
long-term investments to meet short-term earnings forecasts and price targets (He and 
Tian, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2016). This chapter provides strong evidence to support 
the bright side of financial analysts and their role in shaping corporate environmental 
policies and limiting corporate pollution. Prior studies regard financial analysts as the 
important external monitors who play a major role in detecting and restricting 
managerial misconduct (Dyck et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2015). My findings support 
this view and highlight that analyst monitoring works as a substitute for both 
traditional corporate governance mechanisms and regulatory oversight to refrain 
managers from environmentally harmful behaviors.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes 
the sample construction and identification strategy. Section 1.3 presents the main 
empirical results and robustness test. Section 1.4 provides various cross-sectional 
implications. Section 1.5 addresses the plausible underlying mechanisms. Section 1.6 
concludes.  
1.2 Sample Construction and Identification 
1.2.1 Pollution data 
The pollution data are collected from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
database that was constructed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 6 
Beginning in 1986, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) was created to provide information about toxic chemicals to governments 
and the public. Section 313 of EPCRA establishes the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), 
 




tracking the release and disposal of toxic chemicals that may threaten human health 
and the environment. Currently, this program covers data of the release or disposal of 
755 individually listed chemicals and 33 chemical categories from roughly 60,000 
plants (including both public and private owner plants).7 All TRI plants are required 
to submit the annual report if a plant: (1) manufactures, processes, or otherwise uses 
one of the listed chemicals in an amount greater than the certain level of threshold; (2) 
owns more than 10 full-time employees; (3) operates in one of the 409 industries 
covered by EPCRA Section 313 and identified as six-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) code. The TRI dataset is regarded as the primary 
source for plant environmental performance since its’ first release (Prechel and Zheng, 
2012) and is extensively employed in previous studies (e.g., King and Lenox, 2000; 
Currie and Schmieder, 2009; Currie et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2019; Shive and Forster, 
2020; Akey and Appel, 2021).  
As TRI data are self-reported by individual facilities, the main concerns are 
the potential errors and manipulations. To mitigate this concern, EPA provides 
stringent reporting instructions and guidelines to ensure the accuracy of the 
submission. EPA will assign an independent senior official to certify the accuracy and 
completeness of information for each submission. If any deliberately concealing and 
misreporting activities are detected, EPA can enforce enormous fines and potential 
criminal penalties on violators (Greenstone, 2003). For instance, EPA issued a 
$60,000 fine to a plant owned by Hexion Inc. as the plant “failed to comply with 
reporting requirements” in 2019.8 Overall, there is little evidence that proves the 
misreporting of TRI data could bias the estimation results (Bui and Mayer, 2003). 
 






To analyse pollution outcomes, I keep firms that owned at least one plant in 
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database. I then merge the TRI dataset with the 
Compustat and Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database to retrieve 
the financial and analyst information of TRI pollution firms. The challenge in the 
matching is that there is no consistent and common identifier among the TRI, 
Compustat, and I/B/E/S databases. Following prior studies (Shive and Forster, 2020; 
Akey and Appel, 2021), I use a fuzzy string-matching technique to match the unique 
parent company name of each plant with the company names in the Compustat and 
I/B/E/S. To guarantee the accuracy of the matching, I manually verify the accuracy of 
each matched pair via the firm headquarter, company official website, Duns number, 
and Google search.9 Similar to Akey and Appel (2019) and Chu and Zhao (2019), I 
drop the plants with zero toxic pollution. In addition, I exclude the firms in the 
financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility industries (SIC 4900-4999). The initial pollution 
sample (prior to matching and criteria imposed for the identification strategy) consists 
of 765 unique firms with 5,872 plants from 1999 to 2011.  
As the TRI pollution data are provided at the chemical-plant level, I further 
aggregate the release of all chemicals at the plant level and then sum up the plant-
level releases to obtain firm-level pollution. More specifically, I follow prior studies 
(e.g., Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Kim et al., 2019) to identify a 
firm’s total toxic pollution as the sum of total on-site pollution and total off-site 
pollution. On-site pollution is the amount of toxic pollution released onsite into the 
air, water, and ground, while off-site pollution is the quantity of toxic release 
transferred to an off-site location for further release or disposal at specialized waste 
 
9 Duns number is a unique nine-digit business identifier, issued by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) and widely 
used in the U.S. and Europe.  
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management facilities.10 To mitigate the concern of extreme values and skewness, I 
log-transform firm-level pollution. Consequently, I obtain the first measure for firm-
level nominal pollution Log(total), the logarithm of total pollution. In addition, I 
construct a scaled measure to capture the firm’s “eco-efficient”. In particular, I scale 
each pollution variable by the total sales and then log-transform the adjusted pollution 
(Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Shive and Forster, 2020) to 
obtain the second measure for firm-level pollution Log(total/sales), the logarithm of 
total pollution scaled by total sales. 
1.2.2 Identification strategy 
1.2.2.1 Two quasi-experiments: Brokerage closures and brokerage mergers 
To investigate the effect of analyst coverage on corporate environmental 
performance, a major concern is that the relation between analyst coverage and 
corporate pollution is likely to be endogenous. For example, the estimation results 
may be biased by reverse causality, as financial analysts are more likely to cover 
environment-friendly firms (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Luo et al., 2015). In 
addition, unobservable firm heterogeneity (e.g., corporate culture) correlated with 
both analyst coverage and corporate pollution can confound the estimation results. 
Therefore, the most straightforward way of regressing corporate pollution on the 
analyst coverage is inappropriate in this study. To overcome the obstacles, I take 
advantage of two unique quasi-natural experiments of brokerage exits (i.e., broker 
closures and mergers) to create a plausibly exogenous variation in analyst coverage 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; 
 
10 Air pollution is composed of stack emissions and fugitive emissions. Stack emission refers to toxic 
chemical emissions to the air through confined air streams (such as stacks, ducts or pipes). Fugitive 
emissions are toxic air emissions that are not released through confined air streams (such as equipment 
leaks and evaporative losses). Water pollution is the total quantity of the toxic pollution released on-




Irani and Oesch, 2013; 2016; Chen et al., 2015) and then use difference-in-differences 
(DiD) methodology to explore the effect of an exogenous change in analyst coverage 
on corporate environmental performance. 
The first quasi-natural experiment is brokerage closures. Kelly and Ljungqvist 
(2012) find that the occurrences of broker closures are largely driven by increased 
market competition, reduced revenue, and more strict government regulation, rather 
than the heterogeneous firm characteristics covered by the closed brokers. In other 
words, this shock leads to a plausible exogenous decrease in analyst coverage for 
stocks they follow that is unrelated to corporate characteristics (i.e., environmental 
policies). Accordingly, the number of analysts coverage should be the only channel 
through which brokerage closures influence corporate pollution.  
The second quasi-natural experiment is brokerage mergers, which is originally 
introduced by Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) to identify an exogenous reduction in 
analyst coverage due to coverage universes overlapping. When a stock is covered by 
both acquiring and target brokers before the merger, the acquiring broker often fires 
at least one analyst following the stock (usually from the target broker) due to 
redundancy and culture clashes (Wu and Zang, 2009; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010). 
As with brokerage closures, brokerage mergers provide another ideal setting to 
capture an exogenous drop in analyst coverage of “covered” firms. 
1.2.2.2 Identifying treatment and control firms 
To construct my estimation sample, I start by creating the event list of 
brokerage exits. To identify brokerage closures, I follow the procedure of Chen et al. 
(2015) to identify the brokers that disappeared from the I/B/E/S database between 
2000 and 2010. For each disappeared broker, I use BrokerCheck to collect the 
termination status and date of brokers and then manually check historical press 
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releases in Bloomberg, LexisNexis, and Google to confirm the disappearance of listed 
brokers was attributed to the closure. Lastly, I supplement the event list with broker 
closures from Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012). Similar to Chen et al. (2015), I obtain a 
list of 30 brokerage closures events from 2000 to 2010.   
To identify brokerage mergers, I follow the process of Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2010) and Chen et al. (2015) to construct the list of broker mergers using Thomson's 
SDC Mergers and Acquisition database. Specifically, I require the primary SIC code 
of both sides (the target and the acquirer) of one merge event to be 6211 or 6282, as 
sell-side financial analysts are more likely to be employed in these firms.11 I consider 
only completed deals and deals that 100% of the target broker is acquired by the bidder 
broker. I then manually match the event list of broker mergers in Thomson's SDC 
Mergers and Acquisition database with the broker house in the I/B/E/S database and 
consequently produce 24 merge events. In total, I construct the event list of 54 
brokerage exits (30 closures and 24 mergers) which is consistent with Chen et al. 
(2015) and similar to the combination of Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and Kelly and 
Ljungqvist (2012).12  
Next, I merge the event list with the I/B/E/S unadjusted historical detailed 
dataset to construct a sample of treated firms affected by brokerage exits and other 
information on brokers. From this, I construct the estimation window around the 
brokerage exits. Event dates are supposedly dates of brokerage exits. However, the 
termination date (month) of broker closure or merge from BrokerCheck or Thomson 
Reuters SDC Mergers and Acquisition database does not always exactly fall into the 
 
11 SIC code 6211 contains Security Brokers, Dealers, and Flotation Companies. SIC code 6282 is 
Investment Advice firms. 
12 Lehman is not in my sample, as it is not a suitable shock for identification purposes (Kelly and 
Ljungqvist, 2012; Chen et al., 2015). This is because Barclays, which had no U.S. equities business of 
its own, took over Lehman's entire U.S. research department. Untabulated test results show that all my 
results hold if I further exclude Bear Stearns following Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) 
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same month with the disappearance date of the brokers in the I/B/E/S stop file, as the 
completion of one merger or closure event usually needs several months. Following 
Derrien and Kecskes (2013) and He and Tian (2013), I set a 6-month “event period” 
(denoted t) symmetrically around the disappearance date (three months before the 
event date and three months after).13 For example, the Robertson Stephens analyst 
firm closed in July 2002, and I identify the time range from April 2002 to October 
2002 as the event period of this closure event.   
To ensure the results are only driven by the exogenous drop in analyst 
coverage, I identify a two-year estimation window around the event (t-1 and t+1) 
following previous studies (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2013; 
Chen et al., 2015; Chen and Lin, 2017; Li et al., 2019). Given the fact that the analyst 
loss for affected stock can be compensated for by new entries or other brokers in the 
long run, this estimation window ensures this study can directly capture the short-term 
decrease in analyst coverage and its effect on corporate environmental policies.14 
Since I identify six-month spans around the event, there is indeed a six-month gap 
between the year before the event t-1 and the year after t+1. To avoid overlapping 
data, I identify the pre-event year t-1 as the last fiscal year that ended before the 
disappearance date of brokers and the post-event year t+1 as the first complete fiscal 
year after the event date. For instance, if a treatment firm has a December fiscal year-
end and the event date is May 31, 2001, the year t-1 (t+1) would be December 31, 
2000 (2002). In this way, this procedure produces two non-overlapping observations 
of each treated firm (i.e., t-1 and t+1). 
 
13 I also employ 8-, 4-, and 0-month event period to replicate the main results, and do not find significant 
differences.  
14 In robustness tests in Section 1.3.2, I employ different estimation windows such as a 2-year (t-2 to 




Next, I merge the affected firms by brokerage exits to the constructed pollution 
sample to identify the treated firms. I require all treated firms to have the financial 
information and pollution data from t-1 to t+1, which means each treated firm must 
have observations in at least three consecutive years around the events. For the 
brokerage closures, I require firms to be covered by the closed broker in the pre-event 
year and then continue to exist in the I/B/E/S database in the post-event year. For the 
broker mergers, I constrain the treated firms to the stocks covered by both sides of 
mergers (target and acquirer) one year before the event and then continue to be 
covered by the acquirer broker house in the year after the event.15 The unaffected 
firms by brokerage exits are allocated into the pool of control firms. Finally, the 
unmatched sample consists of 326 unique treatment firms (associated with 35 
brokerage exits) and 764 control firms between 1999 and 2011.16,17  
1.2.2.3 Matched treatment and control groups 
Using this sample, I first examine the effect of an exogenous decrease in 
analyst coverage on corporate pollution and find that treated firms significantly emit 
more pollution into the environment after decreases in analyst coverage relative to 
control firms.  However, the relation is likely to be biased as treated and control firms 
may differ along with various observable and unobservable firm characteristics which 
both affect the variation of analyst coverage and corporate pollution. For instance, if 
larger firms tend to be covered more by analysts (and thus more likely to be treated), 
these large firms could also find it more efficient to invest in pollution abatement 
 
15 For both broker closures and mergers, I further require that the estimate of the treated firm is not 
“stopped” in the I/B/E/S database before the disappearance date of the broker to ensure that the 
termination of analyst coverage is exogenous instead of being driven by firm-specific characteristics.  
16 A firm could be affected by more than one closure or merger events during my sample period 
17 The number of treated firms is relatively fewer than other studies (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; 
Chen et al. 2015) as I require firms in my sample to own at least one registered plant in the TRI database 
to include pollution data.  
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technologies. To mitigate this concern, I use propensity score matching (PSM) to 
construct the matched sample.  
Following prior studies (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; Kelly and 
Ljungqvist, 2012; He and Tian, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Derrien and Kecskes, 
2013), I match on a set of firm characteristics in the pre-event year t-1 which may 
predict the probability of being treated, including total assets (Firm Size), Return on 
assets (ROA), Tangibility (Tangibility), Book-to-Market ratio (Book to Market), and 
industry (2-digit SIC). I match on firm size, ROA, book-to-market ratio, as firms with 
larger size and better performance are more likely to be covered by financial analysts 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010). In addition, I match on the tangible asset ratio which 
may lead to different environmental strategies and influence analysts’ decisions on 
the coverage of a particular firm (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Luo et al., 2015; Akey 
and Appel, 2021). Lastly, I match on the 2-digit SIC since the environmental policies 
and analyst coverage are significantly differ across industries. 
After constructing the combinations of matching variables, I generate a 
logistic regression where the outcome variable is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the specific firm-year observation is identified as the treated firm and zero otherwise. 
Next, I employ a one-to-one nearest-neighbor match with replacement based on the 
propensity score of regression.18 The matching sample consists of 254 unique treated 
firms and 116 unique control firms with 1,212 firm-year observations, including 606 
 
18 In the matching, there is a possibility that treated firms can be selected as control firms before (after) 
the three-year (t-1 to t+1) time window. To avoid the overlapping effects, treated firms could not be 
selected into the candidate pool of control firms to ensure a cleaner match.  
24 
 
treated (control) observations.19, 20  That is 303 pairs of treated and control firms 
affected by brokerage exits (2 firm-year observations (t-1 and t+1) each).  
To ascertain the validity of the PSM matching, I perform a balance test to 
examine the differences in the mean of various firm characteristics between treated 
and control firms in the pre-event year (t-1).21 The matching variables and other firm 
characteristics of treated and control firms are largely indistinguishable after PSM 
matching. Collectively, the balance test suggests that the matching process 
successfully controls for the ex-ante differences between treatment and control firms.  
1.2.3 Empirical model 
To investigate the effect of an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage on 
corporate pollution, I employ difference-in-differences estimates to compare the 
change in corporate pollution from pre-event year t-1 to post-event year t+1 in the 
treatment group versus the control group. The baseline regression is shown as follows: 
y𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 
(1-1) 
Where t indexes year and i indexes firm. y is one of two measures for firm total 
pollution, the logarithm of total nominal toxic pollution (log(total)) and the logarithm 
of output adjusted emission (log(total/sale)). Treatmenti,t is an indicator variable 
which equals to one if the firm has experienced an exogenous drop in analyst coverage 
due to brokerage closures or broker mergers and zero otherwise, and Afteri,t is a 
dummy variable equal to one in the year after the events t+1 and zero in the year 
 
19 As the number of firms with pollution data are relatively limited (765 unique firms) and my matching 
requires firms to be in a similar industry (SIC two-digit code), I lose about 100 treated firm-year 
observations. 
20 The number of unique control firms is smaller than treated firms because I use the PSM with 
replacement. The estimation results are not materially changed when employing non-replacement 
matching.  
21 The results are shown in panel B of Table 1-1.  
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before t−1. The variable of interest in this analysis is the interaction variable, 
Treatmenti,t ×Afteri,t. The coefficient β1 captures the change in corporate pollution of 
treated firms after an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage relative to before and 
relative to control firms. The vector Xi,t contains a set of firm-specific variables 
employed in the prior studies, including firm size (Firm size), book-to-market ratio 
(Book to Market), return on assets (ROA), tangibility (Tangibility), debt structure 
(Book Leverage), Research and development expense (R&D), dividend ratio 
(Dividend ratio), and cash ratio (Cash ratio). Details of the variables are presented in 
Appendix 1-A1. εi,t is the error term and clustered at the firm level. 
1.2.4 Summary statistics  
After PSM matching, I obtain 1,212 firm-year observations including 606 
firm-year observations per treated and control firms. To mitigate the effect of outliers, 
all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Panel A of Table 1-1 presents the descriptive statistics for all pollution and 
financial variables. On average, firms in my sample release 2.26 million pounds of 
toxic pollution into the environment, including 2.08 million pounds of on-site 
pollution and 0.18 million pounds of off-site pollution. The on-site pollution is 
composed of 0.74 million pounds air pollution, 0.17 million pounds water pollution, 
and 1.17 million pounds ground pollution. The control variables are largely similar to 
those reported in previous studies that use the TRI data (e.g., Kim et al., 2019; Chu 
and Zhao, 2019; Xu and Kim, 2020).  
[Insert Table 1-1 here] 
1.2.5 Diagnostics tests 
The identification strategy of this paper is built upon the idea that firms 
affected by brokerage exits (treated firms) will lose financial analysts relative to 
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unaffected firms (control firms). In Figure 1-1, I confirm this setting by plotting the 
mean difference in analyst coverage between the treatment and control group 
(treatment-control) for a six-year window symmetrically around the event of 
brokerage exits (from three years before the event t-3 to three years after t+3). Figure 
1-1 shows the mean difference in analyst coverage between treatment and control 
firms is roughly constant before an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage (from 
years t−3 to t−1) and then significantly decreases by approximately one analyst 
between year t-1 and year t+1. The magnitude of the shock is consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; Chen and Lin, 2017). 22 , 23  This plot 
ascertains the validity of my setting that brokerage exits indeed result in an exogenous 
decrease in analyst coverage.  
[Insert Figure 1-1 here] 
Moreover, when employing difference-in-differences analysis, a key 
identifying assumption is the parallel trend assumption that requires the treatment and 
control firms to have a similar trend in corporate pollution before the brokerage exits. 
I follow prior studies (e.g., He and Tian, 2013; Derrien and Kecskes, 2013) to verify 
the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption through plotting the mean difference 
in firm total pollution between treatment and control firms from three years before 
brokerage exits t-3 to three years after t+3. Figure 1-2 shows that the net difference 
(treatment-control) in total pollution is stable prior to brokerage exits from the year t-
 
22 The large gap in analyst coverage between the treatment and control groups is mainly explained by 
the fact that I do not allow the firms affected by brokerage exits to shift to the candidate pool of control 
firms, and I do not add analyst coverage as the matching variable due to the limited matching samples. 
The results are not materially changed if I include analyst coverage in the combination of matching 
criteria. 
23 To further confirm the validity of my settings, I generate a DID estimation with analyst coverage as 
the dependent variable. The coefficient of interation item (Treatment*After) is highly significant with 
a 4.58 t-value, which is consistent with my expectation that treated firms lose about one financial 
analyst after brokerage exits relative to control firms.  
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3 to year t-1, and then has a dramatic increase from the year t-1 to year t+1, suggesting 
no differential pre-event trend in corporate pollution between treated and control firms 
and brokerage exits lead to a significant change in corporate pollution of treated firms 
relative to control firms. Overall, these two diagnostic tests lend confidence to the 
validity of my empirical strategy. 
[Insert Figure 1-2 here] 
1.3 Main Results 
1.3.1 Baseline results 
I begin the empirical analysis by examining the effect of exogenous decreases 
in analyst coverage on corporate pollution using the difference-in-differences 
estimation in Table 1-2.24 The dependent variable is the nominal measure of total 
pollution (log(total)) in Columns (1) to (3) and sale-adjusted total pollution 
(log(total/sales)) in Columns (4) to (6).  
[Insert Table 1-2 here] 
I first estimate the DID regressions without control variables in Column (1) 
and then include control variables in Column (2). Firm and year fixed effects are 
included in Columns (1) and (2) to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across 
firm and time. In Column (3) I obtain firm and industry-year (SIC 2-digit) fixed effects 
to control for time-varying industry characteristics such as environmental regulatory 
changes and industry-technological shifts.  Across all specifications the coefficient on 
the interaction term (Treatment*After) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This increase in toxic pollution is economically large. As shown in Column (3), 
exogenous decreases in analyst coverage are associated with an increase of 36.1% in 
 
24 In the regression specification I omit the item of Treat, as I require that the treated firms cannot be 
shifted into candidate pool of control firms during my sample period and control for the firm fixed 
effects in all columns.  
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toxic emissions (approximately 13% of the dependent variable’s standard deviation). 
The magnitude of the estimate is also comparable to the studies that explore the effect 
of decreases in analyst coverage on the long-term benefits of stakeholders. For 
example, He and Tian (2013) document that after an exogenous decrease in analyst 
coverage, treated firms generate 18.2% more patents and 29.4% more citations 
relative to control firms. Bradley et al. (2021) find that the workplace injury rate 
increases by 33.2% in response to analyst loss. Dong et al. (2016) show that the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) score of treated firms decreases by 60% of the 
absolute sample mean value after decreases in analyst coverage. 
In Columns (4) to (6), I use the output adjusted pollution (log(total/sales)) as 
an alternative firm-level pollution measure (Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997; Konar and 
Cohen, 2001). The coefficient on Treatment*After remains positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Overall, regardless of measures for corporate pollution, 
my results provide initial evidence in support of the external monitoring hypothesis 
that firms are more likely to increase environmentally harmful behaviors (i.e., 
corporate pollution) in the absence of analyst monitoring.  
1.3.2 Robustness tests 
In this section I conduct a battery of robustness tests to confirm the validity of 
my DID analysis. The estimation results are presented in Table 1-3. As with the 
baseline model, the dependent variable is nominal total pollution (log(total)) in 
Columns (1) to (3) and sale-adjusted total pollution (log(total/sales) in Columns (4) 
to (6). For brevity, I only report the coefficient and t-value of the interaction term 
(Treatment*After). 
[Insert Table 1-3 here] 
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I start with different estimation windows. My baseline estimation employs a 
two-year window (t-1 and t+1) around the event of brokerage exits, as it captures the 
short-term variation of analyst coverage and reduces the probability that the analyst 
loss may be filled by new entries or other brokers (Chen et al., 2015). Nonetheless, I 
replicate the results using 4-year (t-2 to t+2) and 6-year (t-3 to t+3) estimation 
windows in Rows (1) and (2) of Panel A. My findings remain robust to alternative 
estimation windows. 
Second, a common concern is the estimation results may be driven by a 
specific set of matching variables when constructing my matching sample. To account 
for this concern, I start with the unmatched sample in Row 3 of Panel B. While the 
estimation may be biased by the difference in firm characteristics between treated and 
control firms, the results are highly robust to the unmatched sample.  Next, in Rows 
(4) to (7), I use alternative combinations of matching variables to re-run my baseline 
estimation. In particular, I create a simple matched sample only with Firm size in Row 
(4). Row (5) is the combination used in the baseline model (Firm size, ROA, Book-to-
Market, and Tangibility) and reproduced here for comparability. Row (6) adds R&D 
since the additional matching criteria since the investments in research and 
development may be associated with the input and output of corporate green 
technologies and pollution abatement (Chu and Zhao, 2019). Lastly, in Row (7) I 
further require treated and control firms to have the similar corporate monthly return 
(Return) and stock return volatility (Volatility) (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; He and 
Tian, 2013). Regardless of how to construct the combinations of matching variables, 
the coefficient on Treatment*After remains positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level or better.  
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Third, I address the concern that the results could be driven by certain 
subsamples of firms. For example, the financial crisis (the internet bubble) may lead 
to brokerage exits and increases in corporate pollution due to financial constraints (He 
and Tian, 2013; Xu and Kim, 2020). Accordingly, I replicate the results after 
excluding all brokerage exits occurred between 2008 and 2010 in Row (8) and 
between 2001 and 2002 in Row (9) of Panel C, respectively. The results are not 
materially changed.    
Fourth, prior studies (e.g., Shapiro and Walker, 2018; Akey and Appel, 2021) 
find a significant and persistent decrease in toxic pollution from the 1990s to the early 
2000s due to the changes in environmental regulation (e.g., implicit pollution tax). In 
addition, approximately one-third of brokerage closures and mergers in my sample 
took place in 2000 and 2001. One potential worry is that this dramatic decrease in 
pollution and a large proportion of brokerage exits may distort my estimation results. 
To mitigate this concern, I re-estimate my regression after excluding the events in 
2000 and 2001 in Row (10) of Panel D and obtain largely similar results. 
Lastly, I note that roughly one-thirds of treated-firm-year observations are 
treated more than once in my sample, causing a reasonable concern that the potential 
confounding effect may bias the empirical results (Kim et al., 2019).  To rule out this 
possibility, I only keep the observations affected by the first event of brokerage exits 
if they are treated more than once, and then replicate the DID estimation in Row (11) 
of Panel E.25 The results are quantitatively similar. 
 
25 As an alternative robustness check, Chen et al. (2018) use a strategic sampling method to randomly 
select one treatment firm-year observation for firms treated more than once. I also employ their method 
to reproduce the estimation and the results remain robust.  
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1.3.3 Analyst coverage and sub-category pollution 
I then investigate which specific component of toxic pollution is affected more 
by the analyst loss. Total pollution is composed of on-site pollution and off-site 
pollution. On-site pollution is the amount of toxic pollution released onsite into the 
air, water, and ground. Off-site pollution is the quantity of toxic release transferred to 
an off-site location for further release or disposal at specialized waste management 
facilities. In Panel A of Appendix 1-A2, I find the increases in toxic pollution of 
treated firms after decreases in analyst coverage are mainly driven by on-site pollution. 
This finding is not surprising. As the transfer and disposal of the off-site pollution are 
costly, firms are more likely to increase the emission of on-site pollution rather than 
transferring the pollution to costly off-site places for further disposal in the absence 
of external monitoring (Kim et al., 2019). 
I further decompose on-site pollution into air, water, and ground pollution. Air 
pollution equals the sum of the onsite stack emissions and onsite fugitive emissions. 
Water pollution is the total quantity of the toxic pollution released onsite as surface 
water discharges. Ground pollution is the total quantity of toxic pollution released to 
the on-site ground. As shown in Panel B of Appendix 1-A2, analyst loss only 
significantly increases air pollution, while is unrelated to water and ground pollution.  
1.3.4 EPA enforcements 
The baseline results show that decreases in analyst coverage significantly 
increase corporate environmentally harmful behaviors (i.e., corporate pollution). In 
this section, I employ EPA enforcement as an alternative measure for environmentally 
harmful behaviors to investigate whether treated firms are more likely to violate the 
EPA regulations after decreases in analyst coverage.  
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EPA enforces environmental laws to protect the environment and takes civil 
or criminal enforcement action against non-compliance cases. 26 While non-
compliance enforcement cannot directly measure the extent of toxic pollution, the 
advantage of this measure is linking toxic pollution to regulatory and litigation risks 
that may shape corporate environmental policies (Xu and Kim, 2020). The 
enforcement cases data are extracted from the Integrated Compliance Information 
System for Federal Civil Enforcement Case Data (ICIS FE&C). This provides plant-
level information about individual enforcement cases such as the primary law violated, 
settlement date, and case number. More importantly, this dataset distinguishes the 
judicial and non-judicial cases, which allows me to observe how managers weigh the 
costs and benefits of corporate pollution.27 If the costs (e.g., administrative corrections) 
are not sufficiently high as compared to judicial litigations that could lead to concerns 
of personal reputational damage, loss of board seats, and increased board turnover 
(Aharony et al., 2015; Fahlenbrach et al., 2017), managers might be more willing to 
engage in “stronger” forms of environmental misconduct. 
As enforcement cases are at the plant level, I construct a firm-year count of 
enforcement cases by summing up the number of EPA enforcement cases. For the 
observations without non-compliance records, I treat the number of cases as zero. In 
my sample, the mean values of EPA enforcement cases, non-judicial cases, and 
judicial cases are 0.21, 0.18, and 0.03, respectively.28 As the detection and settlement 
of non-compliance cases require time, I compare the non-compliance cases in the two 
years before the event (t-2) and two years after (t+2).29 Firm and industry-year fixed 
 
26 See: https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement 
27 Judicial cases are those formal lawsuits that take place in court, while non-judicial cases are those 
activities taken by the EPA but without the court process.  
28 As the distribution of non-compliance data has right-skewness, I log-transform the enforcement 
variables.  
29 The sample size reduces from 1,212 to 1,112 in this model since I use a different time window and 
there are some missing values in the financial or pollution data. 
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effects are included, as the enforcement data significantly vary across industries 
(Shive and Forster, 2020). 
In Table 1-4, I investigate the effect of decreases in analyst coverage on EPA 
enforcement. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of EPA enforcements in Columns (1) and (2), non-judicial enforcements in Columns 
(3) and (4), and judicial enforcements in Column (5) and (6). In Columns (1) and (2), 
the coefficients on the interaction terms (Treatment*After) are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting a significant increase in the total number of EPA 
enforcement cases in the absence of analyst monitoring. The effects are also 
economically significant. As shown in Column (2), the number of non-compliance 
cases in treated firms increases by 7.3% after decreases in analyst coverage, relative 
to control firms. These results are consistent with Hart and Zingales (2016) that 
managers are more likely to increase environmental misbehaviors when the detection 
probability is low. 
[Insert Table 1-4 here] 
Then, I partition total enforcement cases into non-judicial and judicial ones. 
The coefficient on the interaction term (Treatment*After) is negative and statistically 
significant in the regression for non-judicial cases, while it is insignificant for judicial 
cases. This finding illustrates managers indeed strategically choose the types of 
environmental misbehaviors (Xu and Kim, 2020). Specifically, in the absence of 
external monitoring, managers are incentivized to increase environmental 
misconducts without serious consequences (i.e., non-judicial cases), while being more 
cautious in engaging in the misconduct that may threaten their individual reputation 
or career prospects (i.e., judicial cases). 
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1.4 Cross-sectional Analysis 
My findings so far indicate that after an exogenous decrease in analyst 
coverage, firms significantly increase toxic pollution and non-compliance behaviors. 
In this section, I explore how financial analysts interact with cross-sectional 
heterogeneity to influence corporate pollution. To the extent that analysts reduce 
corporate pollution by playing an external monitoring role, which substitutes for 
alternative monitoring mechanisms, I expect the effect of decreases in analyst 
coverage to be more pronounced when alternative monitoring forces are weak. More 
specifically, I investigate whether the effect of analyst monitoring can be mitigated or 
exacerbated by initial analyst coverage, corporate governance, the intensity of 
regulatory scrutiny, and stakeholder orientation laws. 
1.4.1 Analyst coverage and initial analyst coverage 
I first examine the effect of initial analyst coverage before the brokerage exits 
on my results. Intuitively, if treated firms are followed by fewer financial analysts 
before the shock, the loss of an analyst should lead to a greater percentage reduction 
in external monitoring and thus have more effect on subsequent firm policies (Hong 
and Kacperczyk, 2010). Therefore, I conjecture that the effect of decreases in analyst 
coverage on corporate pollution is stronger in firms with low initial analyst coverage.  
To test this conjecture, I split the treatment sample into two groups based on 
terciles sorted on initial analyst coverage of treated firms (He and Tian, 2013; Chen 
et al., 2015). In Table 1-5, treated firms are allocated to the group with low initial 
analyst coverage if they fall into the bottom tercile of analyst coverage in Columns (1) 
and (2). In a similar vein, treated firms are distributed into the group with high initial 
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analyst coverage if they are in the top tercile in Columns (3) and (4).30 As expected, I 
find that the effect of analyst coverage on pollution is more pronounced in the 
subsamples with low initial analyst coverage. The coefficients on the interaction terms 
(Treatment*After) are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In the group 
of low initial analyst coverage, the coefficients on the interaction term are small in 
magnitude and statistically weak. This evidence is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; Irani and Oesch, 2013; He and 
Tian, 2013; Chen et al., 2015) that the effect of an exogenous decrease in analyst 
coverage on firm policies is mainly driven by the firms with low initial analyst 
coverage. 
[Insert Table 1-5 here] 
1.4.2 Analyst coverage and a firm’s corporate governance 
Next, I explore the effect of corporate governance on the relation between 
financial analysts and corporate pollution. Financial analysts play a crucially 
important monitoring role in mitigating managerial agency problems and may serve 
as a substitute for traditional corporate governance mechanisms (Irani and Oesch, 
2013; Chen et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018). Given that the rent-seeking behavior could 
be mitigated by corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal contribution of 
analyst monitoring might be smaller in firms with strong corporate governance.  
I use two proxies for the quality of corporate governance. The first proxy is 
product market competition. High product market competition can lead to managers 
refraining from risk-seeking activities and not only motivates them to maximize firm 
profit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1983), but also to improve corporate social 
 
30 The average analyst coverage in the bottom (top) tercile group is 4.5 (17.4). The results are similar 
when I compare the top and bottom quartiles. 
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and environmental performance (Flammer, 2015), leading to better corporate 
governance. I conjecture that the monitoring role of financial analysts in reducing 
corporate pollution should be stronger for the firms with low product market 
competition. The competition measure employed in this analysis is Fluidity, as 
constructed by Hoberg et al. (2014), which captures the competitive threats faced by 
firms. 31  The greater fluidity indicates higher product market competition. I split 
treated firms into low and high market competition groups based on the median value 
of product market fluidity in the pre-event year (t-1).  
My second proxy is the E-index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). E-index is the 
entrenchment index consisting of six anti-takeover provisions against takeovers and 
measures the rights a firm gives to shareholders as well as the ease of being acquired.32 
Under a takeover threat, managers are incentivized to avoid stock price declines 
caused by poor environmental performance (Kock et al., 2012). This perspective 
predicts that better corporate governance can restrain managers from harming the 
environment (Shive and Forster, 2020). The sample firms are divided into high E-
index (poorly-governed) and low E-index (well-governed) groups based on the 
median value before the broker exits.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 1-6. Using production market 
competition to partition my sample in Columns (1) to (4), I find that the coefficient 
on Treatment*After is positive and significant at the 5% level in firms facing less 
 
31 Fluidity is based on the words firms use to describe their products in the annual report (10-Ks) and 
the change in the words used by its competitors. As the words used by competitors become more similar 
to the firm’s description, fluidity increases, which indicates a higher similarity between the products of 
the firm and its competitors. The product market fluidity measure is constructed using textual analysis 
of each firm’s product descriptions obtained from their 10-K files. It captures changes in rival firms’ 
products relative to the firm. The fluidity measure can be downloaded from: 
https://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/industryconcen.htm 
32 Six anti-takeover provisions are: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison 
pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. 
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competition (poor corporate governance), while it is insignificant for firms in 
competitive markets. The findings are largely similar when employing E-index as a 
measure for corporate governance in Columns (5) to (8). 33  The coefficient on 
Treatment*After is statistically significant only in poorly-governed firms (have a 
higher E-index). 
[Insert Table 1-6 here] 
Overall, using two proxies for the quality of corporate governance, my results 
are consistent with the notion that the monitoring role of financial analysts serves as 
a substitute for traditional corporate governance mechanisms (Irani and Oesch, 2013; 
Chen et al., 2015). In addition, my findings provide evidence supporting the view that 
corporate governance plays a crucial role in reducing toxic pollution (Shive and 
Forster, 2020).   
1.4.3 Analyst coverage and the intensity of regulatory scrutiny 
Then, I investigate the moderating effect of regulatory monitoring on my 
baseline results. Previous studies suggest regulators can be influential in shaping and 
enforcing corporate environmental policies (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Specifically, 
firms monitored closely by regulators are more likely to comply with environmental 
regulations (Cohen, 1998) and join voluntary environmental programs (King and 
Lenox, 2000), thereby leading to better environmental performance (Earnhart, 2004; 
Short and Toffel, 2008). As with corporate governance, the monitoring role of 
financial analysts can also act as a substitute for regulatory oversight. Therefore, I 
expect the influence of financial analysts is exacerbated when firms are less monitored 
by regulators (i.e., EPA).  
 
33 The sample size in this model becomes much smaller since the IRRC database mainly covers S&P 
1500 public firms.  
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To capture the intensity of regulatory scrutiny, I rely on the geographical 
distance between firms’ plants and EPA regional office (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). 
EPA regional offices monitor the enforcement of environmental requirements. 
Intuitively, the cost of monitoring activities (e.g., site inspection) may significantly 
increase by the geographic distance between EPA regional office and firm plants. 
Accordingly, EPA regional office is less efficient in monitoring and detecting the 
environmental misconduct (i.e., toxic pollution) of distant plants.  
I start by identifying the regional offices of the EPA. Figure 1-3 presents the 
geographical distribution of 10 regional offices and specific states covered by each 
office.34 For example, regional office 1 is located in Boston, MA, and is responsible 
for the states of CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, and VT. As pollution and enforcement occur 
at the plant level, I calculate the geographical distance from each plant (belonging to 
a firm) to the EPA office that supervises it (Kim et al., 2019). More specifically, I use 
Coval and Moskowitz’s (1999) formula to calculate the geographical distance for 
every facility-EPA regional office pair as follows:35  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠 {𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖) 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗)
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖) 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗)




Where i denotes the TRI plant and j denotes EPA regional office. Distance is the 
geographic distance between the plant and the relevant EPA regional office. lat and 
lon are latitude and longitude measured in degrees. r is the radius of the earth 
(approximately 3963 statute miles). 
 
34 Source: https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/visiting-regional-office 
35 The location (longitude and latitude) of EPA regional offices and my sample plants are retrieved 




After calculating the distance between each plant- EPA office pair (Distance), 
I then construct a firm-level measure by taking its average (Avg_Distance). A larger 
average distance means weaker regulatory scrutiny by the EPA for a particular firm. 
The mean (median) value of Avg_Distance is 100.99 (100.42) miles. Then, I partition 
the sample into the high and low average distance subsamples based on the median 
Avg_Distance of treated firms in the pre-event year (t-1). The estimation results are 
presented in Table 1-7. I find the effect of analyst coverage on corporate pollution is 
mainly driven by distant firms farther away from the relevant EPA regional offices. 
This evidence suggests that financial analysts play a pivotal role in reducing corporate 
pollution in the absence of strong regulatory scrutiny, consistent with a substitution 
effect between analyst monitoring and regulatory oversight. 
[Insert Table 1-7 here] 
1.4.4 Analyst coverage and stakeholder orientation laws 
Finally, I look at the state-level corporate constituency statutes. The traditional 
fiduciary duties of directors only require them to act in accordance with the interests 
of shareholders (Freeman, 1984). However, an increasing number of scholars criticize 
this view and argue modern firms should adopt stakeholder-oriented decision-making 
(see the review by Tirole (2001)). The proponents of the stakeholder-orientation view 
promote legislation to protect the stakeholder’s interests rather than being merely 
shareholder-oriented, leading to the adoption of constituency statutes (Bainbridge, 
1991). The enactment of state-level constituency statutes encourages corporate 
directors to consider a variety of stakeholders’ interests (i.e., environment) in 
corporate decisions and thus to be more stakeholder-oriented. Indeed, Cheng et al. 
(2018) find a significant improvement in corporate social responsibility after the 
adoption of constituency statutes. To the extent the constituency statutes are effective 
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in promoting environmental performance, I expect a stronger treatment effect of 
analyst coverage on corporate pollution among firms incorporated in states where 
such statutes are not enacted.  
I partition the sample into firms incorporated in states with and without the 
constituency statutes, respectively. Over the sample period, 34 states have adopted 
these statutes.36 The estimation results are reported in Table 1-8. Consistent with my 
expectation, the effect of decreases in analyst coverage on corporate pollution is more 
pronounced for firms incorporated in states without the constituency statutes law. The 
results suggest financial analysts play a crucial role in reducing corporate pollution in 
the absence of stakeholder orientation laws that empower boards to undertake 
environmentally friendly policies.     
[Insert Table 1-8 here] 
1.5 Potential Channels 
The results to this point suggest a causal relationship between analyst coverage 
and corporate pollution, and support the argument that the monitoring role of financial 
analysts can restrain environmentally harmful behaviors. However, it is not clear how 
financial analysts shape corporate environmental policies.  In this section, I explore 
three non-mutually exclusive channels: (1) investments in pollution abatement; (2) 
internal environmental governance; (3) role and influence of institutional investors.  
1.5.1 Investments in pollution abatement 
I first investigate whether underinvestment in pollution abatement is a 
potential channel through which analyst coverage influences corporate pollution. To 
reduce toxic pollution, firms can invest in pollution abatement activities such as 
 
36 See Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016) for a list of states that passed corporate constituency statutes. 




developing green technologies or updating waste management facilities (Akey and 
Appel, 2021). However, investments in pollution abatement are costly. For instance, 
the cost of pollution abatement accounts for 5% -7% of capital expenditures for 
industrial firms (EPA, 2005). In the absence of analyst monitoring, managers may be 
reluctant to invest in pollution abatement activities if detection probability and the 
consequences of environmentally harmful behaviors are limited (Hart and Zingales, 
2016).  As such, the weaker monitoring caused by decreases in analyst coverage may 
induce managers to reduce investments in pollution abatement, leading to higher 
corporate pollution. 
I employ two proxies for pollution abatement activities. The first proxy is total 
environmental capital expenditure. I search each sample firm in the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) database and manually collect the 
environmental expenditures data from 10-K files.37, 38  In my sample, roughly 20% of 
firm-year observations disclose their environmental expenditures. On average, 
environmental expenditures account for 9.83% of total expenditures that is 
comparable to the 9.77% reported in Clarkson et al. (2004). Following Fernando et al. 
(2017), I set corporate environmental expenditures as zero if firms do not disclose the 
environmental expenditures in a particular year. To mitigate the concern of extreme 
values, I log-transform the environmental expenditures (Log(environmental 
expenditure)) as the dependent variable.  
The estimation results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1-9. The 
coefficients on Treatment*After are negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The treatment effects are also economically significant. As shown in Column 
(2), the environmental expenditures of treated firms decrease by 34.7% after analyst 
 
37 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
38 More specifically, I locate firms which mention environmental expenditures or environmental capital 
expenditures under the sections outlined “Environmental matters” or “Environment” in their 10-K files. 
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loss as compared to control firms. This suggests that increases in corporate pollution 
can be partly attributed to lower capital expenditures on activities and processes 
related to the environment. 
[Insert Table 1-9 here] 
The second proxy for pollution abatement is green innovation which captures 
the expense for research and development (R&D) related to green technologies (Chu 
and Zhao, 2019; Chu et al., 2020). The patent data are retrieved from Kogan et al. 
(2017).39 I classify the green innovation following the classification of Carrión-Flores 
and Innes (2010) and Flammer et al. (2019), including innovation related to wind 
energy, solid waste prevention, water pollution, recycling, alternative energy, 
alternative energy sources, geothermal energy, air pollution control, solid waste 
disposal, and solid waste control.40 I then calculate the number of green patents in 
each firm-year observation and set the missing value as zero (Chu and Zhao, 2019). 
Finally, I use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of green patents 
(Log(Green patents)) as the dependent variable. As there is a time gap between the 
initial investments in green innovation and subsequent innovation outputs, I employ 
a longer time window for this test.  
Specifically, I compare the number of green patents two years before and after 
(t-2 & t+2) broker exits in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1-9.41 As indicated by the 
 
39 More details are shown in https://paper.dropbox.com/home/recents 
40 The codes of classifications are shown as follows: Wind energy (242, 073, 180, 440, 340, 343, 422, 
280, 104, 374), Solid waste prevention (137, 435, 165, 119, 210, 205, 405, 065), Water pollution (405, 
203, 210), Recycling (264, 201, 229, 460, 526, 106, 205, 425, 060, 075, 099, 100, 162, 164, 198, 210, 
216, 266, 422, 431, 432, 502, 523, 525, 902), Alternative energy (204, 062, 228, 248, 425, 049, 428, 
242, 222, 708, 976), Alternative energy sources (062, 425, 222), Geothermal energy (060, 436), Air 
pollution control (123, 060, 110, 422, 015, 044, 423), Solid waste disposal (241, 239, 523, 588, 137, 
122, 976, 405), and Solid waste control (060, 137, 976, 239, 165, 241, 075, 422, 266, 118, 119, 435, 
210, 405, 034, 122, 423, 205, 209, 065, 099, 162, 106, 203, 431) 
41 For robustness, I also compare the innovation outputs 3 years before and after the events. The results 
are largely similar. In addition, I follow the study of He and Tian (2013) to build a seven-year time 
window around the event from three years (t-3) before broker exits to three years (t+3) after. The 
estimation results are robust to this alternative time window.  
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negative and significant coefficients on Treatment*After throughout the specifications, 
the number of green patents declines significantly after broker exits. Specifically, I 
find the number of green patents decreases by 12.2% relative to control firms. Taken 
together, my results suggest that treated firms facing less analyst monitoring tend to 
underinvest in pollution abatement and consequently result in higher toxic pollution.   
1.5.2 The internal governance of environmental performance 
The second channel is environmental internal governance. I examine whether 
the effect of analyst coverage on corporate pollution can be explained by the design 
of environmental internal governance that promotes firms’ pro-environmental 
behavior. As discussed before, analyst monitoring increases the consequences of 
corporate environmental misbehaviors (e.g., issuing unfavorable analyst reports and 
stock recommendations), and firms (the board of directors in particular) could be 
motivated to establish internal governance mechanisms to improve corporate 
environmental performance. In contrast, in the absence of analyst monitoring, 
managers may lack incentives to design or maintain internal environmental 
mechanisms since such mechanisms require considerable attention and resources.   
To test this conjecture, I use two proxies for environmental internal 
governance, executives’ compensation contracts and sustainability committees. The 
first proxy is the executives’ compensation contract which is regarded as an effective 
tool to align interests between managers and shareholders (John and John, 1993; 
Frydman and Jenter, 2010). The intuition is that if the managers’ compensation is 
linked with corporate environmental performance, they may have strong incentives to 
develop green technologies and reduce toxic pollution (Flammer et al., 2019).  Over 
recent years, an increasing number of managerial compensation contracts tend to link 
executive pay with social and environmental goals. The ratio of social and 
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environmental-related compensation in S&P 500 firms increases from 12% in 2004 
to 37% in 2013 (Flammer et al., 2019).  
Following previous studies of performance-based compensation (Bennett et 
al., 2017; Bradley et al., 2021), I obtain the information of executives’ compensation 
contracts from the ISS Incentive Lab Database for the largest 750 public firms. 
Specifically, I search for the environmental-related keywords in their compensation 
contract and construct a dummy variable with one if the incentive contract of any 
executive is linked with environmental performance, and zero otherwise.42 In my 
sample, approximately 5% of firm-year observations have environment-related 
incentives in their compensation contracts. I then employ the probit model to examine 
whether an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage may reduce the probability of 
containing environmental incentives in the compensation contract in Columns (1) of 
Table 1-10.43 I find that the coefficient on Treatment*After is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting in the absence of analyst monitoring, firms have less incentives 
to link executives’ pay to environmental performance.  
[Insert Table 1-10 here] 
Second, I examine the establishment of a sustainability committee as another 
internal environmental governance mechanism. Firms create various board 
committees for different strategic goals (Singh and Harianto, 1989) and may set up 
the sustainability committee to be responsible for sustainability issues (e.g., 
environmental performance). The presence of a sustainability committee may serve 
to motivate managers to create sustainability goals in the board meeting (Fu et al., 
 
42  The environment-related keywords include: “environment”, “emission”, “waste”, “toxic”, and 
“release”. 
43 In this regression, my sample size becomes much smaller because I only collect the compensation 
data of largest 750 public firms and lose some observations when using probit regression.  
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2020), leading to better corporate environmental performance (Dalton et al. 1998; 
Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017). However, the creation and maintenance of the 
sustainability committee are costly, which may require considerable attention, effort, 
and resources on the operation of the sustainability committee and subsequent 
sustainability activities (Greening and Gray, 1994). When the consequences of 
environmental misbehaviors decrease due to analyst loss, firms could be reluctant to 
establish or maintain such committees.  
The board committee information is retrieved from the BoardEx database. I 
flag the committees whose title contains the words “sustainability”, “sustainable”, 
“responsibility”, “ethics” or “environment” as sustainability committees and construct 
an indicator variable Sustainability committee that equals one if a firm has a 
sustainability committee in a particular year, and zero otherwise. Similar to my test 
for compensation contract, the probit model is employed to compare the probability 
of having a sustainability committee in two years before and after broker exits, given 
the fact that setting up a new board committee may require more time than other firm 
policy responses. The results are presented in Column (2) of Table 1-10. The negative 
and significant coefficient on Treatment*After suggests treatment firms are less likely 
to set up the sustainability committee after decreases in analyst coverage, relative to 
control firms.  
Taken together, regardless of proxy for the internal environmental governance 
mechanisms, I find the weaker external monitoring caused by decreases in analyst 
coverage induce firms to reduce the quality of environmental internal governance. 
This could be a potential channel through which financial analysts shape corporate 
environmental policies.  
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1.5.3 Role and influence of institutional investors 
Finally, I examine the last channel of role and influence of institutional 
investors. In recent years, institutional investors increasingly incorporate 
environmental issues into their investment decisions (Krueger et al., 2020) and exert 
pressure on managers to enhance environmental performance (Kim et al., 2019; Dyck 
et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020). For instance, Kim et al. (2019) document local 
investors have strong incentives to force firms they invest in to reduce corporate 
pollution. However, the monitoring role and influence of institutional investors rely 
on the corporate information environment. As an important information intermediary, 
analysts disseminate information on a firm’s environmental policies to capital markets 
(Miller, 2006), which reduces the monitoring cost for other stakeholders, in particular, 
institutional investors, when monitoring corporate behavior. Indeed, prior studies find 
that after decreases in analyst coverage, institutional investors are more likely to shy 
away from firms after analyst coverage decreases, as they anticipate these firms 
becoming harder to monitor (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Bushee and Noe, 2000; 
Chen et al., 2015).  Thus, the analyst loss may weaken the role and influence of 
institutional shareholders in shaping corporate environmental policies, thereby 
incentivizing myopic managers to increase corporate pollution.  
To test this channel, I collect information on institutional ownership from the 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database. I first investigate the effect 
of analyst coverage on equity ownership of all institutional investors in Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 1-11. As shown in Column (2), the institutional ownership of 
treatment firms decreases by 2.2% after decreases in analyst coverage as compared to 
control firms. This evidence suggests the increased monitoring costs pertaining to 
environmental policies may lead institutional investors to shy away from treated firms.  
[Insert Table 1-11 here] 
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To sharpen my analysis, I further focus on groups of institutional investors 
that are more long-term oriented and environmentally conscious, as different 
institutional investors have heterogeneous preferences and investment strategies 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012). If environmental 
monitoring cost matters to institutional investors, the results should be more 
pronounced among investors who care more about corporate environmental 
performance. Specifically, I identify two such groups of institutional investors, quasi-
indexers and public pension funds.  
Quasi-indexers are passive investors with long-term investment horizons and 
low trading turnover (Bushee, 2001). They can monitor and influence corporate 
policies through large voting (Appel et al., 2016) and impose pressure on managers to 
improve environmental performance (Kim et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020). I use the 
identifications by Bushee (2001) to classify quasi-indexers and calculate the 
percentage of shares held by quasi-indexers as the dependent variable in Columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 1-11. I find an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage leads to a 
significantly lower quasi-indexers ownership of 3.6% percent in treated firms relative 
to control firms. 
Next, I examine the equity ownership of public pension funds. Public pension 
funds have a relatively long investment horizon and are under the pressure of social 
norms, leading to their stronger preference for social and environmental investments 
(Kim et al., 2019). For instance, pension funds are more likely to initiate social and 
environmental shareholder proposals (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999) and are 
reluctant to invest in “sin” stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). As with quasi-
indexers, I follow Bushee’s (2001) classification to identify public pension funds and 
calculate the proportion held by such investors. The estimation results are shown in 
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Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1-11. I find that the ownership of public pension funds 
in treatment firms decreases by 0.3% after an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage 
relative to control firms. Given the mean value of ownership by public pension funds 
in my sample (2.57%), this decrease is not only statistically but also economically 
significant (0.3/2.57 is 11.67%).  
Overall, the results suggest that as environmental monitoring cost increases 
after analyst loss—institutional investors, in particular, longer-termed and 
environmentally conscious investors, become more reluctant to hold shares in these 
firms. This weakens the role and influence of institutional investors in monitoring 
corporate environmentally harmful behaviors.  
1.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I explore the casual effects of financial analysts on corporate 
environmental policies. Using two quasi-natural experiments (i.e., brokerage closures 
and mergers), I find that firms experiencing an exogenous decrease in analyst 
coverage significantly increase their toxic pollution relative to control firms. My 
results suggest the pivotal monitoring role financial analysts play in restraining 
corporate pollution. In cross-sectional tests, I find the effect is more pronounced for 
firms with low initial analyst coverage, poor corporate governance, less regulatory 
scrutiny, and incorporated in states without stakeholder constituency laws. 
Finally, I explore three non-mutually exclusive channels through which 
analyst coverage shapes corporate environmental policies. First, I find after an 
exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, firms are more likely to underinvest in 
pollution abatement and green technologies, leading to higher corporate pollution. 
Second, analyst loss reduces firms' incentives to establish and maintain internal 
environmental governance mechanisms (i.e., linking executive pay to environmental 
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goals and establishing sustainability committees). Lastly, firms after decreases in 
analyst coverage may face less environmental pressure from institutional investors, 
especially environmentally conscious investors. 
My results highlight the pivotal monitoring role financial analysts play in 
restraining environmentally harmful behaviors (i.e., toxic pollution). As well-trained 
professionals with industry-specific knowledge, financial analysts can directly 
monitor and influence corporate environmental policies by collecting information 
through both public and private channels (e.g., tracking corporate disclosures and 
corporate site visits) and raise their concerns in corporate conference calls. In addition, 
analysts can also play an indirect monitoring role by disseminating information to 
capital markets through media and research reports, which reduce the monitoring 
costs for other stakeholders (i.e., institutional investors). The absence of analyst 
monitoring (an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage) may induce managers to 
increase corporate pollution. Overall, my evidence uncovers a bright side of financial 
analysts in reducing corporate pollution and suggests external oversight (i.e., analyst 








Figure 1-1. Differences in analyst coverage between treatment and control 
firms 
This figure shows the mean difference in analyst coverage (the number of analysts covering a firm) 
between treatment and control firms (treatment-control) three years before (t-3) and after (t+3) 
brokerage exits. Control firms are matched by total assets, the book to market ratio, return on assets 















Figure 1-2. Differences in total pollution between treatment and control firms 
This figure shows the mean difference in total pollution (the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
pollution) between treatment and control firms (treatment-control) three years before (t-3) and after 
(t+3) brokerage exits. Control firms are matched by total assets, the book to market ratio, return on 

















Figure 1-3. Distribution of EPA regional offices 
This figure shows the distribution of EPA regional offices across the U.S. The EPA owns 10 regional 
offices (named EPA region 1 to 10). Each regional office is responsible for several neighboring states 
and monitors the plant operations in these states.  
 






Table 1-1. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for treated and control firms. The sample consists of 1,212 firm-
year observations (606 treatment and control firm-year observations) from 1999 to 2011. Panel A 
presents summary statistics of the matched sample. Panel B reports means and t-tests for differences 
between treated and control firms in the pre-event year (t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1-
A1. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics (matched sample) 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th 75th 
Pollution variables        
Total Pollution (1000s) 1,212  2262.770  64.033 22538.130 8.451 464.547 
On-site Pollution (1000s) 1,212 2086.881 41.868 22444.550 2.553 314.087 
Off-site pollution (1000s) 1,212 175.889  1.930 1152.640 0.000 41.485 
Air pollution (1000s) 1,212 738.782 31.681 2235.939  2.262 244.257 
Water pollution (1000s) 1,212 174.215  0.000 1409.633 0.000 0.677 
Ground pollution (1000s) 1,212  1173.884 0.000 22103.92 0.000 0.021 
Log(total) 1,212 10.709 11.067 3.493 9.042 13.049 
Log(on-site) 1,212 9.920 10.642 4.097 7.845 12.657 
Log(off-site) 1,212 6.484 7.566 4.889 0.000 10.633 
Log(air) 1,212 9.606 10.363 4.082 7.724 12.406 
Log(water) 1,212 3.401 0.000 4.629 0.000 6.519 
Log(ground) 1,212 2.436 0.000 4.502 0.000 3.092 
Log(total/sales) 1,212 -10.867 -10.358 3.156 -12.415 -8.782 
Log(on-site/sales) 1,212 -11.656 -10.940 3.727 -13.452 -9.162 
Log(off-site/sales) 1,212 -15.092 -14.113 4.478 -19.891 -11.412 
Log(air/sales) 1,212 -11.970 -11.114 3.711 -13.638 -9.351 
Log(water/sales) 1,212 -18.175 -19.788 4.129 -21.097 -16.184 
Log(ground/sales) 1,212 -19.140 -20.757 4.415 -21.643 -18.230 
       
Firm characteristics        
Firm size 1,212 7.784 7.621 1.482 6.763 8.537 
ROA 1,212 0.036 0.045 0.082 0.009 0.074 
Book to Market  1,212 0.492 0.456 0.528 0.279 0.693 
Tangibility 1,212 0.281 0.249 0.152 0.164 0.366 
Book leverage 1,212 0.277 0.265 0.171 0.165 0.373 
R&D ratio 1,212 0.024 0.016 0.032 0.000 0.030 
Dividend ratio 1,212 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.019 
Cash ratio 1,212 0.087 0.052 0.099 0.020 0.115 
Analyst coverage 1,212 6.868 5.250 6.410 2.083 9.458 
Panel B. Difference in means in t-1 between treated and control firms 
Variable Mean (Treated) Mean (Control) Diff. P-value 
Firm characteristics     
Firm size 7.700 7.761 -0.061 0.615 
ROA 0.050 0.049 0.000 0.956 
Book to Market  0.469 0.454 0.015 0.667 
Tangibility 0.291 0.273 0.017 0.154 
Book leverage 0.278 0.279 0.000 0.988 
R&D ratio 0.026 0.022 0.004 0.160 
Dividend ratio 0.013 0.014 -0.001 0.519 







Table 1-2. Decreases in analyst coverage and corporate pollution 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
corporate pollution. The sample consists of 1,212 firm-year observations (606 treatment and control 
firm-year observations) from 1999 to 2011. The dependent variable is Log(total) in Columns (1) to (3) 
and Log(total/sales) in Columns (4) to (6). Log(total) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount 
of total pollution. Log(total/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales-adjusted total 
pollution. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous 
decrease in analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Log(total)  Log(total/sales) 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment*After 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.361***  0.458*** 0.462*** 0.397*** 
 
(2.86) (2.79) (2.60)  (2.91) (2.92) (2.82) 
After -0.290 -0.295 -0.125  -0.311* -0.305 -0.143 
 (-1.58) (-1.59) (-0.73)  (-1.67) (-1.63) (-0.81) 
Firm size 
 
0.479** 0.581**   -0.175 -0.161 
  
(2.32) (2.41)   (-0.84) (-0.64) 
ROA 
 
0.364 0.344   -0.272 -0.140 
  
(0.39) (0.41)   (-0.30) (-0.17) 
Book to Market 
 
-0.002 -0.050   0.046 -0.024 
  
(-0.02) (-0.33)   (0.42) (-0.16) 
Tangibility  0.914 0.906   0.547 -0.057 
  (0.76) (0.63)   (0.46) (-0.04) 
Book leverage  0.740 1.612*   0.813 1.771** 
  (1.02) (1.84)   (1.11) (1.99) 
R&D ratio  2.969 2.787   1.030 0.691 
  (0.41) (0.34)   (0.14) (0.08) 
Dividend ratio  7.260 4.063   4.929 1.770 
  (1.10) (0.66)   (0.74) (0.28) 
Cash ratio  0.060 -0.273   0.347 -0.082 
  (0.06) (-0.20)   (0.35) (-0.06) 
Industry-Year FE No No Yes  No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No 
N 1,212 1,212 1,212  1,212 1,212 1,212 






Table 1-3. Robustness tests 
This table reports various robustness tests for my baseline DiD regression. Panel A uses different estimation windows. Panel B shows results with alternative matching criteria. 
Panel C excludes brokerage exits that occurred during the financial crisis or the internet bubble. Panel D excludes observations in 2001 and 2002 due to large decreases in pollution. 
Panel E retains observations only for their first treatment (if treated more than once). The dependent variable is Log(total) in Columns (1) to (3) and Log(total/sales) in Columns 
(4) to (6). Log(total) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total pollution. Log(total/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales-adjusted total 
pollution. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). For brevity, only the coefficients of interaction terms Treatment*After are 
reported. All variables are defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Log(total)  Log(total/sales)  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Different DiD estimation windows        
(1) t-2 to t+2 years 0.377** 0.371** 0.294**  0.356** 0.368** 0.308** 
 (2.25) (2.27) (2.09)  (2.16) (2.26) (2.17) 
(2) t-3 to t+3 years 0.353** 0.336* 0.271*  0.300* 0.325* 0.280* 
 (2.01) (1.94) (1.75)  (1.74) (1.89) (1.81) 
Panel B: Alternative matching criteria        
(3) Unmatched sample 0.248*** 0.242*** 0.295***  0.238*** 0.250*** 0.303*** 
 (3.70) (3.65) (4.36)  (3.60) (3.84) (4.51) 
(4) Firm size only 0.337** 0.321** 0.420***  0.344** 0.371** 0.466***  
(2.01) (2.02) (3.04)  (2.05) (2.30) (3.34) 
(5) Firm size/ROA/Book-to-Market/Tangibility 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.361***  0.458*** 0.462*** 0.397***  
(2.86) (2.79) (2.60)  (2.91) (2.92) (2.82) 
(6) Firm size/ROA/Book-to-Market/Tangibility/R&D 0.383** 0.397** 0.436**  0.341** 0.401*** 0.456*** 
 (2.31) (2.52) (2.45)  (2.18) (2.62) (2.61) 
(7) Firm size/ROA/Book-to-Market/Tangibility/Return/Volatility 0.409** 0.441*** 0.560***  0.428*** 0.478*** 0.594*** 
 (2.44) (2.71) (3.20)  (2.66) (2.95) (3.38) 
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Panel C. Excluding brokerage exits in financial crises        
(8) Exclude events after 2008 0.459*** 0.445*** 0.371**  0.448*** 0.458*** 0.402*** 
 (2.89) (2.70) (2.51)  (2.83) (2.76) (2.66) 
(9) Exclude events in the 2001 and 2002 0.391** 0.355** 0.369**  0.387** 0.374** 0.408** 
 (2.18) (2.10) (2.28)  (2.19) (2.21) (2.49) 
Panel D. Excluding the period of rapid pollution decline        
(10) Exclude events in the 2000 and 2001 0.601*** 0.613*** 0.394**  0.640*** 0.647*** 0.436** 
 (2.90) (2.87) (2.30)  (3.12) (3.04) (2.52) 
Panel E. First treatment        
(11)  Retain only firm-year obs. impacted by first exit  0.374** 0.369** 0.335**  0.382** 0.389** 0.370** 
 (2.34) (2.28) (2.10)  (2.39) (2.39) (2.31) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE No No Yes  No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 







Table 1-4. Decreases in analyst coverage and EPA enforcements 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
EPA enforcement. The dependent variable Log(total enforcement) is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the total number of EPA enforcements (non-judicial + judicial) in Columns (1) and (2). Log(non-JDC) 
is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of non-judicial cases in Columns (3) and (4), while 
Log(JDC) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of judicial cases in Columns (5) and (6). I 
use EPA cases for two years before (t-2) and after (t+2) brokerage exits as the investigation and 
settlements of EPA enforcements require time. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 0 
otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+2) brokerage exits and 0 for the 
year before (t-2). For brevity, control variables are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix 
1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and 
∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Log(total enforcement)  Log(non-JDC)  Log(JDC)  
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
Treatment*After 0.077** 0.073*  0.094** 0.089**  -0.014 -0.014   
(2.02) (1.96)  (2.54) (2.48)  (-0.90) (-0.93)  
After -0.052 -0.051  -0.052 -0.051  -0.010 -0.009  
 
(-1.07) (-1.07)  (-1.23) (-1.23)  (-0.44) (-0.38)  
Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
N 1,112 1,112  1,112 1,112  1,112 1,112  








Table 1-5. Cross-sectional analysis: Initial analyst coverage 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
corporate pollution conditional on initial analyst coverage. The sample is divided into two subsamples 
(low and high initial analyst coverage). Treated firms are partitioned into the low (Columns (1) and (2)) 
initial analyst coverage subsample if initial analyst coverage is in the bottom tercile for treated firms in 
the year prior to brokerage exits (t-1). Treated firms are partitioned into the high (Columns (3) and (4)) 
initial analyst coverage subsample if initial analyst coverage is in the top tercile for treated firms in the 
year prior to brokerage exits (t-1). The dependent variable is Log(total) in Columns (1) and (3) and 
Log(total/sales) in Columns (2) and (4). Log(total) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of 
total pollution. Log(total/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales-adjusted total 
pollution. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous 
decrease in analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Low initial coverage  High initial coverage  
 
Log(total) Log(total/sales)  Log(total) Log(total/sales) 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment*After 0.669** 0.680**  0.338 0.409*  
(2.05) (2.10)  (1.55) (1.89) 
After -0.662* -0.686**  -0.115 -0.122 
 
(-1.94) (-2.02)  (-0.39) (-0.42) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 392 392  420 420 
R-sq 0.168 0.190  0.327 0.374 
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Table 1-6. Cross-sectional analysis: Corporate governance 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on corporate pollution conditional on the firms’ corporate governance. The 
sample is divided into two subsamples (poor and good corporate governance) based on product market competition and the E-index. Treated firms are partitioned into the low 
(Columns (1) and (2)) product market competition subsample if the product market fluidity is higher than the median value for treated firms in the year prior to brokerage exits (t-
1). Treated firms are partitioned into the high (Columns (3) and (4)) product market competition subsample if the product market fluidity is lower than the median value for treated 
firms in the year prior to brokerage exits (t-1). Treated firms are partitioned into the high (Columns (5) and (6)) managerial entrenchment subsample if the E-index is higher than 
the median value for treated firms in the year prior to brokerage exits (t-1). Treated firms are partitioned into the low (Columns (7) and (8)) managerial entrenchment subsample if 
the E-index is lower than the median value for treated firms in the year prior to brokerage exits (t-1). The dependent variable is Log(total) in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) and 
Log(total/sales) in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Log(total) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total pollution. Log(total/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the amount of sales-adjusted total pollution. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result of 
brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 
1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Low competition  High competition  High E-index  Low E-index 
 Log(total) Log 
(total/sales) 
 Log(total) Log 
(total/sales) 
 Log(total) Log 
(total/sales) 
 Log(total) Log 
(total/sales)  
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Treatment*After 0.664** 0.672**  0.217 0.251  0.526** 0.537**  0.178 0.205  
(2.50) (2.53)  (1.38) (1.58)  (2.54) (2.58)  (0.99) (1.13) 
After -0.519* -0.511*  -0.087 -0.104  -0.177 -0.159  -0.123 -0.171 
 
(-1.71) (-1.68)  (-0.41) (-0.48)  (-0.77) (-0.68)  (-0.53) (-0.73) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 580 580  596 596  552 552  320 320 







Table 1-7. Cross-sectional analysis: Regulatory monitoring 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
corporate pollution conditional on the intensity of regulatory monitoring. The sample is divided into 
two subsamples (low and high regulatory scrutiny) based on the average physical distance from the 
firm’s plants to the regional EPA office that supervises it. Treated firms are partitioned into the long 
distance (Columns (1) and (2)) subsample if the average firm level distance of plant-EPA pairs is higher 
than the median value for treated firms in the year prior to brokerage exits (t-1). Treated firms are 
partitioned into the short distance (Columns (3) and (4)) subsample if the average firm level distance 
of plant-EPA pairs is lower than the median value for treated firms in the year prior to brokerage exits 
(t-1). The dependent variable is Log(total) in Columns (1) and (2) and Log(total/sales) in Columns (3) 
and (4). Log(total) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total pollution. Log(total/sales) is 
the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales-adjusted total pollution. Treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result 
of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) 
brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  Long distance  Short distance 
 
 Log(total) Log(total/sales)  Log(total) Log(total/sales) 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment*After  0.553** 0.565***  0.300 0.322  
 (2.58) (2.62)  (1.49) (1.62) 
After  -0.570*** -0.556**  -0.415 -0.447* 
 
 (-2.62) (-2.51)  (-1.60) (-1.72) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N  608 608  604 604 







Table 1-8. Cross-sectional analysis: State stakeholder orientation laws 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
corporate pollution conditional on the passage of state stakeholder orientation laws. My sample is 
divided into two subsamples (“No Law” and “Has Law”) based on if a firm is incorporated in a state 
that has passed the stakeholder orientation law. As of 2011 (the end of my sample period), 34 states 
have adopted stakeholder orientation laws. With the exception of the state of Texas, the stakeholder 
orientation laws were passed prior to 1999 (the start of my sample period). Therefore, I drop firms that 
are incorporated in Texas (passed the law in 2006). Treated firms are partitioned into the “No Law” 
(Columns (1) and (2)) subsample if they are incorporated in states that have not passed stakeholder 
orientation laws. Treated firms are partitioned into the “Has Law” (Columns (3) and (4)) subsample if 
they are incorporated in states that have passed stakeholder orientation laws. The dependent variable 
is Log(total) in Columns (1) and (2) and Log(total/sales) in Columns (3) and (4). Log(total) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the amount of total pollution. Log(total/sales) is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the amount of sales-adjusted total pollution. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 
0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for 
the year before (t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
 No Law  Has Law 
 
Log(total) Log(total/sales)  Log(total) Log(total/sales) 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment*After 0.536** 0.581***  0.237 0.197  
(2.49) (2.72)  (1.32) (1.05) 
After -0.390* -0.415*  -0.049 -0.025 
 
(-1.66) (-1.77)  (-0.15) (-0.07) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 846 846  360 360 









Table 1-9. Channels: Investments in pollution abatement 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
investments in pollution abatement technologies and processes. The dependent variable is 
Log(environmental expenditure) in Columns (1) and (2) and Log(green patents-2,+2) in Columns (3) 
and (4). Log(environmental expenditure) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of 
environmental expenditures on pollution abatement. Log(green patents) is the natural logarithm of the 
number of green patents. I use green patents for two years before (t-2) and after (t+2) brokerage exits 
as there is a time lag between initial investments in green technology and innovation outputs. Treatment 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage 
as a result of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after 
(t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1-A1. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Log(environmental expenditure)  Log(green patents-2,+2)  
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment*After -0.373* -0.347*  -0.121* -0.122*  
(-1.80) (-1.69)  (-1.88) (-1.88) 
After 0.238 0.224  0.024 0.008 
 
(1.06) (1.03)  (0.30) (0.11) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 1,212 1,212  1,112 1,112 








Table 1-10. Channels: Compensation contracts and sustainability committees 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
managerial compensation contracts and the presence of a sustainability committee. Probit models are 
used in this estimation. The dependent variable is Environmental compensation in Column (1) and 
Sustainability committee-2,+2 in Column (2). Environmental compensation is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if firms set environmental targets in the executives’ performance-based compensation and 0 
otherwise. Sustainability committee is an indicator variable which equals 1 if firms have a specialized 
sustainability committee and 0 otherwise. I use the presence of sustainability committees for two years 
before (t-2) and after (t+2) brokerage exits as there is a time lag as committees require time to be formed. 
Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in 
analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 
1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Probit model Environmental compensation  Sustainability committee-2,+2  
(1)  (2) 
Treatment*After -0.576*  -0.778**  
(-1.87)  (-2.45) 
After 1.063*  0.955*** 
 
(1.90)  (2.70) 
Treatment 2.117***  1.398*** 
 
(5.14)  (3.40) 
Controls Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
N 213  406 


















Table 1-11. Channels: Institutional ownership 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
institutional ownership. The dependent variable is the % of equity a firm owned by: institutional 
investors (IO) in Columns (1) and (2); quasi-indexers (Quasi-indexers) in Columns (3) and (4), and; 
public pension funds (Public pension funds) in Columns (5) and (6). IO is the percentage of shares held 
by intuitional investors. Quasi-indexers is defined following Bushee (2001) and is calculated as the 
percentage of shares held by quasi-indexers. Public pension funds is defined following Bushee (2001) 
and is calculated as the percentage of shares held by public pension funds. Treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm has experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result 
of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) 
brokerage exits and 0 for the year before (t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 IO  Quasi-indexers  Public pension funds 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Treatment*After -0.024* -0.022*  -0.039*** -0.036***  -0.003** -0.003**  
(-1.97) (-1.74)  (-2.96) (-2.67)  (-2.30) (-2.28) 
After 0.047*** 0.044***  0.047*** 0.043***  0.001 0.001 
 
(3.83) (3.56)  (3.67) (3.43)  (1.23) (1.09) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 848 848  848 848  848 848 















Appendix 1-A1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Pollution variables 
 
Total pollution  Total quantity of on- and off-site toxic emission at the firm 
level 
TRI 
On-site pollution Total quantity of toxic pollution released onsite into the air, 
water, and ground at the firm level 
TRI 
Off-site pollution Total quantity of toxic release transferred to off-site 
locations for further release or disposal at the firm level 
TRI 
Air pollution Total quantity of onsite stack emissions and on-site fugitive 
emissions at the firm level 
TRI 
Water pollution Total quantity of toxic pollution released on-site as surface 
water discharges at the firm level 
TRI 
Ground pollution Total quantity of toxic pollution released to on-site grounds 
at the firm level 
TRI 
   
Log(total) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the total pollution  TRI 
Log(on-site) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the on-site pollution TRI 
Log(off-site) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the off-site pollution TRI 
Log(air) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the air pollution TRI 
Log(water) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the water pollution TRI 
Log(ground) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the ground pollution TRI 
Log(total/sales) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the sales adjusted total 
pollution (total pollution/sales) 
TRI 
Log(on-site/sales) Natural logarithm of (one plus) on-site pollution scaled by 
sales 
TRI 
Log(off-site/sales) Natural logarithm of (one plus) off-site pollution scaled by 
sales 
TRI 
Log(air/sales) Natural logarithm of (one plus) air pollution scaled by sales TRI 
Log(water/sales) Natural logarithm of (one plus) water pollution scaled by 
sales 
TRI 





Natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of EPA 
enforcement cases) at the firm level 
ICIS FE&C 
Log(non-JDC)  Natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of non-judicial 
cases at the firm level 
ICIS FE&C 
Log(JDC) Natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of judicial cases 
at the firm level 
ICIS FE&C 
   
Firm characteristics  
 
Firm size Natural logarithm of (one plus) total assets Compustat 
ROA Operating income divided by total assets Compustat 
Book to Market  Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity Compustat 
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets Compustat 
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Book leverage The sum of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by 
the total assets 
Compustat 
R&D ratio Research and development expenses divided by total assets.  Compustat 
Dividend ratio The sum of common dividends and preferred dividends 
divided by total assets 
Compustat 
Cash ratio Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets Compustat 
   
Cross-sectional analysis  
Analyst coverage Arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly numbers of earnings 
forecasts over the fiscal year 
I/B/E/S 
Fluidity Fluidity is defined as the dot product between the words used 
in a firm’s product description and the change in the words 
used by its competitors. As the words used by competitors 
become more similar to the firm’s description, fluidity 
increases, which indicates a higher similarity between the 
products of the firm and its competitors.  
Hoberg et al. 
(2014) 
E-index The sum of six anti-takeover provisions introduced by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
IRRC 
Average distance  Average geographic distance between plants owned by a 
firm and the EPA regional offices at the firm level using the 
formula of Coval and Moskowitz’s (1999) 
TRI 
   
Channels analysis  
Institutional 
ownership (IO) 
Fraction of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors Thomson 
Reuters 13-F 
Quasi-indexers Fraction of a firm’s shares held by quasi-indexers (defined 





Fraction of a firm’s shares held by public pension funds 





Natural logarithm of (one plus the amount of a firm’s 








Indicator variable that equals one if firms set environmental 
performance-based compensation contracts for any named-




Indicator variable equals one if firms have a sustainability 








Appendix 1-A2. Decreases in analyst coverage and sub-categories of corporate 
pollution 
This table reports the results of the DiD regression on the effects of decreases in analyst coverage on 
sub-categories of pollution. The sample consists of 1,212 firm-year observations (606 treatment and 
control firm-year observations) from 1999 to 2011. Panel A investigates the decreases in analyst 
coverage on firms’ on-site and off-site pollution. On-site pollution is the quantity of toxic chemicals 
released into the air, water, and ground on-site at the plant. Off-site pollution is the quantity of toxic 
release transferred to off-site locations for further release or disposal at specialized waste management 
facilities. Log(on-site) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of on-site pollution. Log(on-
site/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales adjusted on-site pollution. Log(off-
site) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of off-site pollution. Log(off-site/sales) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales adjusted off-site pollution.  Panel B splits on-site 
pollution into air, water, and ground pollution. Air pollution is the total quantity of on-site stack 
emissions and on-site fugitive emissions. Water pollution is the total quantity of toxic pollutions 
released on-site as surface water discharges. Ground pollution is the total quantity of toxic pollution 
released on-site on grounds. Log(air) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of air pollution. 
Log(air/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of sales adjusted air pollution. Log(water) 
is the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of water pollution. Log(water/sales) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the amount of sales adjusted water pollution. Log(ground) is the natural logarithm 
of one plus the amount of ground pollution. Log(ground/sales) is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
amount of sales adjusted ground pollution. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has 
experienced an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage as a result of brokerage exits and 0 otherwise. 
After is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year after (t+1) brokerage exits and 0 for the year before 
(t-1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1-A1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-
values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Impact of an exogenous drop in analyst Coverage on on-site pollution and 
off-site pollution 
 On-site pollution  Off-site pollution   
Log(on-site) Log(on-site/sales)  Log(off-site) Log(off-site/sales)   
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Treatment*After 0.470*** 0.489***  0.278 0.297   
(2.67) (2.79)  (1.31) (1.39)  
After -0.243 -0.252  -0.259 -0.268   
(-1.23) (-1.27)  (-1.24) (-1.28)  
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
N 1,212 1,212  1,212 1,212  
R-sq 0.191 0.271  0.080 0.068  
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Panel B. Impact of an exogenous drop in analyst Coverage on air, water, and ground pollution 
 Air pollution  Water pollution  Ground pollution  
Log(air) Log (air/sale)  Log(water) Log (water/sales)  Log (ground) Log (ground/sales)  
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Treatment*After 0.402** 0.421***  -0.076 -0.057  -0.021 -0.002  
(2.52) (2.65)  (-0.54) (-0.40)  (-0.10) (-0.01) 
After -0.189 -0.199  0.030 0.020  -0.389 -0.399  
(-1.05) (-1.10)  (0.31) (0.20)  (-1.57) (-1.62) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 1,212 1,212  1,212 1,212  1,212 1,212 
R-sq 0.200 0.284  0.070 0.161  0.054 0.088 
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2 Gender, Workplace Preferences, and Firm Performance: 
Looking Through the Glass Door 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Over recent years, gender differences in the labor market have attracted the 
attention of many scholars (e.g., Adams and Funk, 2012; Tate and Yang, 2015; Adams 
and Kirchmaier, 2016; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Zandberg, 
2021). While the gender gap has been significantly narrowed in various aspects such 
as the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2017), female labor force participation (Blau 
and Kahn, 2007), and gender leadership gap (Field et al., 2020), gender differences in 
female’s choices and preferences are persisted (Bertrand et al., 2010; Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2009; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). In this chapter, I 
explore the gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace preferences, and the 
financial implications of the gender satisfaction gap at work using 96,983 Glassdoor 
employer reviews from 2,301 U.S. public firms between 2008 and 2015.  
Glassdoor is an employer review and online recruitment platform where 
employees can anonymously review their companies, interview experience, 
compensation and benefits, and other workplace practices. Each company review 
includes the rating of employee overall satisfaction, as well as other workplace 
attributes such as career opportunity, compensation and benefits, work-life balance, 
senior leadership, and corporate culture. In addition, Glassdoor also provides a rich 
set of information about employee characteristics including employee gender, highest 
education level, job title, and age. Such information enables this chapter to examine 
the dynamics of gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace attribute 
preferences, and investigate whether these differences matter for firm performance.  
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I start with the gender gap in job satisfaction.  I find, on average, female 
employees are less satisfied at work than male employees. Specifically, females have 
a significantly lower rating on overall satisfaction and most workplace attributes and 
the workplace attribute with the highest gender satisfaction gap is work-life balance. 
Moreover, I explore gender differences in workplace preferences, where the greater 
sensitivity of the overall job satisfaction rating to each of the workplace attributes 
indicates higher preferences. The results indicate that females, relative to males, care 
more about work-life balance, senior leadership, and corporate culture, while they 
care less about career opportunity and compensation benefits. Again, the largest 
gender difference in workplace preference is in work-life balance, suggesting the 
balance between work and personal life contributes most to the gender satisfaction 
gap at work. This evidence is consistent with prior studies that females demand and 
value the flexibility at work more than males do (e.g., Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall 
and Zafar, 2018). 
The workplace preference in work-life balance reflects the career-family 
conflict female employees face. While females have made remarkable progress in the 
labor market over recent decades (Blau and Kahn, 2006; Blau and Kahn, 2007; Blau 
and Kahn, 2017), they remain the main providers of family commitments (e.g., 
household production and childcare). Such conflict increases their difficulty in 
balancing work and family life and influences their career path selection, especially 
when having children (Bertrand et al., 2010; Mas and Pallais, 2017). To further 
explore the role of selection in female career development, I compare gender gaps in 
workplace preferences between rank-and-file employees and mid-level managers. It 
is worth noting that the work-life balance is the only dimension along which the 
manager gender gap significantly differs from the employee gender gap. Among rank-
and-file employees, females significantly care more about work-life balance than 
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males, while this gender gap appears to vanish when becoming a mid-level manager. 
This evidence indicates females do not care more about work-life balance than males 
at the manager level, suggesting the crucial role work-life balance plays in females’ 
career progression. Given their dual roles in the home and the labor market, females 
are less likely to choose a career path to the managerial position when they have to 
sacrifice work-life balance to be promoted. 
Having established the gender gap in job satisfaction, I then examine whether 
this gap matters for firm performance. Given the crucial role work-life balance plays 
in the gender satisfaction gap at work, I focus on the financial implications of the 
gender gap in work-life balance in this section.44 Specifically, I calculate the gender 
gap as the difference between the average work-life balance rating of male and female 
employees for each firm-year observation. The lower gender satisfaction gap in work-
life balance represents a more family-friendly workplace. A family-friendly 
orientation helps create a more positive work environment that improves employee 
morale and productivity, leading to a higher firm valuation (Bloom et al., 2011). 
Indeed, I show that firms with lower gender gaps in work-life balance have higher 
firm value. This finding is robust to controls for employee average satisfaction (Green 
et al., 2019) and “100 Best Companies to Work for” (Edmans, 2011). Moreover, I 
examine the underlying mechanism of this gender gap-firm value relation. Firms with 
low gender satisfaction gaps exhibit superior operating performance and higher labor 
productivity, consistent with the view that family-friendly workplaces are beneficial 
for firm valuation through employee productivity.  
 
44 As a robustness test, I calculate the gender satisfaction gap using overall rating. The results are shown 
in Appendix 2-A8 and my findings are largely similar.  
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To better understand the relation between the gender satisfaction gap and firm 
valuation, I conduct several cross-sectional tests on how the value implications vary 
across different industries and different types of firms. First, I examine whether some 
industries benefit more from workplace family-friendliness. If family-friendly 
workplaces can indeed improve firm value, the results should be more pronounced in 
industries relying more on female employees. Consistent with this conjecture, I find 
the negative effect of the gender satisfaction gap on firm value is stronger in industries 
with a higher female proportion. Second, I investigate whether corporate governance 
can affect the relation between the gender gap and firm value. I find that this relation 
is mainly driven by firms with stronger corporate governance proxied by blockholder 
ownership, product market competition, and co-opted directors. Third, I find the 
estimation results are only significant in financially unconstrained firms, suggesting 
firms subject to financing difficulties are less likely to benefit from family-friendly 
policies.  
Finally, I investigate whether the information in the gender satisfaction gap at 
work is fully incorporated into stock prices by capital markets. In particular, my 
analysis uncovers a significant negative relation between the gender gap in work-life 
balance and stock returns. For instance, equal-weighted portfolios consisting of firms 
with the lowest gender gap (bottom quintile) outperform firms with the highest gender 
gap (top quintile) by a four-factor alpha of 0.89% per month. The magnitude of this 
estimate is similar to that reported by Green et al. (2019).45 This finding is robust to 
controlling for a range of firm characteristics and “100 Best Companies to Work for” 
(Edmans, 2011) using the Fama-MacBeth regressions.  
 
45 Using the change in overall employer rating from Glassdoor, Green et al. (2019) report a 0.88% per 
month alpha estimate for the long-short portfolio that buy firms with improving rating and sell firms 
with declining rating.   
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This chapter contributes to at least two strands of literature. First, this chapter 
adds to the literature on gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace 
preferences. I document that females are less satisfied at work than males, largely due 
to their preferences for work-life balance. This finding is consistent with Mas and 
Pallais (2017) and Wiswall and Zafar (2018) that females value work flexibility more 
than males. Moreover, I find this workplace preference in work-life balance vanishes 
among mid-level managers, illustrating the role of selection. Since females remain the 
main providers of family commitments, female employees are less likely to choose a 
career path to the managerial position if they care about work-life balance. This result 
complements the evidence of Adams and Funk (2012) that female directors in less 
family-friendly workplaces are less likely to be married and have fewer children.  
Second, this chapter contributes to the literature on the relation between 
employee satisfaction and firm performance. Human capital plays an increasingly 
important role in the modern company (Edmans, 2011) and employees are regarded 
as a key ingredient of the human capital that can create substantial value for companies 
through building client relationships or inventing new products and patents (Maslow, 
1943; McGregor, 1960; Becker and Gerhart, 1996). Accordingly, maintaining 
employee satisfaction can effectively improve employee morale and productivity, 
leading to higher firm value.  Consistent with this view, Edmans (2011) finds the 
portfolio with firms in the list of “100 Best Companies to Work For in America” can 
earn a positive abnormal return. Using Glassdoor employer reviews, Green et al. 
(2019) suggest a positive effect of the change in employee overall satisfaction on stock 
returns, while Hales et al. (2018) and Sheng (2019) find employees’ assessment on 
company business outlook can predict future performance. To the best of my 
knowledge, this chapter is the first study to examine the value implications of the 
gender satisfaction gap at work. I show that family-friendly workplaces with smaller 
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gender satisfaction gaps are associated with a higher firm valuation after controlling 
for employee overall satisfaction. Moreover, this chapter explores how this gender 
gap-firm value relation varies across different industries and firms. I find firms in 
industries relying more on female employees, with stronger corporate governance, 
and with less financial constraints may benefit more from workplace family-
friendliness than others.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes 
the Glassdoor data, sample construction, and descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 
presents the results about gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace 
preference. Section 2.4 explores the value implications of the gender satisfaction gap. 
Section 2.5 concludes this chapter.  
2.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
2.2.1 Glassdoor data 
I obtain employee reviews from Glassdoor to measure employee satisfaction. 
Glassdoor (www.glassdoor.com) is one of the largest online review and recruiting 
platforms with 60 million monthly visits that launched in 2008.46 As of 2015, the 
platform contains approximately three million reviews from 280,000 firms (including 
public and private firms) covering the majority of U.S. public firms. In Glassdoor, 
employees can anonymously review their companies, interview experience, 
compensation and benefits, and other workplace practices. From each employer 
review, I extract one-to-five point employees’ overall rating (Overall rating), as well 
as the assessments of various workplace attributes regarding career opportunities 
(Career), compensation benefits (Compensation), work-life balance (Work-life), 
senior leadership (Leadership), and corporate culture (Culture), ranging from 1 (least 
 
46 Source: https://www.glassdoor.com/about-us/ 
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satisfied) to 5 (most satisfied). In addition, such a review also provides information of 
employee characteristics, including employee gender (Female), the highest education 
level (Education), age (Age), and job title (Manager). Female is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the review is posted by a female, and zero otherwise. Age is the 
employee’s age in years. Education is the employee’s highest education level, coded 
as 0 for employees who do not own a bachelor or higher degree, 1 for bachelor’s, 2 
for master’s and MBA, 3 for PhD. Manager is an indicator variable that equals to one 
if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. Details of the 
Glassdoor variables are presented in Appendix 2-A1. 
To ensure data quality, Glassdoor implements various requirements for 
employee reviews. First, a priority concern when using online reviews is the sample 
selection bias, that is, the extremely satisfied or unsatisfied employees are more likely 
to post online reviews. For instance, the customer reviews from Amazon are a strongly 
skewed distribution with a large proportion of 5-star and 1-star ratings. To alleviate 
this concern, the Glassdoor platform employs a “give-to-get” model to attract more 
neutral and balanced reviews. The model is such that new users can only access 
limited information in Glassdoor until they make a contribution such as posting a 
“company review”. In this way, Glassdoor induces more employees who hold 
moderate opinions to evaluate their employer and workplace practices, which in turn 
mitigates the self-selection concern. In addition, Liu et al. (2017) compare the 
Glassdoor data to nationally representative data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau 
and show that the Glassdoor wage distribution matches that of the Census Bureau 
wage distribution for major metropolitan areas and industries. This suggests that non-
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random selection into the site is unlikely to be a severe threat to the validity of the 
results.47  
Second, Glassdoor adopts tight scrutiny for submitted reviews. To distinguish 
the authenticity of reviews, Glassdoor requires that each review must be submitted 
through an active email address or valid social media account. Moreover, Glassdoor 
uses proprietary technology filters and algorithm programs to detect multiple reviews 
from the same IP address. In addition, platform editors are responsible for the scrutiny 
and removal of inappropriate content or fake news. 48  Finally, these successfully 
posted reviews will be censored by users. To maintain the integrity of reviews, 
Glassdoor encourages users to flag the review with inappropriate content. Such 
reviews will be deleted after the verification by Glassdoor.  
Third, the community guidelines of Glassdoor claim “Glassdoor strives to be 
the most trusted and transparent place for today's candidate to search for jobs and 
research companies”. It assures users that Glassdoor never deletes, revises, or 
selectively discloses the contents or ratings of company review once a review is in 
line with community guidelines. Furthermore, the company review is completely 
anonymous and prohibits any exact names, reducing the risk of reprisal and coercion.  
To further validate the quality of Glassdoor data, I empirically compare the 
Glassdoor rating with the KLD employee relation score and the list of “100 Best 
Companies to Work” which are two of the most widely used proxies for employee 
satisfaction.49 In untabulated analysis, I regress Glassdoor Overall rating on KLD 
 
47 As a robustness test, I replicate my results after excluding extreme reviews in Section 2.3.4. The 
results remain robust.  
48 Roughly 15% reviews are removed by editors in this process.   
49 The employee relation score is the difference between the number of employee relation strengths and 




employee relation score and “100 Best Companies to Work” separately and find both 
measures are positively associated with the contemporaneous rating, confirming the 
validity of Glassdoor rating in capturing employee satisfaction at work.  
2.2.2 Sample construction and summary statistics  
My sample begins with Glassdoor employee reviews for U.S. public firms 
from 2008 to 2015. To ensure the informativeness of the ratings, I first remove the 
reviews posted by “former” employees since the exact departure date of former 
employees is not presented in Glassdoor. 50  In addition to timeliness, the former 
employees, especially the dismissed employees, are more likely to post irrational 
reviews on their employer.51 Second, I drop reviews posted by senior managers (e.g., 
CEO, CFO, director, and executive) to mitigate the bias of potential self-promotion.52 
The remaining reviews are completed by either current rank-and-file employees or 
mid-level managers. Finally, I exclude incomplete reviews with at least one missing 
employee characteristic such as employee gender, education, age, and job title. In total, 
my sample consists of 96,983 reviews from 2,301 U.S. public firms.  
In Figure 2-1, I compare the overall satisfaction (Overall rating) of female and 
male employees across industries using the Fama-French 12-industry classification. 
It is apparent that employee overall satisfaction and gender satisfaction gap vary 
across industries. The Enrgy (Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products) and Chems 
(Chemicals and Allied Products) firms have the highest employee overall satisfaction, 
while the industries with relatively low employee satisfaction are Shops (Wholesale, 
 
50 Employees are required by Glassdoor to claim the employee status (current or previous employee) 
when they post a company review. 
51 Indeed, the ratings by former employees are substantially lower than those by current employees. In 
Section 2.3.4, I replicate my main finding after adding back former employee reviews and the results 
remain robust. 
52 More specifically, I remove the reviews with the job title that includes any of the following words: 
“President”, “CFO”, “CEO”, “Chairman”, “Director”, “Executives”, and “Head”.  
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Retail, and Some Services) and Telcm (Telephone and Television Transmission). 
Regarding the gender satisfaction gap (the difference in overall satisfaction between 
male and female employees), females are less satisfied with their job than males in 
most industries. Industries with the largest gender gaps are Hlth (Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs) and Money (Finance), whereas those with the smallest gender 
gaps are Telcm (Telephone and Television Transmission) and Chems (Chemicals and 
Allied Products), respectively.  
[Insert Figure 2-1 here] 
Next, I present the trend of female and male overall satisfaction across years 
in Figure 2-2. During the sample period, there is a downward trend in overall 
satisfaction for both male and female employees in the early years, while it rebounds 
after 2010. The initial decline trend may be driven by the recent financial crisis which 
leads both male and female employees to be under the threat of unemployment and to 
have more pessimistic expectations about their career prospects. As a robustness test, 
I regenerate my main results after excluding the reviews between 2008 and 2010. My 
results are not driven by this particular period.53  
[Insert Figure 2-2 here] 
I then present descriptive statistics for Glassdoor variables in Panel A of Table 
2-1. My final sample consists of 92,915 reviews from 2,163 U.S. public firms between 
2008 and 2015. The number of reviews in sub-category ratings is slightly lower than 
that in the overall rating because the filling of such reviews is not compulsory.54 The 
average Overall rating is 3.425, suggesting employees tend to post a generally 
positive opinion on the company. The mean values of other workplace attributes vary 
 
53 The details are shown in section 2.3.4 Robustness check.  
54 The number of reviews in Culture is substantially smaller than that in other ratings since this 
assessment is added by Glassdoor from 2012.  
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from 3.045 for Leadership to 3.522 for Culture. With respect to employee 
characteristics, 32.1% and 26.9% of the reviews are posted by female employees and 
mid-level managers respectively. The average education level in my sample is a 
bachelor’s degree and the average employee age is 33. 
[Insert Table 2-1 here] 
Panel B of Table 2-1 presents the correlation matrix across Glassdoor ratings. 
It is not surprising that overall rating is highly correlated with all sub-category ratings, 
with correlations ranging from 0.576 (Work-life) to 0.742 (Culture). The correlations 
among sub-category ratings vary from 0.387 (Work-life & Compensation) to 0.709 
(Culture & Leadership). These numbers are comparable to those reported in Huang 
et al. (2015) and Green et al. (2019).   
Then, I perform a univariate analysis to compare the differences in Glassdoor 
variables, stratified by female and male employees in Panel C of Table 2-1. I find 
females have substantially lower overall satisfaction (3.347) relative to males (3.461), 
leading to an unconditional gender satisfaction gap of 0.114. Female employees are 
also less satisfied with all other workplace practices. The largest gender satisfaction 
gap exists in the assessment of Work-life with 0.180 difference, suggesting female 
employees, relative to male employees, are subject to more challenges in the balance 
of career and family commitments. The rating with the smallest gap is Leadership 
with only 0.071 disparity. In terms of employee characteristics, female employees 
have the same age and a similar proportion of mid-level managers relative to male 
employees, while they are significantly less educated.  
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2.3 Gender Differences in Job Satisfaction and Workplace Preferences 
2.3.1 Gender gaps in employer ratings 
In this section, I investigate the gender satisfaction gaps at work using the 
following baseline regression: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2-1) 
Where i indexes individual, j indexes firm, and t indexes year. The dependent variable 
is employee job satisfaction measured by Overall rating and various other workplace 
practices related to Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture. The 
variable of interest is Female, an indicator variable that equals one if the review is 
posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. The vector Z denotes a set of 
employee characteristics such as Age, Education, and Manager. Age is the employee’s 
age in years. Education is the employee’s highest education level, coded as 0 for 
employees who do not own a bachelor or higher degree, 1 for bachelor’s, 2 for 
master’s and MBA, 3 for PhD. Manager is an indicator variable that equals to one if 
the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. 55  Details of 
Glassdoor variables are presented in Appendix 2-A1. I include firm-year fixed effects 
to account for any time-varying heterogeneity at the firm level correlated with 
workplace gender gaps.56 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Table 2-2 presents the estimation results. I begin my analysis by examining 
the gender gap in overall satisfaction in Column (1). The coefficient on Female is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, the average overall 
satisfaction of female employees is 0.039 points lower than that of male employees. 
The magnitude of the estimated gender satisfaction gap is much smaller as compared 
 
55 Employee is identified as a mid-level manager if his/her job title contains one of the following words: 
“manager”, “officer”, and “controller”.  
56 The results are not materially changed if I control for firm and year fixed effects separately.  
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to the unconditional differential (0.114) shown in Panel C of Table 2-1, implying 
about 66% of the unconditional differential can be accounted for by the set of control 
variables and time-varying heterogeneity at the firm level.  
[Insert Table 2-2 here] 
I then investigate which specific workplace practice females are least satisfied 
with versus males. In Columns (2) to (6), I examine the gender satisfaction gap in five 
sub-dimensions: career opportunity (Career), compensation benefit (Compensation), 
work-life balance (Work-life), senior leadership (Leadership), and culture value 
(Culture). Across all specifications, I find that the coefficient on Female remains 
negative and four of the five coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better. The 
only exception is Compensation in Column (4), which provides the “correct” sign 
while it is insignificant. It suggests the gender pay gap is limited at lower levels of the 
corporate hierarchy.57 In contrast, female employees are significantly less satisfied 
with career opportunity, work-life balance, and corporate culture. The magnitudes of 
coefficients for the regression of career opportunity (-0.032), senior leadership (-
0.028), and culture value (-0.038) are largely similar to that of the overall rating (-
0.038). It is worth noting that female employees are least satisfied with work-life 
balance as compared to male employees with 0.071 points gender gap which is about 
twice as large in magnitude as those for other workplace attributes, highlighting the 
important role work-life balance plays in the gender gap at work.  
2.3.2 Gender gaps in workplace preferences 
The above evidence suggests females, on average, are less satisfied at work 
than males, and the highest gender gap exists in the assessment of work-life balance. 
 
57 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2019), women earn 82% of men’s income on 
average. Despite the lower income relative to men, women have similar satisfaction with compensation, 
pointing to gender differences in preferences. 
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I then examine how female employees differ from their male counterparts in 
preferences for workplace attributes. I compare employee preferences for various 
workplace attributes by estimating the sensitivity of the overall job satisfaction to each 
of the subcategory ratings separately, with greater sensitivities indicating higher 
preferences. For example, if female employees care more about work-life balance than 
male employees, then females’ overall job satisfaction should be more sensitive to 
changes in work-life balance satisfaction. That is, a reduction (rise) in the work-life 
balance rating should lower (increase) females’ job overall satisfaction to a larger 
extent relative to that of males. Specifically, I use the following model to investigate 
the employee gender gap in workplace preferences: 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(2-2)  
Where i denotes individual, j denotes firm, and t denotes year. Overall is employee 
overall job satisfaction and Sub rating is one of five sub-category ratings including 
Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture. Female is an indicator 
variable that takes the value one if the reviewer is female, and zero otherwise. The 
variable of interest in this model is the interaction variable Sub rating×Female. The 
coefficient β3 identifies the gender satisfaction gap in workplace preference.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 2-3. Regressions for Columns (1) 
to (5) include the workplace attributes, Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, 
and Culture, respectively. 58  The results show significantly different workplace 
preferences between female and male employees. In Columns (1) and (2), the 
coefficients on Career × Female and Benefit × Female are negative and statistically 
 
58 As a robustness check, I examine how female and male employees value each attribute after taking 
other attributes into account in Appendix 2-A2. My findings are not materially changed.  
83 
 
significant, indicating female employees care less about career opportunities and 
compensation and benefits relative to male employees. In contrast, females care more 
about work-life balance, senior leadership, and corporate culture as shown by the 
positive and significant coefficients on interaction variables in Columns (3) to (5).  
[Insert Table 2-3 here] 
Again, the workplace attribute with the largest preference gap is Work-life 
(0.032), while the corresponding magnitudes are much smaller for other attributes. 
These findings are consistent with prior studies that females value the flexibility at 
work more than males do. Mas and Pallais (2017) find that females tend to select and 
place a higher valuation on more flexible work arrangements. In a similar vein, 
Wiswall and Zafar (2018) estimate the preferences of undergraduates for workplace 
attributes and indicate female undergraduates have a higher willingness to pay for 
work flexibility. My study complements this strand of literature by emphasizing the 
pertinence of work-life balance as the most important workplace attribute, responsible 
for gender gaps in job satisfaction and workplace preferences. 
2.3.3 Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers  
The previous sections suggest the work-life balance is the main contributor to 
the gender gap in job satisfaction and workplace preferences. The workplace 
preference in work-life balance reflects the career-family conflict female employees 
face. While females have made remarkable progress in the labor market over recent 
decades (Blau and Kahn, 2006; Blau and Kahn, 2007; Blau and Kahn, 2017), they 
remain the main providers of household production (Hersch and Stratton, 2002). Such 
conflict leads to difficulty in balancing their work and family life and is likely to 
influence the selection of a female’s career path, especially when having children 
(Bertrand et al., 2010; Mas and Pallais, 2017). For example, Bertrand et al. (2010) 
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find many qualified female employees choose to leave the job market after having 
children. To further explore the role of selection in female career development, I 
investigate whether the pattern of gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace 
preferences carries over in mid-level managers.  
I first compare the differences in gender satisfaction gaps between mid-level 
managers and rank-and-file employees by estimating the following model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(2-3) 
Where i denotes individual, j denotes firm, and t denotes year. Y stands for the overall 
and subcomponent ratings. Manager (Female) is an indicator variable that equals to 
one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager (female), and zero otherwise. The 
variable of interest is the interaction variable Female×Manager. The coefficient β3 
shows the difference in gender gap between the mid-level managers and rank-and-file 
employees.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 2-4. On average, managers are 
more satisfied with Overall rating, Career, Benefit, Leadership, and Culture than 
non-managerial employees. The only workplace attribute that managers are less 
satisfied with is Work-life. It is perhaps not surprising because the increasing 
additional tasks and responsibilities associated with managerial roles may crowd out 
the attention devoted to their life and family. It is worth noting that the coefficients on 
Female×Manager suggest that the position of mid-level manager widens the gender 
satisfaction gap in Work-life, which is offset by the reduced gender gaps in satisfaction 
regarding Career and Benefit, leading to an insignificant coefficient for the Overall 
rating in Column (1).  
[Insert Table 2-4 here] 
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Next, to further examine whether gender gaps in workplace preference for 
mid-level managers differ from those of rank-and-file employees, I employ a triple-
difference analysis as follows: 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑏 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡





Where i denotes individual, j denotes firm, and t denotes year. Overall is employee 
overall job satisfaction and Sub rating is one of five sub-category ratings including 
Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture. Manager (Female) is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager 
(female), and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest in this analysis is β7, which 
captures the difference of gender gap in workplace preferences between mid-level 
managers and rank-and-file employees.  
In Table 2-5, I find that while most of the gender gaps among rank-and-file 
employees continue to hold for managers, the gender preference for work-life balance 
is significantly changed. Specifically, among rank-and-file employees, females care 
more about work-life balance than males. However, this preference appears to vanish 
or even reverse at the manager level, as indicated by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the triple interaction term Work-life × Female × Manager 
in Column (3). This evidence indicates that the managerial position narrows the 
gender gap in the preference for work-life balance. In other words, females do not 
care more about work-life balance relative to males when becoming mid-level 
managers.  
[Insert Table 2-5 here] 
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This evidence suggests a particularly important role work-life balance plays 
in female career progression. Given their dual roles in the home and the labor market, 
females are less likely to choose a career path to the managerial position when they 
have to sacrifice work-life balance to be promoted. This finding echoes the view of 
Bertrand et al. (2010) and Adams and Funk (2012) that the selection cost of leadership 
career path is much higher for females.  
2.3.4 Robustness check  
In this section, I conduct a series of robustness tests to confirm the validity of 
my main results. First, in the previous analysis, I identify the employee highest 
education level as a single linear variable, coded as 0 for employees who do not own 
a bachelor or higher degree, 1 for bachelor’s, 2 for master’s and MBA, 3 for PhD. To 
account for the potential nonlinearity in the relation between employee satisfaction 
and education, I replace Education with a set of indicator variables: Bachelor is an 
indicator that equals one if the employee has a bachelor’s degree, and zero otherwise; 
Master (MBA) is an indicator that equals one if the employee has a Master’s or MBA 
degree, and zero otherwise; PhD is an indicator that equals one if the employee has a 
PhD degree, and zero otherwise. In Appendix 2-A3, I re-estimate my main results 
(Tables 2, 3, and 5) and find the results are not materially affected when replacing 
Education with the three indicator variables.  
Second, as discussed in 2.2.2, there is a downward trend in overall satisfaction 
for both male and female employees during the financial crisis (2008 to 2010). To 
alleviate the concern that the results are driven by this particular period, I exclude the 
reviews between 2008 and 2010 and re-run the main regressions in Appendix 2-A4. 
The estimation results are qualitatively similar. Third, I drop all reviews from former 
employees in sample construction as such reviews are less informative and more 
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likely to be irrational. In addition, I delete reviews with missing data on the employee-
specific controls (i.e., age, education, and manager). These procedures result in a large 
loss of observations. As a robustness check, I add back reviews by former employees 
and exclude the controls for employee characteristics. The results are presented in 
Appendix 2-A5 and are robust to this expanded sample.  
Fourth, when using online reviews, a common concern is the sample selection 
bias that the extremely satisfied or unsatisfied employees are more likely to post an 
online review than moderate one leads to heavily skewed review distributions. For 
example, the product reviews of Amazon are concentrated in 1-star and 5-star (Leah-
Martin, 2017; Huang, 2018). To account for this concern, Glassdoor uses a Give-to-
Get policy to encourage moderate employees to express their voice.59 Moreover, I 
calculate the mode of each rating to mitigate the concern of selection bias. The mode 
for each rating is 4.0 with the exception of 3.0 for Career and Leadership, suggesting 
that a majority of Glassdoor reviews are posted by moderate employees.  As a further 
robustness check, I drop the extreme reviews with 1 or 5 ratings and re-estimate the 
main results. As shown in Appendix 2-A6, the main findings are not materially 
changed after excluding the extreme reviews. Thus, the results are unlikely to be 
affected by selection bias. 
Lastly, employees are identified as mid-level managers and rank-and-file 
employees according to their job titles. One possible concern is that different positions 
(job titles) may afford different levels of flexibility, resulting in the gender satisfaction 
gap (Goldin, 2014). To rule out the possibility that the findings are driven by 
unobserved differences across positions, I re-generate estimation results after 
controlling for the more stringent firm-position-year fixed effects in Appendix 2-A7. 
 
59 The specific description for Give-to-Get policy has been provided in Section 2.2.1. 
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For those rank-and-file employees, I use the last word in the job title provided by 
Glassdoor to categorize employees into different position groups. For instance, 
employees identified as “Business Analyst”, “Analyst”, or “Financial Analyst” by 
Glassdoor are classified into the “Analyst” group. Finally, I identify all groups that 
account for less than 1% of the total observations to the “others” group.60 In total, 
there are 13 unique position groups. The results remain robust after controlling for 
firm-position-year fixed effects 
2.4 Performance Implications 
2.4.1 Gender satisfaction gap and firm value 
My findings so far indicate a significant gender gap in their workplace 
preferences between male and female employees, especially when it comes to the 
preference for work-life balance. Next, I explore whether the gender gap in job 
satisfaction matters for firm performance. Hereafter, I focus on the gender satisfaction 
gap in work-life balance rating because the previous results suggest that female and 
male employees differ the most in their satisfaction with and preferences for work-
life balance.61 In particular, I examine the relation between the gender gap in work-
life balance and firm valuation at the firm level as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑝_𝑊𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2-5) 
Where i denotes firm, and t denotes year. The dependent variable is Tobin' s Q defined 
as the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided 
by total assets. For each firm-year observation, I compute Gender gap_WL as the 
difference between the average work-life balance rating of male and female 
employees. The vector Z contains a rich set of firm, governance, and CEO 
 
60 I also try to use 0.5% and 0.1% to identify the “others” group. The results are not significantly 
changed.   
61 My findings are largely similar when using overall satisfaction gender gap.  
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characteristics, including innovation (R&D), firm size (Ln(Sales)), cash holding 
(Cash), capital structure (Leverage), annual return (Return), the number of employees 
(Ln(Employee)), the fraction of female directors (% of Female director), board size 
(Board size), CEO duality (CEO chair), CEO gender (Female CEO), and the tenure 
(Ln(CEO tenure))  and age (Ln(CEO age))  of CEO.62 In addition, I further control 
for Average overall rating and Best100. Average overall rating is the average overall 
rating that may capture firm fundamental information and predict firm performance 
(Huang et al., 2015; Green et al., 2019). Best100 is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm is in the list of “the 100 Best Companies to Work For”, and zero 
otherwise. Edmans (2011) shows the portfolio with firms included in the list of “100 
Best Companies to Work For in America” exhibits positive abnormal returns. Details 
of all variables are presented in Appendix 2-A1. Firm and year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 2-6. I start with the regression of 
Tobin’s Q on Gender gap_WL, Average overall rating, and other firm, governance, 
and CEO characteristics in Column (1) and further control for Best100 in Column (2). 
In both columns, the coefficient on Gender gap_WL is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting family-friendly workplaces with smaller gender 
gaps in work-life balance enhance firm value. In Appendix 2-A8, I also examine the 
effect of the gender satisfaction gap in overall rating on Tobin’s Q. There is a 
consistently significant negative relation between gender gap and firm valuation.  
[Insert Table 2-6 here] 
While my results suggest a positive effect of family-friendly workplaces on 
firm valuation, it does not rule out the possibility of reverse causality that firms with 
 
62 To mitigate the effects of outliers, I winsorize all accounting variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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higher values may have more resources to afford more flexibility in work 
arrangements, resulting in a smaller gender satisfaction gap. To mitigate this potential 
endogeneity concern, I adopt an instrumental variable approach to support the causal 
relation between the gender satisfaction gap and firm valuation. Specifically, I 
estimate a two-stage least squares regression using the Average cost childcare as an 
instrument for work-life balance gender gap (Gender gap_WL). Average cost 
childcare is defined as the average employee-specific Cost childcare under 3 in a firm 
in a year based on the employee’s work location (State), where Cost childcare under 
3 is the cost of childcare for children under three years old in a state as a percentage 
of the state’s personal income per capita. The idea is since females are the main 
providers of family commitments (i.e., childcare), the expensive childcare services 
may force females to pay more attention to the family, thereby deteriorating the 
balance between work and personal life and leading to a higher gender satisfaction 
gap in work-life balance. Under this view, firms with higher average costs of childcare 
services tend to have larger gender satisfaction gaps. More importantly, the average 
childcare costs based on employee work location are unlikely to be correlated with 
firm valuation other than through the gender satisfaction gap. The results presented in 
Appendix 2-A9 confirm the causal effect of the gender gap at work on firm valuation.  
2.4.2 Potential channels through which gender satisfaction gap drives firm 
value 
The above results confirm that family-friendly workplaces and cultures are 
beneficial to firm value. I then explore how such gaps influence firm performance. A 
family-friendly orientation helps create a more positive work environment that 
improves employee morale and productivity, leading to an improved firm valuation 
(Bloom et al., 2011). To provide direct evidence on this channel, I investigate whether 
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family-friendly firms exhibit superior operating performance and higher labor 
productivity.   
I start by examining the relation between the work-life balance gender gap and 
operating performance (ROA) in Column (1) of Table 2-7. The coefficient on Gender 
gap_WL is negative and statistically significant at the 5%, suggesting family-friendly 
workplaces with smaller gender gaps are associated with improved operating 
performance. I then study the effect of family-friendly workplaces on employee 
productivity. Production per employee (Production/Emp) and revenue per employee 
(Revenue/Emp) are used as proxies for employee productivity (Schoar, 2002; 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Caskey and Ozel, 2017). Production/Emp is defined as 
the firm's sum of the cost of goods sold and change of inventory divided by the total 
number of employees. Revenue/Emp is defined as the firm's sum of total annual sales 
and change of inventory divided by the total number of employees. The estimation 
results are shown in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2-7. In both columns, I find a 
significant negative relation between the gender gap and employee productivity.  
[Insert Table 2-7 here] 
Overall, my results suggest operating performance and employee productivity 
are two underlying channels through which gender satisfaction gaps at work influence 
firm valuation, providing further support for the labor productivity channel. In 
addition to this channel, family-friendly workplaces and cultures may retain key 
employees and achieve greater innovation success, resulting in a higher firm valuation. 
To rule out alternative explanations, I further investigate whether employee turnover 
and corporate innovation are significantly influenced by the work-life gender gap. The 
results presented in Appendix 2-A10 show that the effects of Gender gap_WL on 
employee turnover and ln(Patents) are insignificant.  
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2.4.3 Cross-sectional analysis of the relation between gender satisfaction gap 
and firm value 
Having established a negative relation between the gender satisfaction gap in 
work-life balance and firm value, I further investigate how this effect varies cross-
sectionally using sub-sample analysis related to industry and firm characteristics. 
Specifically, family-friendly workplaces are unlikely to add value to all firms equally. 
Firms facing higher costs and constraints to implement family-friendly policies are 
less likely to benefit from family-friendliness than others. In particular, I investigate 
how the gender gap interacts with industry characteristics, corporate governance, and 
financial constraints to influence firm valuation.  
I first look at the industries that tend to rely on females. My results have 
indicated females value work-life balance more than males. Intuitively, if family-
friendly workplaces indeed increase labor productivity and firm valuation, this 
relation should be more pronounced in industries relying more on female employees. 
To test this argument, I partition my sample into two groups based on whether the 
firm’s industry is female-dominated in Panel A of Table 2-8. An industry is identified 
as being female-dominated if the proportion of females in such an industry is above 
the sample median. I use the two-digit NAICS industry classification in Columns (1) 
and (2) and the Fama-French 12-industry classification in Columns (3) and (4). 
Regardless of how industries are classified, the coefficient on Gender gap_WL is only 
negatively significant in female-dominated industries.  
[Insert Table 2-8 here] 
I then consider the role of corporate governance in the relation between the 
gender gap in job satisfaction and firm valuation. Under the agency framework, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers’ nonpecuniary private benefits may 
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include their personal relations with employees. For example, entrenched managers 
might care more than shareholders about worker loyalty and employee relations. One 
way for managers to strengthen employee relations and secure loyalty is to make 
workplaces more employee-friendly and promote gender equality (Edmans, 2011). 
Moreover, in the spirit of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), fostering family-friendly 
workplaces could be a way for quiet-life managers to buy peace with employees and 
making their job easier. Together, these arguments point to the potential agency 
problems associated with workplace practices, implying a key role of corporate 
governance in mitigating these problems and enhancing the value of family-friendly 
workplaces. 
I use three proxies for corporate governance. The first proxy is Institutional 
blockholding, defined as the percentage of shares owned by all institutional investors 
who own 5% or more of the firm's equity. Higher blockholder ownership means 
stronger corporate governance. The second proxy is the product market fluidity 
developed by Hoberg et al. (2014) which captures the competitive threats faced by 
firms. A higher value of fluidity represents greater market competition.63 The third 
proxy is a measure of board monitoring effectiveness developed by Coles et al. (2014). 
TW Co-option is the sum of the tenure of co-opted directors divided by the total tenure 
of all directors, where co-opted directors are directors who join the board after the 
CEO assumes office.64 Lower TW Co-option implies stronger corporate governance. 
For each proxy, I partition firms into groups with weak and strong corporate 
 
63 Fluidity is defined as the dot product between the words used in a firm’s product description and the 
change in the words used by its competitors. As the words used by competitors become more similar 
to the firm’s description, fluidity increases, which indicates a higher similarity between the products of 
the firm and its competitors. Therefore, fluidity is a measure of the competitive threats faced by a firm. 
The product market fluidity measure is constructed using textual analysis of each firm’s product 
descriptions obtained from their 10-K files. It captures changes in rival firms’ products relative to the 
firm. The fluidity measure can be downloaded from: 
https://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/industryconcen.htm 
64 Data source: https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/ 
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governance groups based on the median value of my sample. I expect the value 
implications of the gender satisfaction gap to be stronger in subsamples with stronger 
corporate governance. 
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2-8. Regardless of the 
governance proxy, Gender gap_WL has a significantly negative coefficient only in 
strong governance firms. These results confirm that family-friendly practices are not 
equally beneficial for all firms. In the face of severe agency problems, the benefits of 
such a policy for firm valuation could be much less, suggesting the quality of 
corporate governance plays a crucial role in the value implications of the gender 
satisfaction gap.   
Finally, I investigate whether financial constraints can influence the relation 
between the gender satisfaction gap and firm valuation. Investments in family-
friendly workplaces such as flexible working hours, parental leave provisions, and 
formal childcare support are costly. Such investments may reduce firms’ capital and 
other critical resources and force firms to forgo positive NPV projects, especially 
when facing financing constraints. Hence, I conjecture that financially constrained 
firms are unlikely to benefit greatly from family-friendly workplaces.  
To test this conjecture, I use two proxies for financial constraints: WW index 
and Equity constraints. The WW index is an accounting-based measure constructed 
by Whited and Wu (2006). The construction of the WW index loads on six accounting 
variables, including cash flow to total assets, an indicator variable of dividend policy, 
long-term debt to total assets, firm size, sales growth, and industry sales growth. The 
less profitable, highly leveraged, smaller, and lower growth firms will have a larger 
WW index, indicating a higher degree of financial constraints. Equity constraints is a 
text-based financial constraints measure developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic 
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(2015).65 Through analysing the mandatory disclosure of liquidity in the Management 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section in the 10-K file, Hoberg and Maksimovic 
(2015) evaluate corporate financing constraints using the objective algorithm, with 
higher values indicating that firms are more at risk of delaying their investments due 
to issues with equity liquidity. I partition firms into financially constrained 
(unconstrained) firms based on the median value of the WW index and Equity 
constraints. The estimation results are shown in Panel C of Table 2-8. Consistent with 
the expectation, I find the coefficient on Gender gap_WL is negative and statistically 
significant in financially unconstrained firms, while it is insignificant in the subsample 
of constrained firms. This evidence suggests that investing in family-friendly 
workplaces could add undesirable strain to the already tight financial situation facing 
constrained firms. 
2.4.4 Gender satisfaction gap and stock returns 
In the final part of my analysis, I further explore whether the information in 
the gender satisfaction gap is fully incorporated into stock prices. In particular, I 
employ a portfolio approach to examine the relation between the gender gap and stock 
returns. Following Green et al. (2019), sample firms are partitioned into quintile 
portfolios based on the average gender gap in work-life balance at end of each 
calendar quarter. For each firm-quarter observation, I calculate the average gender 
gap as the difference between the average male and female employee ratings. The 
firms with the highest (lowest) quintile quarterly gender gap are assigned into the high 
(low) gap portfolio and the rest are in the middle portfolio. To alleviate the concern 
that the results are driven by the firms with few reviews, I further require each firm-
quarter observation to include at least 15 reviews in Glassdoor posted by employees 
 




(Green et al., 2019).66 I then track the equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio 
returns of the three portfolios in the subsequent quarter and use the Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) to ensure the outperformance of female-
friendly firms does not result from risk.67 The regression specification is as follows:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2-6) 
Where Rit is the excess return (in excess of a risk-free rate) on portfolio i in month t 
using equal-weighted and value-weighted approaches. α is an intercept capturing the 
abnormal risk-adjusted return. MKTt, HMLt, SMBt, and MOMt are risk factor returns 
of market, value, size, and momentum extracted from Ken French’s website. 68 
Newey-West standard errors are used in the estimation.  
The results are presented in Table 2-9. The dependent variable is equal-
weighted portfolio excess return in Columns (1) to (4) and value-weighted portfolio 
excess return in Columns (5) to (8). The first three columns of each approach 
(Columns (1) to (3) and Columns (5) to (7)) include the portfolio with low, middle, 
and high workplace gender gaps, respectively. Columns (4) and (8) report the results 
for the long-short portfolio. For value-weighted returns, the alpha is 0.561% per 
month for a low gender gap portfolio and -0.328% per month for a high gender gap 
portfolio. The alpha estimate for the long-short portfolio that buys the low gender gap 
portfolio and sells the high gender gap portfolio is 0.889% each month with a t-
statistic of 2.42. The returns are qualitatively similar but slightly larger when using 
the value-weighted approach. The long-short portfolio of the value-weighted 
approach yields an alpha of 0.906% with a t-statistic of 2.98. Importantly, it is 
 
66 For robustness, I also try other review threshold (e.g., 5, 10, and 20) which do not significantly 
influence my results.  
67 As a robustness check, I also use Fama-French three-factor and five-factor model and the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
68Data source: https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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reassuring that the magnitudes of alpha estimates in my analysis are close to those 
reported by Green et al. (2019). Using the change of overall employer rating from 
Glassdoor, they show that the long-short alpha for firms with improving and declining 
ratings is 0.88% per month when equal-weighted and 0.77% per month when value-
weighted. Taken together, my findings suggest family-friendly workplaces are 
positively associated with the future stock returns. This evidence complements the 
recent studies by Edmans (2011) and Green et al. (2019) who find a positive relation 
between employee satisfaction and stock performance.  
[Insert Table 2-9 here] 
The above portfolio sorting approach indicates a positive abnormal return 
associated with family-friendly workplaces, while it does not control for firm 
characteristics which may influence the return predictability of the workplace gender 
gap. To address this concern, I estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to 
control for a rich set of characteristics as a robustness check. In particular, I conduct 
the following cross-sectional regression of the monthly stock return on the lagged 
quarterly gender gap in work-life balance and a battery of control variables:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2-7) 
Where i denotes the firm, and t denotes the month. R is the excess return adjusted by 
a risk-free rate. Gender gap is the difference between the average male and female 
employee ratings in the lagged quarter. The vector Z denotes a vector of firm-level 
characteristics taken from Brennan et al. (1998), Gompers et al. (2003), and Edmans 
(2011): Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization (in $ billions) 
in month t-2; BM is the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio at the end of the 
previous fiscal year; Return2–3, Return4–6, and Return7–12 are the natural logarithm 
of the compounded returns in month t-3 to month t-2, month t-6 to month t-4, and 
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month t-12 to month t-7, respectively; Price is the natural logarithm of the stock price 
of a particular firm at the end of month t-2; Volume is the natural logarithm of the 
dollar volume of trading (in $ millions) in month t-2; Div. Yield is the dividend yield 
of a particular firm at the end of the previous fiscal year. In addition, I further control 
for the employee average satisfaction by using the Best 100 that is an indicator 
variable equaling one if the firm is nominated as the “100 Best Companies to Work 
for” on Fortune’s list, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are calculated following 
Newey and West (1987).   
The results are presented in Table 2-10. I first estimate the regression of the 
monthly excess return on the lagged gender gap without controls in Column (1). The 
coefficient on Gender gap_WL is -0.428 with Newey-West t-statistic of 2.49, 
suggesting firms with family-friendly workplaces are positively associated with 
superior future stock returns. In Column (2), I introduce other control variables to the 
model and find the coefficient on Gender gap_WL remains negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Notably, I also examine the return predictability of the 
Top100 (“100 Best Companies to Work for”). While Edmans (2011) finds firms in 
this list have a persistent long-term outperformance during 1984 to 2009, Column (2) 
shows that the coefficient estimate on Top100 is positive but insignificant, which is 
consistent with empirical findings of recent Glassdoor studies (e.g., Green et al., 2019; 
Sheng, 2019; Welch and Yoon, 2020) and support the view of McLean and Pontiff 
(2016) that investors can learn the information of mispricing from academic 
publication, leading to a decline of post-publication return predictability.  




In this chapter, I explore the gender satisfaction gap at work using 96,983 
Glassdoor reviews from 2,301 U.S. public firms between 2008 and 2015. I find that 
females are significantly less satisfied at work than males and they differ 
systematically in their workplace preferences, particularly those regarding work-life 
balance. In particular, female employees care more about work-life balance but this 
gender difference vanishes at the manager level, illustrating the role of selection. 
Given the crucial role of the gender satisfaction gap in work-life balance, I further 
investigate the value implications of family-friendliness. The results suggest family-
friendly workplaces with low gender satisfaction gaps lead to a higher firm valuation. 
This chapter supports the persistence of gender differences in females’ choices 
and preferences at work, particularly those regarding work-life balance. This evidence 
is consistent with the view that females value work flexibility more than males. More 
importantly, such preference for work-life balance vanishes at the manager level, 
reflecting the career-family conflict female employees are facing. Given the fact that 
females remain the main providers of family commitments, females are less likely to 
choose a career path to the managerial position when they have to sacrifice work-life 
balance to be promoted. Accordingly, it is plausible that family-friendly workplaces 
play a particularly important role in career progression, which can enhance employee 







Figure 2-1. Average overall rating by industry and gender 
This figure shows the average overall ratings of male and female employees of firms in Fama-French 
12 industries: NoDur for non-durables; Durbl for durables; Manuf for manufacturing; Enrgy for oil, 
gas, and coal extraction and products; Chems for chemicals and allied products; BusEq for business 
equipment; Telcm for telephone and television transmission; Utils for utilities; Shops for wholesale, 
retail, and some services; Hlth for healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs; Money for finance; and 




















Figure 2-2. Average overall rating by year and gender 






















Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used in my study. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics based on the whole sample. Panel B shows the correlation matrix. Panel C reports 
the univariate analysis results by gender. All variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Stdev 25th Median 75th 
Overall rating 96,983 3.425 1.169 3.000 4.000 4.000 
Career 94,994 3.250 1.208 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Benefit 94,907 3.321 1.145 3.000 3.000 4.000 
Work-life 94,879 3.437 1.234 3.000 4.000 4.000 
Leadership 94,470 3.045 1.281 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Culture 71,100 3.522 1.292 3.000 4.000 5.000 
Female 96,983 0.321 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Age 96,983 33.313 10.055 25.000 31.000 39.000 
Education 96,983 1.093 0.656 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Manager 96,983 0.269 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B. Correlation matrix  
Overall rating Career Benefit Work-life Leadership Culture 
Overall rating 1.000 
     
Career 0.716*** 1.000 
    
Benefit 0.589*** 0.526*** 1.000 
   
Work-life 0.576*** 0.421*** 0.387*** 1.000 
  
Leadership 0.739*** 0.627*** 0.469*** 0.534*** 1.000 
 
Culture 0.742*** 0.599*** 0.464*** 0.538*** 0.709*** 1.000 
Panel C. Univariate analysis by gender 
 Male  Female  Difference 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Overall rating 3.461 4.000  3.347 3.000  0.114*** 1.000*** 
Career 3.284 3.000  3.177 3.000  0.107*** 0.000*** 
Benefit 3.360 3.500  3.239 3.000  0.121*** 0.500*** 
Work-life 3.495 4.000  3.314 3.000  0.180*** 1.000*** 
Leadership 3.068 3.000  2.997 3.000  0.071*** 0.000*** 
Culture 3.558 4.000  3.450 4.000  0.108*** 0.000*** 
Age 33.317 31.000  33.303 30.000  0.014 1.000*** 
Education 1.144 1.000  0.987 1.000  0.157*** 0.000*** 









Table 2-2. Gender differences in job satisfaction 
This table reports gender differences in employer overall and subcategory ratings. The dependent variables include the overall job satisfaction rating, Overall rating, 
in Column (1), and the five subcategory ratings, Career, Benefit, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture in Columns (2) to (6), respectively. The variable of interest, 
Female, is an indicator variable that equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise.  Age is the employee’s age in years. Education is 
the employee’s highest education level, coded as 0 for employees who do not own a bachelor or higher degree, 1 for bachelor’s, 2 for master’s and MBA, 3 for PhD. 
Manager is an indicator variable that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. Firm-Year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Overall rating  Career  Benefit  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Female -0.039***  -0.032***  -0.010  -0.071***  -0.029**  -0.039*** 
 (-3.51)  (-2.92)  (-0.87)  (-5.88)  (-2.32)  (-3.12) 
Age -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.001**  -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.013*** 
 (-12.64)  (-16.72)  (-1.96)  (-11.44)  (-13.64)  (-12.28) 
Education 0.019***  -0.016*  -0.040***  0.065***  0.039***  0.047*** 
 (2.59)  (-1.77)  (-4.51)  (6.03)  (4.53)  (4.78) 
Manager 0.067***  0.214***  0.154***  -0.126***  0.052***  0.060*** 
 (5.01)  (10.82)  (7.08)  (-6.11)  (3.71)  (3.81) 
Firm-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 96,983  94,994  94,907  94,879  94,470  71,100 







Table 2-3. Gender differences in workplace attribute preferences 
This table examines the gender differences in workplace preferences. The dependent variable is Overall 
rating. Female is an indicator variable that equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, 
and zero otherwise. Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture are the five 
subcomponent ratings. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.026 0.027 -0.114*** -0.065*** -0.074*** 
 (1.20) (1.11) (-4.71) (-3.34) (-2.92) 
Career 0.657*** 
    
 (128.03) 
    
Career × Female -0.013** 
    
 (-2.15) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.019*** 


























   
(123.72) 
 
Leadership × Female 








    
0.627*** 
 
    
(96.05) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.014** 
 
    
(2.07) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 94,994 94,907 94,879 94,470 71,100 









Table 2-4. Gender gaps in job satisfaction among mid-level managers 
This table examines the differences in gender satisfaction gaps for mid-level managers and those of rank-and-file employees. The dependent variables include the 
overall employer rating, Overall rating, as well as the five subcomponent ratings, namely, Career, Benefit, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture. Female is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. Manager is an indicator variable that equals to one if the review is posted 
by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Overall rating  Career  Benefit  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Manager 0.073***  0.200***  0.138***  -0.111***  0.062***  0.068*** 
 (4.72)  (9.74)  (6.22)  (-5.02)  (3.67)  (3.73) 
Female -0.034***  -0.045***  -0.024*  -0.058***  -0.020  -0.032** 
 (-2.70)  (-3.39)  (-1.68)  (-4.25)  (-1.37)  (-2.25) 
Female × Manager -0.018  0.044**  0.050**  -0.047*  -0.031  -0.024 
 (-0.88)  (2.18)  (2.05)  (-1.80)  (-1.44)  (-0.98) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 96,983  94,994  94,907  94,879  94,470  71,100 




Table 2-5. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers 
This table examines the difference of gender gap in workplace preferences between mid-level managers 
and those of rank-and-file employees. The dependent variable is Overall rating. Female is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. Career, 
Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture are the five subcomponent ratings. Manager is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Manager -0.132*** -0.082** 0.133*** -0.058* -0.055* 
 (-4.27) (-2.13) (3.24) (-1.91) (-1.65) 
Female 0.032 0.038 -0.159*** -0.075*** -0.089*** 
 (1.29) (1.38) (-5.28) (-3.14) (-2.83) 
Female × Manager -0.032 -0.054 0.148*** 0.032 0.055 
 (-0.66) (-1.00) (2.88) (0.74) (1.13) 
Career  0.650*** 
    
 (117.77) 
    
Career × Female  -0.012* 
    
 (-1.68) 
    
Career × Manager 0.023*** 
    
 (3.04) 
    
Career × Female × Manager -0.003 
    
 (-0.24) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.019** 




   
Benefit × Manager 
 
0.022** 




   
Benefit × Female × Manager 
 
0.004 










































   
(109.64) 
 
Leadership × Female 




   
(2.58) 
 
Leadership × Manager 




   
(3.72) 
 
Leadership × Female × Manager 








    
0.621*** 
 
    
(87.40) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.019** 
 
    
(2.23) 
Culture × Manager 
    
0.024*** 
 
    
(2.73) 
Culture × Female × Manager 
    
-0.018 
 
    
(-1.37) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 94,994 94,907 94,879 94,470 71,100 
Adjusted R-sq 0.554 0.413 0.419 0.580 0.572 
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Table 2-6. Gender satisfaction gap and firm value 
This table examines the relation between the gender satisfaction gap in work-life balance and firm 
value. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the market value of equity plus total assets minus 
the book value of equity, all divided by total assets. For each firm in a particular year, I compute Gender 
gap_WL as the average work-life balance rating of male employees minus the average work-life 
balance rating of female employees. I include a rich set of firm, governance, and CEO controls. Average 
overall rating is the average overall rating of all employees in a firm. Best100 is an indicator that equals 
one if a firm is included in the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America” list, and zero otherwise. 
R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. Ln(Sales) is the natural logarithm of sales. Cash 
is cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets, 
where total debt is defined as current liabilities plus long-term debt. Return is the annual stock return. 
Ln(Employee) is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. % of Female director is the 
fraction of female directors on the board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. CEO chair 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. Female 
CEO is an indicator that equals one if the CEO is female, and zero otherwise. Ln(CEO tenure) is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has been in office. Ln(CEO age) is the natural 
logarithm of CEO age in years. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Tobin’s Q  
(1) (2) 
Gender gap_WL -0.025** -0.025**  
(-1.97) (-1.97) 




0.096   
(0.73) 
R&D 3.556 3.580  
(0.63) (0.63) 
Ln(Sales) 0.609** 0.610**  
(2.39) (2.39) 
Cash 0.655** 0.664**  
(1.96) (2.01) 
Leverage -0.219 -0.210  
(-0.74) (-0.72) 
Return 0.597*** 0.597***  
(10.08) (10.09) 
Ln(Employee) -0.253 -0.256  
(-1.39) (-1.41) 
% Female director -0.303 -0.306  
(-0.95) (-0.96) 
Board size -0.001 -0.001  
(-0.11) (-0.12) 
CEO chair -0.011 -0.012  
(-0.16) (-0.17) 
Female CEO 0.015 0.015  
(0.13) (0.13) 
Ln(CEO tenure) 0.062* 0.062*  
(1.82) (1.82) 
Ln(CEO age) -0.609** -0.610** 
 (-2.38) (-2.38) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 3,758 3,758 







Table 2-7. Channels in the relation between gender satisfaction gap and firm 
value 
This table examines whether the gender satisfaction gap influences firm value through labor 
productivity. The dependent variable in Panel A is Tobin’s q, defined as the market value of equity plus 
total assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by total assets. In Panel B, the dependent 
variables include: Production/Emp is the sum of the cost of goods sold and change of inventory divided 
by the total number of employees. Revenue/Emp is the sum of annual sales and change of inventory 
divided by the total number of employees. ROA is the return on assets. For each firm in a particular 
year, I compute Gender gap_WL as the average work-life balance rating of male employees minus the 
average work-life balance rating of female employees. High (Low) labor intensity is an indicator that 
equals one if the industry Labor intensity is above (below) the sample median and zero otherwise, 
where Labor intensity is the average ratio of labor and pension expenses to sales in an industry in a 
year. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
  ROA Production/Emp  Revenue/Emp  
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Gender gap_WL  -0.002** -0.007**  -0.006**  
 (-2.49) (-2.10)  (-2.22) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes 
N  3,750 3,392  3,392 









Table 2-8. Cross-sectional analysis in the relation between gender satisfaction 
gap and firm value  
This table explores the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relation between the gender satisfaction gap 
and firm value. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the market value of equity plus total 
assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by total assets. For each firm in a particular year, I 
compute Gender gap_WL as the average work-life balance rating of male employees minus the average 
work-life balance rating of female employees. Panel A partitions firms into two subsamples based on 
whether the firm’s industry is female-dominated. An industry is noted as being female-dominated if its 
percentage of women employed is above the sample median. Panel B split firms into strong and weak 
governance firms based on the sample median of the corporate governance measure in question. I use 
three measures of corporate governance. Institutional blockholding is the percentage of shares owned 
by all institutional investors who own 5% or more of the firm's equity. Product market fluidity captures 
changes in a firm’s product space due to moves made by its rivals, based on a textual analysis of the 
firm’s business descriptions in 10-K filings. TW Co-option is the sum of the tenure of co-opted directors 
divided by the total tenure of all directors, where co-opted directors are directors who join the board 
after the CEO assumes office. Panel C split firms into high and low financing constraints firms based 
on the sample median of the financing constraints measure in question. I use two measures. WW Index, 
proposed by Whited and Wu (2006), is a linear combination of six empirical factors, with higher values 
indicating more severe financing constraints. Equity constraints is a text-based financial constraints 
measure from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), with higher values indicating that firms are more at risk 
of delaying their investments due to issues with equity liquidity. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 2-A1. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Industry female employee representation 
 Female-dominated industry 
 Two-digit NAICS   Fama-French 12 
 No  Yes  No  Yes  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Gender gap_WL -0.009  -0.043*  -0.012  -0.039**  
(-0.61)  (-1.92)  (-0.71)  (-2.04) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,213  1,498  1,998  1,760 
Adjusted R-sq 0.187  0.288  0.184  0.278 
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Panel B. Corporate governance 
 Institutional  
blockholding 
 Product market 
fluidity 
 TW Co-option 
 Low High   Low High   High Low  
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Gender gap_WL 0.007 -0.043**  -0.012 -0.038**  -0.023 -0.036**  
(0.38) (-2.18)  (-0.66) (-2.18)  (-1.00) (-2.04) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 1,858 1,853  1,845 1,842  1,747 1,752 
Adjusted R-sq 0.238 0.251  0.266 0.214  0.258 0.254 








Gender gap_WL -0.049** -0.003 
 




Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 1,864 1,859 
 
1,082 1,078 









Table 2-9. Returns for stock portfolios sorted on the gender satisfaction gap 
This table reports the return results of a sorted portfolio using the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model, MKT, HML, SMB, and MOM. The sample is partitioned into three 
portfolios based on the quarterly work-life balance gender gap, including low (bottom 20%), middle (middle 60%), and high (top 20%) gender gap portfolios. I then track the 
returns of the three portfolios over the following quarter. The dependent variable is the monthly portfolio excess return (raw return less the risk-free rate). Portfolio results are 
reported using equal- and value-weighted portfolio weights. Newey–West adjusted t -statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 Equal-Weighted  Value-Weighted 
 
Low Middle High L-H  Low Middle High L-H 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Alpha 0.561** 0.054 -0.328 0.889**  0.568** 0.132 -0.338 0.906*** 
 
(2.12) (0.25) (-1.21) (2.42)  (2.45) (0.62) (-1.33) (2.98) 
MKT 0.906*** 0.947*** 0.949*** -0.043  0.957*** 0.901*** 0.952*** 0.006 
 
(10.15) (16.90) (16.22) (-0.55)  (12.76) (17.68) (14.73) (0.07) 
SMB 0.012 -0.050 0.210** -0.197*  -0.233* -0.157** 0.138 -0.371*** 
 
(0.10) (-0.64) (2.16) (-1.90)  (-1.92) (-2.32) (1.49) (-2.98) 
HML 0.205 -0.089 -0.173 0.378**  0.132 0.023 -0.158 0.291* 
 
(1.57) (-1.04) (-1.11) (2.37)  (1.21) (0.30) (-0.99) (1.83) 
MOM -0.049 -0.110** -0.085 0.036  0.027 -0.084*** -0.044 0.071 
 







Table 2-10. Gender satisfaction gap and stock returns: Fama-MacBeth 
regressions 
This table reports the average slope coefficients from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions of monthly stock returns on the gender satisfaction gap. Gender gap_WL is defined as the 
average work-life balance rating of male employees minus the average work-life balance rating of 
female employees. The set of controls follows those of Brennan et al. (1998), Gompers et al. (2003), 
and Edmans (2011). Best100 is an indicator that equals one if a firm is included in the “100 Best 
Companies to Work For in America” list, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market capitalization (in billions) in month t-2. BM is the natural logarithm of the firm’s book-to-
market ratio at the end of the previous fiscal year. Return2–3, Return4–6, and Return7–12 are the 
natural logarithms of the compounded returns in month t-3 to month t-2, month t-6 to month t-4, and 
month t-12 to month t-7, respectively. Price is the natural logarithm of the stock price at the end of 
month t-2; Vol is the natural logarithm of the dollar trading volume (in millions) in month t-2; Div. 
Yield is the firm’s dividend yield at the end of the previous fiscal year. Newey–West adjusted t-statistics 
are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Return  
(1) (2) 




































-0.543   
(-1.02) 







Appendix 2-A1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Data source 
Glassdoor rating components  
Overall rating Employee’s overall rating of employer ranked on a 
five-point scale, with five (one) being most favorable 
(unfavorable). 
Glassdoor 
Career Employee’s opinion of his or her opportunities for 
career prospects at the company ranked on a five-point 
scale, with five (one) being most favorable 
(unfavorable). 
Glassdoor 
Compensation Employee’s opinion of his or her compensation and 
benefits package ranked on a five-point scale, with 
five (one) being most favorable (unfavorable). 
Glassdoor 
Work-life Employee’s opinion of his or her work-life balance 
ranked on a five-point scale, with five (one) being 
most favorable (unfavorable). 
Glassdoor 
Leadership Employee’s opinion of employer’s senior 
management ranked on a five-point scale, with five 
(one) being most favorable (unfavorable). 
Glassdoor 
Culture Employee’s opinion of employer’s culture and values 
ranked on a five-point scale, with five (one) being 
most favorable (unfavorable). This rating is available 




Female An indicator that equals one if the review is completed 
by a female employee, and zero otherwise. 
Glassdoor 
Gender gap_WL Difference in the average work-life balance rating 
between female and male employees in a firm. 
Glassdoor 
Gender gap_Overall Difference in the average overall rating between 
female and male employees in a firm. 
Glassdoor 
Education Employee’s highest education level, coded as 0 (below 
bachelor), 1 (bachelor), 2 (Master’s and MBA), and 3 
(PhD). 
Glassdoor 
Age Employee’s age in years. Glassdoor 
Average overall rating Average overall rating of all employees in a firm. Glassdoor 
Manager An indicator that equals one if the review is completed 
by a mid-level manager (e.g., group, regional or 




Best100 An indicator that equals one if a firm is included in the 
“100 Best Companies to Work For in America” list, 
and zero otherwise. 
Great Place to 
Work® 
Ln(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales. Sales is converted into year 
2008 dollars using the Consumer Price Index obtained 




Leverage Total debt divided by total assets, where total debt is 
defined as current liabilities plus long-term debt. 
Compustat 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets. 
Compustat 
R&D Ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. Compustat 
Tobin's q Market value of equity plus total assets minus the book 
value of equity, all divided by total assets, where 
market value of equity is the product of fiscal year-end 
closing price and number of shares outstanding. 
Compustat 
ROA Return on assets. Compustat 
Production/Emp  Sum of cost of goods sold and change of inventory 
divided by total number of employees. 
Compustat 
Revenue/Emp Sum of total annual sales and change of inventory 
divided by total number of employees. 
Compustat 
Return Annual stock return. Compustat 
Ln(Employee) Natural logarithm of the number of employees. 
 
Compustat 
Governance and CEO characteristics 
CEO chair An indicator that equals one if the CEO also chairs the 
board, and zero otherwise.  
Execucomp 
Ln(CEO tenure) Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has 
been in office. 
Execucomp 
Ln(CEO age) Natural logarithm of the age of the CEO in years. Execucomp 
Female CEO An indicator that equals one if the CEO is female, and 
zero otherwise 
Execucomp 
% Female director Number of female directors on the board divided by 
board size. 
RiskMetrics 
Board size Number of directors on the board.  
 
RiskMetrics 
Variables for endogeneity 
Average cost childcare  Average employee-specific Cost childcare under 3 in 





Cost childcare under 3 Cost of childcare for children under three years old in 















Appendix 2-A2. Robustness tests: Including all subcomponent ratings in the 
same regression 
This table reproduces my main results (Tables 4 and 6) after including all of the subcategory ratings in 
the same specification. The dependent variable is Overall rating. Female is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. Career, Compensation, 
Work-life, Leadership, and Culture are the five subcomponent ratings. Manager is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix 2-1A. Firm-Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
Panel A. Gender differences in job attribute preferences 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) 
Female 0.051** 0.035 
 (2.38) (1.51) 
Career 0.317*** 0.242*** 
 (59.67) (43.44) 
Career × Female -0.040*** -0.035*** 
 (-5.85) (-4.66) 
Benefit 0.184*** 0.170*** 
 (38.18) (31.19) 
Benefit × Female -0.022*** -0.024*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.74) 
Work-life 0.166*** 0.115*** 
 (38.30) (25.51) 
Work-life × Female 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (4.77) (4.13) 
Leadership 0.304*** 0.204*** 
 (65.93) (45.81) 
Leadership × Female 0.019*** -0.000 
 (2.93) (-0.01) 
Culture  0.238*** 
  (45.64) 
Culture × Female  0.019** 
  (2.30) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes 
N 90,080 67,288 
Adjusted R-sq 0.715 0.731 
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Panel B. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) 
Manager -0.104*** -0.099*** 
 (-4.34) (-3.64) 
Female 0.051** 0.031 
 (2.24) (1.15) 
Female × Manager -0.023 -0.007 
 (-0.56) (-0.15) 
Career  0.318*** 0.247*** 
 (51.43) (36.77) 
Career × Female  -0.039*** -0.034*** 
 (-5.13) (-4.02) 
Career × Manager -0.003 -0.016* 
 (-0.41) (-1.65) 
Career × Female × Manager -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.08) (-0.19) 
Benefit 0.189*** 0.173*** 
 (38.38) (29.88) 
Benefit × Female -0.031*** -0.033*** 
 (-4.24) (-4.37) 
Benefit × Manager -0.016** -0.013 
 (-2.19) (-1.48) 
Benefit × Female × Manager 0.038*** 0.036*** 
 (2.89) (2.63) 
Work-life 0.164*** 0.113*** 
 (35.46) (23.81) 
Work-life × Female 0.033*** 0.030*** 
 (4.96) (4.15) 
Work-life × Manager 0.006 0.007 
 (0.90) (0.99) 
Work-life × Female × Manager -0.024** -0.017 
 (-2.04) (-1.31) 
Leadership 0.291*** 0.196*** 
 (57.12) (37.97) 
Leadership × Female 0.021*** 0.002 
 (2.68) (0.16) 
Leadership × Manager 0.044*** 0.028*** 
 (5.50) (3.11) 
Leadership × Female × Manager -0.009 -0.005 
 (-0.65) (-0.31) 
Culture  0.232*** 
  (37.34) 
Culture × Female  0.021** 
  (1.98) 
Culture × Manager  0.022** 
  (2.28) 
Culture × Female × Manager  -0.009 
  (-0.50) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes 
N 90,080 67,288 








Appendix 2-A3. Robustness tests: Replacing the education variable with education dummies 
This table reproduces my main results (Tables 3, 4, and 6) after replacing the education variable with a set of education dummies. Bachelor is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the employee has a bachelor’s degree and zero otherwise. Master(MBA) is an indicator variable that equals one if the employee has a Master’s or 
MBA degree and zero otherwise. PhD is an indicator variable that equals one if the employee has a PhD degree and zero otherwise. The holdout group consists of 
those who do not have a bachelor’s or above degree. The dependent variables include the overall job satisfaction rating, Overall Rating, and the five subcomponent 
ratings, Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture, respectively in Panel A. The variable of interest, Female, is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. Manager is an indicator variable that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, 
and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Gender differences in job satisfaction after replacing the education variable with education dummies 
 Overall rating  Career  Compensation  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Female -0.039***  -0.032***  -0.010  -0.071***  -0.029**  -0.039*** 
 (-3.51)  (-2.91)  (-0.87)  (-5.88)  (-2.31)  (-3.15) 
Age -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.001*  -0.010***  -0.012***  -0.013*** 
 (-12.26)  (-16.42)  (-1.77)  (-11.16)  (-13.27)  (-12.00) 
Bachelor 0.062***  0.020  -0.005  0.087***  0.091***  0.080***  
(4.76)  (1.22)  (-0.33)  (5.46)  (6.20)  (4.80) 
Master (MBA) 0.055***  -0.025  -0.078***  0.147***  0.102***  0.111*** 
 (3.50)  (-1.25)  (-4.15)  (6.75)  (5.65)  (5.42) 
PhD 0.010  -0.027  -0.052  0.096  0.028  0.023 
 (0.24)  (-0.58)  (-1.15)  (1.47)  (0.56)  (0.37) 
Manager 0.067***  0.215***  0.155***  -0.127***  0.051***  0.060*** 
 (5.00)  (10.86)  (7.12)  (-6.15)  (3.68)  (3.79) 
Firm-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 96,983  94,994  94,907  94,879  94,470  71,100 
Adjusted R-sq 0.154  0.117  0.171  0.129  0.119  0.145 
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Panel B. Gender differences in job attribute preferences after replacing the education 
variable with education dummies 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.026 0.028 -0.114*** -0.065*** -0.073*** 
 (1.20) (1.12) (-4.72) (-3.33) (-2.91) 
Career 0.656*** 
    
 (128.01) 
    
Career × Female -0.013** 
    
 (-2.15) 








   
Compensation × Female 
 
-0.019*** 


























   
(123.79) 
 
Leadership × Female 








    
0.627*** 
 
    
(96.14) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.014** 
 
    
(2.06) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 94,994 94,907 94,879 94,470 71,100 
Adjusted R-sq 0.554 0.413 0.419 0.580 0.572 
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Panel C. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers after 
replacing the education variable with education dummies 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Manager -0.133*** -0.082** 0.133*** -0.058* -0.055* 
 (-4.29) (-2.15) (3.24) (-1.90) (-1.66) 
Female 0.032 0.039 -0.158*** -0.075*** -0.089*** 
 (1.29) (1.39) (-5.28) (-3.13) (-2.82) 
Female × Manager -0.032 -0.054 0.147*** 0.032 0.055 
 (-0.68) (-1.01) (2.87) (0.73) (1.12) 
Career  0.650*** 
    
 (117.81) 
    
Career × Female  -0.012* 
    
 (-1.69) 
    
Career × Manager 0.023*** 
    
 (3.06) 
    
Career × Female × Manager -0.003 
    
 (-0.23) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.019** 




   
Benefit × Manager 
 
0.022** 




   
Benefit × Female × Manager 
 
0.004 










































   
(109.75) 
 
Leadership × Female 




   
(2.58) 
 
Leadership × Manager 




   
(3.73) 
 
Leadership × Female × Manager 








    
0.620*** 
 
    
(87.54) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.019** 
 
    
(2.22) 
Culture × Manager 
    
0.024*** 
 
    
(2.75) 
Culture × Female × Manager 
    
-0.017 
 
    
(-1.36) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 94,994 94,907 94,879 94,470 71,100 









Appendix 2-A4. Robustness tests: Excluding observations between 2008 and 2010 
This table reproduces my main results (Tables 3, 4, and 6) after excluding observations between 2008 and 2010. The dependent variables include the overall job 
satisfaction rating, Overall Rating, and the five subcomponent ratings, Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture, respectively in Panel A. The 
variable of interest, Female, is an indicator variable that equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. Manager is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Gender differences in job satisfaction after excluding observations between 2008 and 2010 
 Overall rating  Career  Compensation  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Female -0.045***  -0.034***  -0.012  -0.074***  -0.037***  -0.039***  
(-3.95)  (-2.90)  (-1.00)  (-5.74)  (-3.03)  (-3.12) 
Age -0.011***  -0.013***  -0.002***  -0.011***  -0.013***  -0.013***  
(-12.21)  (-15.73)  (-2.92)  (-11.26)  (-13.28)  (-12.28) 
Education 0.028***  -0.007  -0.039***  0.065***  0.038***  0.047***  
(3.32)  (-0.72)  (-4.22)  (5.70)  (3.87)  (4.78) 
Manager 0.068***  0.217***  0.165***  -0.151***  0.047***  0.060***  
(4.77)  (10.04)  (7.55)  (-7.08)  (3.21)  (3.81) 
Firm-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 79,822  77,833  77,746  77,718  77,309  71,100 
Adjusted R-sq 0.147  0.114  0.171  0.133  0.119  0.145 
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Panel B. Gender differences in job attribute preferences after excluding observations 
between 2008 and 2010 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.026 0.034 -0.126*** -0.055*** -0.074*** 
 (1.10) (1.35) (-4.78) (-2.61) (-2.92) 
Career 0.643*** 
    
 (113.99) 
    
Career × Female -0.015** 
    
 (-2.22) 








   
Compensation × Female 
 
-0.022*** 


























   
(110.72) 
 
Leadership × Female 








    
0.627*** 
 
    
(96.05) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.014** 
 
    
(2.07) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 77,833 77,746 77,718 77,309 71,100 





Panel C. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers after 
excluding observations between 2008 and 2010 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Manager -0.149*** -0.107*** 0.140*** -0.066** -0.055* 
 (-4.21) (-2.63) (3.21) (-1.99) (-1.65) 
Female 0.024 0.040 -0.176*** -0.065** -0.089*** 
 (0.86) (1.36) (-5.24) (-2.45) (-2.83) 
Female × Manager -0.001 -0.032 0.164*** 0.031 0.055 
 (-0.02) (-0.57) (2.93) (0.66) (1.13) 
Career  0.635*** 
    
 (103.00) 
    
Career × Female  -0.011 
    
 (-1.41) 
    
Career × Manager 0.028*** 
    
 (3.33) 
    
Career × Female × Manager -0.012 
    
 (-0.90) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.021** 




   
Benefit × Manager 
 
0.029*** 




   
Benefit × Female × Manager 
 
-0.002 










































   
(98.19) 
 
Leadership × Female 




   
(1.86) 
 
Leadership × Manager 




   
(3.96) 
 
Leadership × Female × Manager 








    
0.621*** 
 
    
(87.40) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.019** 
 
    
(2.23) 
Culture × Manager 
    
0.024*** 
 
    
(2.73) 
Culture × Female × Manager 
    
-0.018 
 
    
(-1.37) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 77,833 77,746 77,718 77,309 71,100 








Appendix 2-A5. Robustness tests: Using reviews by both current and former employees and excluding controls for employee 
characteristics 
This table reproduces my main results (Tables 3, 4, and 6) after adding back reviews by former employees and excluding the controls for employee characteristics. 
The dependent variables include the overall job satisfaction rating, Overall Rating, and the five subcomponent ratings, Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, 
and Culture, respectively in Panel A. The variable of interest, Female, is an indicator variable that equals one if the review is posted by female employee, and zero 
otherwise. Manager is an indicator variable that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Gender differences in job satisfaction after adding back reviews by former employees and excluding controls for employee 
characteristics 
 Overall rating  Career  Compensation  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Former  -0.307***  -0.267***  -0.072***  -0.243***  -0.320***  -0.342*** 
 (-26.32)  (-24.23)  (-6.00)  (-30.78)  (-26.56)  (-28.20) 
Female -0.046***  -0.043***  -0.005  -0.085***  -0.033***  -0.043*** 
 (-7.34)  (-6.72)  (-0.63)  (-10.76)  (-4.52)  (-5.78) 
Firm-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 319,279  299,116  298,854  298,805  296,853  232,072 
Adjusted R-sq 0.140  0.102  0.165  0.114  0.108  0.141 
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Panel B. Gender differences in job attribute preferences after adding back reviews by 
former employees and excluding controls for employee characteristics 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Former -0.134*** -0.269*** -0.180*** -0.101*** -0.110*** 
 (-21.07) (-32.06) (-20.69) (-19.08) (-20.49) 
Female 0.045*** 0.017 -0.068*** -0.047*** -0.032** 
 (3.73) (1.16) (-5.15) (-4.09) (-2.51) 
Career 0.670*** 
    
 (166.02) 
    
Career × Female -0.019*** 
    
 (-5.35) 








   
Compensation × Female 
 
-0.017*** 


























   
(155.77) 
 
Leadership × Female 








    
0.647*** 
 
    
(148.23) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.004 
 
    
(1.18) 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 299,116 298,854 298,805 296,853 232,072 
Adjusted R-sq 0.546 0.395 0.421 0.585 0.590 
125 
 
Panel C. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers after 
adding back reviews by former employees and excluding controls for employee 
characteristics 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Former -0.133*** -0.266*** -0.178*** -0.101*** -0.109*** 
 (-18.54) (-30.34) (-19.20) (-16.65) (-17.73) 
Manager -0.167*** -0.141*** 0.128*** -0.041** -0.045** 
 (-7.31) (-4.75) (4.31) (-2.10) (-2.11) 
Female 0.054*** 0.023 -0.099*** -0.042*** -0.027 
 (2.96) (1.06) (-5.05) (-2.76) (-1.43) 
Female × Manager -0.014 0.002 0.101*** 0.013 0.032 
 (-0.43) (0.06) (3.19) (0.54) (1.09) 
Career  0.660*** 
    
 (135.37) 
    
Career × Female  -0.018*** 
    
 (-3.54) 
    
Career × Manager 0.024*** 
    
 (4.31) 
    
Career × Female × Manager -0.007 
    
 (-0.86) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.013** 




   
Benefit × Manager 
 
0.016** 




   
Benefit × Female × Manager 
 
-0.011 










































   
(139.97) 
 
Leadership × Female 




   
(2.20) 
 
Leadership × Manager 




   
(4.49) 
 
Leadership × Female × Manager 








    
0.640*** 
 
    
(132.83) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.006 
 
    
(1.03) 
Culture × Manager 
    
0.018*** 
 
    
(3.16) 
Culture × Female × Manager 
    
-0.011 
 
    
(-1.41) 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 188,518 188,395 188,359 187,386 146,936 








Appendix 2-A6. Robustness tests: Excluding extreme reviewers 
This table reproduces my main results (Tables 3, 4, and 6) after dropping extreme reviews with a 1 or 5 overall rating. The dependent variables include the overall 
job satisfaction rating, Overall Rating, and the five subcomponent ratings, Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture, respectively in Panel A. The 
variable of interest, Female, is an indicator variable that equals one if the review is posted by a female employee, and zero otherwise. Manager is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if the review is posted by a mid-level manager, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm-Year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A. Gender differences in job satisfaction after dropping extreme reviews with 1 or 5 overall rating 
 Overall rating  Career  Benefit  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Female -0.035***  -0.026**  -0.011  -0.086***  -0.031**  -0.047*** 
 (-4.65)  (-2.28)  (-0.90)  (-7.04)  (-2.48)  (-3.80) 
Age -0.006***  -0.010***  0.002**  -0.009***  -0.011***  -0.010*** 
 (-10.98)  (-14.83)  (2.27)  (-8.84)  (-11.89)  (-10.49) 
Education 0.030***  -0.008  -0.034***  0.088***  0.057***  0.064*** 
 (5.22)  (-0.83)  (-3.59)  (7.71)  (6.23)  (5.93) 
Manager 0.019**  0.189***  0.138***  -0.174***  0.004  0.015 
 (2.00)  (9.66)  (6.14)  (-7.27)  (0.29)  (0.99) 
Firm-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 70,698  69,157  69,105  69,093  68,796  50,708 
Adjusted R-sq 0.085  0.068  0.137  0.119  0.061  0.092 
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Panel B. Gender differences in job attribute preferences after dropping extreme 
reviews with 1 or 5 overall rating 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.088*** 0.045* -0.064*** -0.025 -0.052*** 
 (4.18) (1.86) (-3.28) (-1.45) (-2.60) 
Career 0.398*** 
    
 (82.11) 
    
Career × Female -0.037*** 
    
 (-6.02) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.025*** 


























   
(95.89) 
 
Leadership × Female 








    
0.360*** 
 
    
(93.68) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.006 
 
    
(1.11) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 69,157 69,105 69,093 68,796 50,708 
Adjusted R-sq 0.340 0.226 0.228 0.377 0.364 
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Panel C. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers after 
dropping extreme reviews with 1 or 5 overall rating 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Manager -0.088*** -0.020 0.095*** -0.091*** -0.035 
 (-3.28) (-0.54) (3.30) (-4.04) (-1.21) 
Female 0.097*** 0.053* -0.088*** -0.035* -0.055** 
 (3.89) (1.87) (-3.78) (-1.75) (-2.17) 
Female × Manager -0.038 -0.034 0.072* 0.033 0.008 
 (-0.88) (-0.65) (1.80) (0.92) (0.18) 
Career  0.395*** 
    
 (70.63) 
    
Career × Female  -0.039*** 
    
 (-5.33) 
    
Career × Manager 0.012* 
    
 (1.73) 
    
Career × Female × Manager 0.008 
    
 (0.63) 








   
Benefit × Female 
 
-0.027*** 




   
Benefit × Manager 
 
-0.000 




   
Benefit × Female × Manager 
 
0.009 










































   
(83.43) 
 
Leadership × Female 




   
(0.26) 
 
Leadership × Manager 




   
(5.56) 
 
Leadership × Female × Manager 








    
0.357*** 
 
    
(87.50) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.005 
 
    
(0.76) 
Culture × Manager 
    
0.012 
 
    
(1.60) 
Culture × Female × Manager 
    
0.004 
 
    
(0.31) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 69,157 69,105 69,093 68,796 50,708 







Appendix 2-A7. Robustness tests: Introducing firm-position-year fixed effects 
In this table, I reproduce the main results for my employee-level analyses after introducing firm-position-year fixed effects. The dependent variables include the 
overall job satisfaction rating, Overall Rating, and the five subcomponent ratings, Career, Compensation, Work-life, Leadership, and Culture, respectively. The 
variable of interest, Female, is a dummy variable taking a value of one if female, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2-A1. Statistical 
significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Gender differences in job satisfaction with firm-position-year fixed effects 
 Overall rating  Career  Compensation  Work-life  Leadership  Culture 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Female -0.045***  -0.027**  -0.009  -0.072***  -0.037**  -0.042*** 
 (-3.59)  (-2.14)  (-0.66)  (-5.52)  (-2.55)  (-2.80) 
Age -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.002***  -0.011***  -0.013***  -0.013*** 
 (-10.10)  (-13.96)  (-2.71)  (-10.43)  (-10.80)  (-10.09) 
Education 0.012  -0.028***  -0.041***  0.043***  0.029***  0.040*** 
 (1.51)  (-2.84)  (-4.24)  (4.10)  (3.21)  (3.70) 
Firm-Position-Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 96,983  94,994  94,907  94,879  94,470  71,100 
Adjusted R-sq 0.173  0.136  0.183  0.152  0.133  0.157 
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Panel B. Gender differences in job attribute preferences with firm-position-year fixed effects 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.002 -0.001 -0.136*** -0.072*** -0.078** 
 (0.10) (-0.02) (-4.78) (-3.23) (-2.54) 
Career 0.650*** 
    
 (111.51) 
    
Career × Female -0.009 
    
 (-1.28) 








   
Compensation × Female 
 
-0.012 


























   
(106.31) 
 
Leadership × Female 








    
0.618*** 
 
    
(86.12) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.014* 
 
    
(1.77) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Position-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 94,994 94,907 94,879 94,470 71,100 
Adjusted R-sq 0.559 0.427 0.428 0.581 0.576 
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Panel C. Gender gaps in workplace preferences among mid-level managers with firm-
position-year fixed effects 
 Overall rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.012 -0.002 -0.180*** -0.090*** -0.100** 
 (-0.42) (-0.06) (-4.98) (-3.20) (-2.58) 
Female × Manager 0.052 0.003 0.136** 0.058 0.076 
 (0.94) (0.05) (2.26) (1.16) (1.36) 
Career  0.644*** 
    
 (99.59) 
    
Career × Female  -0.005 
    
 (-0.59) 
    
Career × Manager 0.022** 
    
 (2.35) 
    
Career × Female × Manager -0.015 
    
 (-1.08) 








   
Compensation × Female 
 
-0.011 




   
Compensation × Manager 
 
0.022* 




   
Compensation × Female × Manager 
 
-0.002 










































   
(93.34) 
 
Leadership × Female 




   
(2.84) 
 
Leadership × Manager 




   
(4.03) 
 
Leadership × Female × Manager 








    
0.609*** 
 
    
(78.00) 
Culture × Female 
    
0.021** 
 
    
(2.05) 
Culture × Manager 
    
0.029*** 
 
    
(2.71) 
Culture × Female × Manager 
    
-0.022 
 
    
(-1.54) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Position-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 94,994 94,907 94,879 94,470 71,100 






Appendix 2-A8. Gender gap in overall rating and firm value 
This table examines the relation between the gender gap in overall rating and firm value. The dependent 
variable is Tobin’s q, defined as the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of 
equity, all divided by total assets. For each firm in a particular year, I compute Gender gap_Overall as 
the average overall rating of male employees minus the average overall rating of female employees. I 
include a rich set of firm, governance, and CEO controls. Average overall rating is the average overall 
rating of all employees in a firm. Best100 is an indicator that equals one if a firm is included in the 
“100 Best Companies to Work For in America” list, and zero otherwise. R&D is the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total assets. Ln(Sales) is the natural logarithm of sales. Cash is cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets, where total debt is 
defined as current liabilities plus long-term debt. Return is the annual stock return. Ln(Employee) is the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees. % of Female director is the fraction of female 
directors on the board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. CEO chair is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. Female CEO is an 
indicator that equals one if the CEO is female, and zero otherwise. Ln(CEO tenure) is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the CEO has been in office. Ln(CEO age) is the natural logarithm of 
CEO age in years. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Tobin’s Q  
(1) (2) 
Gender gap_Overall -0.030** -0.030**  
(-2.27) (-2.28) 




0.100   
(0.75) 
R&D 3.597 3.623  
(0.63) (0.64) 
Ln(Sales) 0.608** 0.609**  
(2.38) (2.39) 
Cash 0.656** 0.665**  
(1.97) (2.02) 
Leverage -0.217 -0.208  
(-0.73) (-0.71) 
Return 0.595*** 0.595***  
(10.12) (10.14) 
Ln(Employee) -0.255 -0.258  
(-1.40) (-1.42) 
% Female director -0.309 -0.311  
(-0.97) (-0.98) 
Board size -0.001 -0.002  
(-0.12) (-0.13) 
CEO chair -0.011 -0.012  
(-0.17) (-0.18) 
Female CEO 0.015 0.015  
(0.13) (0.13) 
Ln(CEO tenure) 0.064* 0.064*  
(1.88) (1.89) 
Ln(CEO age) -0.626** -0.628** 
 (-2.45) (-2.45) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 3,758 3,758 








Appendix 2-A9. Instrumental variable approach 
This table presents the results of the instrumental variable method using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
panel regressions. The dependent variables are Gender gap_WL and Tobin’s q for the first-stage and 
second-stage regressions, respectively. Tobin’s q is defined as the market value of equity plus total 
assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by total assets. For each firm-year observation, I 
calculate Gender gap_WL as the average work-life balance rating of male employees minus the average 
work-life balance rating of female employees. The instrumental variable, Average cost childcare, is the 
average employee-specific Cost childcare under 3 in a firm in a year, based on the employee’s work 
location. I add the same set of firm, governance, and CEO controls as in Table 9 including Average 
overall rating, Best100, R&D, Ln(Sales), Cash, Leverage, Return, Ln(Employee), % Female directors, 
Board size, CEO chair, Female CEO, Ln(CEO tenure), and Ln(CEO age). All other variables are 
defined in Appendix 2-A1. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 2SLS 
 Gender gap_WL  Tobin’s Q 
 First stage  Second stage 
 (1)  (3) 
Gender gap_WL   -0.665* 
   (-1.65) 
Average cost childcare  3.046**   
 (2.11)   
Controls Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE Yes  Yes 
Firm FE Yes  Yes 








Appendix 2-A10. Alternative explanations for the value effect of gender 
satisfaction gap 
This table reports the results of regressing employee turnover and corporate innovation on the gender 
gap of work-life balance. Employee turnover is the number of forfeited employee stock options in the 
previous year divided by the total number of outstanding stock options, following Carter and Lynch 
(2004) and Babenko and Sen (2014). Ln(Patent) is the natural logarithm of the number of patents. For 
each fir-year, I compute Gender gap_WL as the average work-life balance rating of male employees 
minus the average work-life balance rating of female employees. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 2-A1. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 Employee turnover  Ln(Patent)  
(1)  (2) 
Gender gap_WL -0.001  0.001  
(-0.28)  (0.17) 
Controls Yes  Yes 
Firm FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
N 3,547  3,758 
Adjusted R-sq 0.040  0.308 
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3 Financial Constraints and Employee Satisfaction 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Employees, as a key ingredient of human capital, play a pivotal role in the 
modern corporation. Most firms face the challenge of recruiting and retaining talented 
and skilled employees and improving employee engagement in today’s competitive 
labor market. Prior literature highlights the satisfaction of employees can enhance 
employee motivation and retention (Maslow, 1943; Hertzberg, 1959; McGregor, 1960; 
Becker and Gerhart, 1996), which in turn have a favorable impact on firm 
performance (Edmans, 2011; Green et al., 2019). To increase employee satisfaction, 
many firms spend considerable resources not only on employee compensation but also 
on the construction of employee-friendly workplaces with flexible working schedules 
and supportive management styles. For instance, Google provides various benefits for 
employees, including free food, onsite childcare facilities, flexible holiday and leave 
policies, 20% Creative Time Program, and employee stock options.69  
Investments in employee satisfaction, however, depend on a firm’s access to 
finance. As with other forms of investments in intangible assets such as research and 
development (R&D), spending on employee wellbeing must be financed by firms, 
while the payoffs of such investments generally accrue slowly and are difficult to be 
evaluated by capital markets. In the face of financing constraints, managers have 
strong incentives to preserve internal cash flows by reducing investments in long-term 
projects (Savignac, 2008; Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016; Xu and Kim, 2020). Hence, 
financially constrained firms can see the reduction in investments in employee 
wellbeing and deteriorating workplace culture. For example, employees in financially 
 
69 20% Creative Time Program is that employees are allowed to use twenty percent of their paid work 
time in the project they are interested in.  
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constrained firms are likely to work overtime, face greater performance pressure, and 
have more uncertain career prospects. As a result, such employees are significantly 
less satisfied with their jobs. In this chapter, I investigate the effect of financial 
constraints on employee satisfaction using 120,610 Glassdoor employee reviews from 
848 U.S. public firms between 2008 and 2015. I hypothesize financial constraints have 
an adverse impact on employee satisfaction.  
Glassdoor is an employer review platform where employees can voluntarily 
and anonymously review their companies and share working experiences. Each 
company review contains the rating of employee overall satisfaction, as well as other 
workplace attributes such as work-life balance, senior leadership, career opportunity, 
and recommendation. In addition, Glassdoor provides a rich set of employee 
information, including employee gender, highest education level, and age. Using this 
novel dataset, I examine the influence of corporate financing conditions on employee 
satisfaction at the individual level after controlling for various employee and firm 
characteristics.  
Using several proxies and empirical strategies to capture corporate financial 
constraints, I find that employee satisfaction is substantially lower in financially 
constrained firms. This effect is not only statistically but also economically significant. 
On average, a one-standard-deviation increase in the degree of financial constraints 
reduces employee overall satisfaction by roughly 3.3%. The results are robust to 
controls for a battery of employee and firm characteristics, various models, and 
different subsamples. In addition, I find male, high-educated, and young employees 
are on average more satisfied with their working environment.  
To sharpen my evidence, I further explore the moderating effect of exogenous 
state-level corporate tax increases on financially constrained firms (Heider and 
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Ljungqvist, 2015). The increases in corporate tax result in firms having a greater 
demand for debt financing due to an enlarged tax shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), 
while it is hard for financially constrained firms to adjust their leverage to seize the 
benefits (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016). If employee-friendly policies are 
significantly shaped by financial constraints, I expect the effect to be amplified when 
increasing debt level is optimal. The estimation results are consistent with my 
conjecture that the adverse impact of financial constraints on employee satisfaction is 
more pronounced in firms incorporated in the states with exogenous increases in state-
level corporate tax. 
In addition to employee overall satisfaction, I further explore which specific 
aspect of workplace attributes is influenced more by financial constraints. By 
decomposing the overall rating, I find the lower employee satisfaction in financially 
constrained firms is mainly driven by decreasing employee assessments of work-life 
balance, lower confidence in senior leadership, and worse career opportunities. Career 
opportunity is the workplace attribute most sensitive to the degree of financial 
constraints, suggesting employees in financially constrained firms have more 
pessimistic expectations about their career prospects. Consequently, such employees 
are less likely to recommend their employer in the job market, impeding the 
recruitment of talent.  
Finally, I explore the value implications of employee satisfaction. Employees 
are widely recognized as the critical organizational assets, who can create value for 
firms through fostering product innovation or building customer relationships 
(Maslow, 1943; Hertzberg, 1959; McGregor, 1960). Satisfied employees are more 
motivated, productive, and loyal and consequently improve firm performance 
(Edmans, 2011). In this chapter, I find that employee overall satisfaction, as well as 
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the satisfaction on various workplace attributes such as work-life balance, senior 
leadership, career opportunity, and recommendation, is positively associated with 
firm performance. This is consistent with Edmans (2011) and Green et al. (2019) that 
employee-friendly policies are beneficial for firm value and shareholder wealth. More 
importantly, my results highlight employee satisfaction is a plausible channel through 
which financial constraints influence firm performance.  
This chapter contributes to several strands of the literature. First, this chapter 
is related to the literature on the real effects of financial constraints on corporate social 
and environmental performance. The investments in social and environmental 
performance are costly but the benefits accrue slowly over time. Therefore, financially 
constrained firms are incentivized to underinvest in such projects to preserve internal 
cash flows (Savignac, 2008; Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016; Xu and Kim, 2020). For 
instance, Hong et al. (2012) report a negative impact of financial constraints on 
corporate social responsibility. Xu and Kim (2020) find the relaxation of financial 
constraints encourages managers to invest more in pollution abatement and thus 
reduce corporate pollution. With respect to employee wellbeing, Cohn and Wardlaw 
(2016) suggest financing frictions reduce corporate investments in workplace safety, 
leading to higher workplace injury rates. Using bankruptcy filings by U.S. public 
firms, Graham et al. (2013) show employee compensation in financially distressed 
firms significantly decreases around bankruptcy. Benmelech et al. (2019) uncover a 
negative effect of financial frictions on employment during the Great Depression. 
Using Glassdoor reviews, this chapter studies the effect of financial constraints on 
employee satisfaction which is an important aspect of social and environmental 
performance. Consistent with previous studies, I find that financial constraints may 




Second, this chapter contributes to the literature on the determinants of 
employee-friendly policies. Over recent years, extensive literature explores the 
implications of employee satisfaction on innovation (Chen et al., 2016), capital 
structure (Bae et al., 2011), cash holding (Ghaly et al., 2015), financial misconduct 
(Zhou and Makridis, 2019), corporate disclosure (Ji et al., 2017), and firm 
performance (Edmans, 2011, 2012; Guiso et al., 2015; Hales et al., 2018; Green et al., 
2019). However, the drivers of employee satisfaction remain largely unexplored.70 In 
this chapter, I find that financial constraints are the key determinant of employee-
friendly policies. Employees may be less satisfied with their employer in the face of 
financing constraints. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first study to 
provide empirical evidence on how corporate financing conditions influence 
employee satisfaction at the individual level.  
Lastly, this chapter finds employee overall rating, as well as various workplace 
attributes such as work-life balance, senior leadership, career opportunity, and 
recommendation, is positively associated with firm performance. My results 
complement previous studies using similar data. For instance, Green et al. (2019) 
suggest a positive effect of the change in employee overall satisfaction on stock 
returns, while Hales et al. (2018) and Sheng (2019) find employees’ assessment of 
company’s business outlook can predict future performance. More importantly, this 
chapter suggests the underinvestment in intangible assets (i.e., employee satisfaction) 
can be a potential channel through which financial constraints reduce firm value, 
particularly in the long run, which echoes the findings by Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) 
that the increased workplace injury rates caused by financial constraints substantially 
 
70 There is a small contemporary literature on how employee satisfaction is determined by corporate 
governance (Menner and Menninger, 2018), relative compensation (Leah-Martin, 2017), and 
organization form (Huang et al., 2015).  
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reduce firm value. The results caution against reducing investments in intangible 
assets when financing is tight. Moreover, given the importance of employee 
satisfaction for firm performance, the results imply that firms should be prudent in 
their financing choice. Maintaining financial slack (i.e., spare debt capacity and cash 
reserve) could play a pivotal role in sustaining employee satisfaction. 
3.2 Data and Summary Statistics  
3.2.1 Glassdoor data  
Glassdoor (www.glassdoor.com) is an employee review website with 60 
million monthly visits where employees can review their companies, interview 
experience, compensation and benefits, and other workplace practices.71 The platform 
was founded in 2008 and contains approximately three million reviews from 280,000 
firms (including public and private firms) in 2015. 
For each employee review, I extract information of employees’ overall rating 
for their employer (Overall rating), as well as sub-category ratings regarding work-
life balance (Work-life), senior leadership (Leadership), and career opportunity 
(Career), ranging from 1 (least satisfied) to 5 (most satisfied). In addition to these 
ratings, Glassdoor provides an assessment of recommendation (Recommend) that is 
an indicator variable that equals to one if the employee is willing to recommend this 
company to others, and zero otherwise. Moreover, each review contains a set of 
employee characteristics such as employee gender (Gender), the highest education 
level (Education), and age (Age). Gender is an indicator variable that equals one for 
male employee, and zero for female employee. Education is an indicator variable set 
to one if the employee owns a bachelor or higher degree and zero otherwise. Age is 
employees’ age in the years. 
 
71 Source: https://www.glassdoor.com/about-us/ 
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3.2.2 Measures of financial constraints 
There are various measures for financial constraints in previous studies (e.g., 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; Hoberg 
and Maksimovic, 2015; Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2015). In this chapter, I use 
several proxies prevalent in the literature, including the Whited-Wu (WW) index 
(Whited and Wu, 2006) and the text-based equity and debt constraints (Hoberg and 
Maksimovic, 2015). 
The main measure for financial constraints is the WW index (Whited and Wu, 
2006) that is an accounting-based measure constructed by the coefficients of a 
structural model. As compared to other widely used accounting-based financial 
constraints measures such as the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) and the HP 
index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), the WW index can more accurately identify firm 
characteristics related to financial constraints and avoid the problems of sample 
selection, simultaneity, and measurement-error (Whited and Wu, 2006). In addition, 
the WW index can provide “sufficient” time-series variation and thus I can include 
firm fixed effects in the estimation to control for firm-level time-invariant and 
unobservable characteristics. The construction of the WW index loads on six 
accounting variables, including cash flow to total assets (negative), an indicator 
variable of dividend policy (negative), long-term debt to total assets (positive), firm 
size (negative), sales growth (negative), and industry sales growth (positive). The less 
profitable, highly leveraged, smaller, and lower growth firms will have a larger WW 
index, representing a higher degree of financial constraints. The linear combination 
of the WW index is presented as follows: 
𝑊𝑊 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.091𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 − 0.062𝑃𝑎𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 0.021𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡





Where i indexes firm and t indexes year. CF is the sum of income before extraordinary 
items and depreciation and amortization, divided by total assets. PayDiv is an 
indicator variable set to one if firms pay dividends and zero otherwise. LTD is the ratio 
of long-term debts to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. IndustrySG is 
the average industry sales growth by the SIC three-digit industry code. SG is the firm 
sales growth.  
In addition to the WW index, I employ two text-based financial constraints 
measures, developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015).72  Through analysing the 
mandatory disclosure of liquidity in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) section in the 10-K file, Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) evaluate corporate 
financing constraints using the objective algorithm, with higher values indicating that 
firms are more at risk of delaying their investments due to issues with liquidity. The 
merit of this measure is not relying on corporate accounting information that may be 
associated with employee satisfaction. Indeed, I find the text-based financial 
constraints measures are weakly correlated with accounting-based financial measures 
(i.e., KZ, WW, and HP index). Specifically, I focus on two text-based variables, equity 
constraints and debt constraints, to capture financial constraints in the equity and debt 
market, respectively. The higher score indicates firms are more constrained in the 
equity and debt market.  The definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3-1. 
[Insert Table 3-1 here] 
3.2.3 Sample construction and summary statistics  
To construct my sample, I begin with Glassdoor employee reviews for public 
firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ from 2008 to 2015. I exclude financial 
(SIC code 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC code 4900-4999) because their firm 
 
72 Data source: http://faculty.marshall.usc.edu/Gerard-Hoberg/MaxDataSite/index.html 
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characteristics (e.g., capital structure) are affected by regulatory requirements. To 
ensure the informativeness of the ratings, I first remove the reviews posted by “former” 
employees since the exact departure date of former employees is not presented in 
Glassdoor.73 In addition to timeliness, the former employees, especially the dismissed 
employees, are more likely to post irrational reviews on their employer.74 To alleviate 
the concern that the results are manipulated by the firms with few reviews, I then 
require firms to have at least 50 reviews during the sample period (Hales et al., 
2018). 75  Further, I delete all the incomplete reviews with missing employee 
characteristics (i.e., employee gender, highest education level, and age). 
I then merge Glassdoor data with the Compustat database to obtain financial 
information. As Glassdoor data have no common identifier with Compustat, I 
manually match Glassdoor company names with those from the Compustat database. 
To ensure the accuracy of the match, I manually check my sample firms on several 
identifiers such as CEO name, company headquarter, founding year, and short 
business description provided by Glassdoor and delete incorrect matches. Finally, my 
sample consists of 12,610 employee reviews from 848 U.S. public firms listed on 
NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX between 2008 and 2015. Panel A of Table 3-2 presents 
summary statistics for Glassdoor variables. The number of reviews in sub-category 
ratings is slightly less than that in the overall rating because the filling of such reviews 
is not compulsory.  
[Insert Table 3-2 here] 
 
73 Employees are required by Glassdoor to claim the employee status (current or previous employee) 
when they post a company review. 
74 Indeed, I find that former employees are significantly less satisfied with all workplace attributes than 
current employees. 
75 I also set the threshed as at least 40, 60, 80, and 100 reviews, the results are not materially changed. 
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On average, employee overall satisfaction (Overall Rating) is 3.440. The sub-
category ratings vary from 3.038 (Leadership) to 3.413 (Work-life), suggesting 
employees tend to post a positive rating for their companies. To mitigate the concern 
of selection bias that only most and least satisfied employees could post reviews, I 
calculate the mode of each employee rating. The mode is 4.00 for Overall Rating and 
Work-life, and 3.00 for Leadership and Career, indicating reviews on Glassdoor 
platform are mainly posted by moderate employees.76 Unlike the 5-star scale of other 
ratings, the Recommend is a dummy variable that equals to one if reviewers are willing 
to recommend this company to their friends, and zero otherwise. The mean 
Recommend is 0.68, suggesting considerable employees regard their current company 
as a good place to work. In terms of employee characteristics, 84.4% of employees in 
my sample have a bachelor or higher degree, 66.7% of employees are male, and the 
average age of employees is 33.08. 
Panel B of Table 3-2 presents the correlation matrix for Glassdoor ratings. 
Unsurprisingly, all sub-category ratings are highly correlated with Overall Rating. In 
particular, Overall Rating is least correlated with Work-life Balance (0.575) and most 
correlated with Recommend (0.748). The correlations among sub-category ratings 
vary from 0.426 (Work-life Balance & Career Opportunity) to 0.638 (Senior 
Leadership & Recommend).  
Panel C of Table 3-2 reports a univariate analysis for differences in Glassdoor 
variables between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Following Farre-
Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), I define firms as “constrained” if the WW index is in 
the top tercile of the sample and as “unconstrained” in the bottom tercile. Employee 
 
76 To further mitigate this concern, I replicate my main results after excluding extreme review (1 or 5 
rating). The results main robust. 
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satisfaction is substantially lower in financially constrained firms than that in 
unconstrained firms. For instance, the mean value of Overall Rating in unconstrained 
firms is 3.586, while that is only 3.294 in constrained firms, leading to a 0.292 
unconditional gap.  
3.3 Main Results  
3.3.1 Financial constraints and employee overall rating  
In this section, I employ the ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to 
investigate the effect of financial constraints on employee overall rating. 77  The 
regression specification is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3-2) 
Where i indexes the individual review, j indexes the firm, and t indexes the year 
respectively. The dependent variable is employee overall rating (Overall rating). The 
variable of interest, FCjt, measures financial constraints using the Whited and Wu 
(2006) index (WW index) and text-based financial constraints measures in the equity 
and debt markets (Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2015). Xijt is a vector of employee 
characteristics including employee gender, employee education, and employee age. Zjt 
is a vector of firm characteristics such as return on asset (ROA), firm size (Size), 
capital structure (Leverage), and market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book). The 
definitions of variables are presented in Table 3-1. Firm and year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications to control for time-invariant firm and year characteristics. 
I cluster the standard errors at the firm level.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 3-3. FC stands for WW index in 
Columns (1), (2), and (5), equity constraints in Column (3), and debt constraints in 
 
77 As Glassdoor employee rating ranges from 0 to 5, I also employ the ordered probit model to replicate 
the main results and obtain similar results.  
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Column (4), respectively. I start with a model without control variables in Column (1). 
The coefficient on FC is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting employees are less satisfied in financially constrained firms. The 
coefficient on FC remains negative and statistically significant when controlling for 
employee and firm characteristics in Column (2). This effect is also economically 
significant. As shown in Column (2), a one-standard-deviation increase in financial 
constraints is associated with approximately a 3.3% decrease in employee overall 
satisfaction. Columns (3) and (4) use equity constraints and debt constraints as 
alternative measures for financial constraints in the equity and debt markets (Hoberg 
and Maksimovic, 2015). In both columns, the results continue to show a negative 
effect of financial constraints on employee satisfaction, suggesting firms subject to 
difficulty in raising funds through equity or debt markets have significantly lower 
employee satisfaction. Taken together, regardless of the financial constraints proxy, 
this chapter reports a significant and negative effect of financial constraints on 
employee satisfaction. In addition, the coefficients on employee characteristics imply 
that male, highly educated, and young employees are more satisfied at work with their 
employer.  
[Insert Table 3-3 here] 
I then explore the moderating effect of corporate tax increases on constrained 
firms (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). Trade-off theory predicts the optimal capital 
structure is determined by the trade-off between tax-saving and bankruptcy cost (Scott, 
1977). As debt confers tax benefits on firms when interests are tax-deductible, 
increases in tax rates may raise the value of tax shields, thereby motivating firms to 
improve the use of debt financing (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Indeed, Heider and 
Ljungqvist (2015) find firms are incentivized to increase firm leverage and borrowing 
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to take advantage of tax shields, in response to an increase in state corporate tax. 
However, financially constrained firms may have difficulties increasing their leverage 
to seize the benefits of a larger tax shield after tax increases, thereby becoming more 
constrained (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016). Thus, if financial constraints indeed 
decrease employee satisfaction, I conjecture this relation could be more pronounced 
in periods of corporate tax increases.  
To test this conjecture, I exploit state corporate income tax increases during 
my sample period.78 I define Tax Shock as an indicator variable that equals one if a 
state experiences an increase in corporate income tax in the given year, and zero 
otherwise. In Column (5) of Table 3-3, I explore how the WW index interacts with 
state-level corporate tax increases to influence employee satisfaction. As expected, I 
find that the coefficient on the interaction term FC*Tax Shock is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. It suggests that financially constrained firms 
become more constrained in the period of corporate tax increases, thereby amplifying 
the negative effect of financial constraints on employee satisfaction.  
3.3.2 Robustness tests 
In this section, I perform a battery of robustness tests to confirm the validity 
of the results. I start with the major concern of over/under-sampling due to the 
distribution of employee reviews. As my sample consists of 120,610 reviews from 
only 848 unique public firms, the number of reviews per firm may vary largely within 
and across the sample. Appendix 3-A1 reports the average number of reviews per firm 
across years at the different percentiles of the distribution (5th-95th). Indeed, there is 
substantial variation both across years and across firms. For example, the median 
 
78 The list of state corporate income tax increases is collected from Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), the 
Book of the States, and the Tax Foundation website (http://www.taxfoundation.org). 
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number of reviews is only 7 in 2008, while it significantly increases to 26 reviews in 
2015. Also, there is a cross-sectional variation in the same year. The number of 
reviews per firm at the 5th and 95th percentile is 40 and 228 respectively in 2015. 
Moreover, I find the reviews in my sample are concentrated in a few firms. The 
number of reviews in the top 10 firms (with most reviews) accounts for approximately 
20% (24,616 reviews) of sample observations.  
I conduct two tests to alleviate this concern. First, I replicate my main results 
with Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression, weighting by the number of reviews 
per firm scaled by total reviews. The results are presented in Appendix 3-A2 and are 
robust to this alternative estimated model. Second, I drop reviews (25,116) from the 
top 10 firms with the most (least) reviews and re-estimate the regressions.79 As shown 
in Appendix 3-A3, my main findings are not materially changed after excluding firms 
with the most (least) reviews. Overall, the over/under-sampling issue is unlikely to 
influence the validity of the results. 
Second, a common concern with online reviews is the sample selection bias; 
that is, the extremely satisfied or unsatisfied employees are more likely to post an 
online review compared with moderate ones. To address this concern, I first calculate 
the mode of each rating. The mode for overall satisfaction (Overall Rating) and work-
life balance (Work-life) is 4 and for senior leadership (Leadership) and career 
opportunity (Career) it is 3, suggesting most reviews are posted by moderate 
employees. In addition, I exclude the extreme reviews with 1 or 5 ratings and re-run 
the estimations. The results reported in Appendix 3-A4 demonstrate that my main 
findings remain robust after excluding the extreme reviews. 
 
79 In untabulated tables, I also try to exclude the top 5 and 20 firms with the most/least reviews, 
respectively and find qualitatively similar results 
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Third, financially constrained firms are less likely to attract new employees 
(Garmaise, 2008) and more likely to reduce employment (Siemer, 2019), hindering 
the retaining and recruitment of talent in the labor market. The changes in employment 
may be associated with the number of reviews and ratings for the employer (Huang et 
al., 2015). As such, in Appendix 3-A5 I obtain an additional control variable, 
employee turnover, to control for the annual percentage change in employees. The 
results are quantitatively similar.  
3.3.3 Financial constraints and employee sub-category ratings 
Next, I explore which specific aspects of workplace practices are influenced 
more by financial conditions. Employees in financially constrained firms are likely to 
work overtime, face greater performance pressure from senior management, and have 
more uncertain career prospects. From this perspective, I investigate the effect of 
financial constraints on employee rating of work-life balance, senior leadership, and 
career opportunity. The results are presented in Table 3-4. Columns (1) to (3) report 
the estimation results for the effects of financial constraints on work-life balance 
(Work-life), senior leadership (Leadership), and career opportunity (Career), 
respectively. The variable of interest is financial constraints FC measured by the WW 
index.80 The regression specifications are the same as those in Table 3-3.  
[Insert Table 3-4 here] 
Consistent with results for overall satisfaction, the coefficient on FC in 
Columns (1) to (3) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that the lower satisfaction in financially constrained firms is mainly driven by 
decreasing employee assessments of work-life balance, lower confidence in senior 
 
80 I obtain similar results when two text-based measures (i.e., Equity and debt constraints) are employed 
as proxies for financial constraints. 
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leadership and more pessimistic expectations about career prospects. Career 
opportunity is most sensitive to corporate financial conditions. The magnitude of 
coefficient for Career is -1.357 which is considerably larger than those for Work-life 
(-0.903) and Leadership (-1.073).  
Finally, I explore whether lower employee satisfaction with work-life balance, 
senior leadership, and career opportunity consequently lead to challenges in the 
recruitment of talent. In Column (4) of Table 3-4, I find employees in firms with 
financial constraints are less likely to recommend their employer to others, suggesting 
financial constraints result in difficulty in recruiting new talent. This finding 
complements Brown and Matsa (2016), that a deterioration in financial condition 
reduces a firm’s attractiveness in the job market.  
3.4 Employee Satisfaction and Firm Value 
While my results so far indicate an adverse effect of financial constraints on 
employee satisfaction, one important question remains unanswered: Whether the 
reduced employee satisfaction sufficiently matters for firms? To address this question, 
I explore the consequences of the reduction in employee satisfaction on firm value in 
this section.  
Previous literature indicates employee satisfaction benefits firms in several 
ways. First, high employee satisfaction can enhance the motivation of employees. 
Human relations theories view employees as the key source of human capital assets 
that can create substantial value for companies through building client relationships 
or inventing new products and patents (Maslow, 1943; McGregor, 1960; Becker and 
Gerhart, 1996). Employee-friendly workplaces can motivate employees to enhance 
efforts due to the increasing costs of losing a satisfying job (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984). Accordingly, satisfied employees are motivated to complete, even go beyond 
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the formal requirements of the job, whereby producing additional values for 
companies (Edmans, 2012). Second, maintaining employee satisfaction benefits the 
recruitment and retention of talented employees who are becoming increasingly 
valuable for modern firms; to the extent that compensation is not the only deciding 
factor in terms of which company they working for. Instead, the “soft” factors such as 
a pleasant and flexible working environment, employee-friendly corporate culture, 
and potential career opportunities are more likely to attract employees (Mitchell et al., 
2001). In contrast, firms with a bad reputation may suffer a higher turnover rate and 
challenges in the recruitment of talent (Shapiro and Titman, 1986), leading to a lower 
firm valuation. Indeed, recent studies (Edmans, 2011; Green et al., 2019) find a 
significant positive relation between employee satisfaction and firm performance.  
In this section, I attempt to investigate the value implications of employee 
satisfaction using Glassdoor reviews. Specifically, I estimate the model as follows: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡  (3-3) 
Where j indexes the firm and t indexes the year. The dependent variable is one of two 
measures for firm value, Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value 
of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets. ROA 
is the return on assets calculated as the operating income divided by total assets. To 
capture the employee satisfaction at the firm level, I calculate Average employee 
satisfaction as the average employee rating of overall satisfaction, as well as each 
workplace practice, submitted by all employees for each firm-year observation. Z is a 
vector of firm characteristics including firm size, leverage ratio, and market-to-book 
ratio. I control for firm and year fixed effects in my analysis and cluster standard errors 
at the firm level.  
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The estimation results are shown in Table 3-5. The dependent variable is 
Tobin’s Q in Panel A and ROA in Panel B. I start by regressing the average overall 
rating on Tobin’s Q in Column (1) of Panel A. The coefficient on average employee 
satisfaction is positively related to Tobin’s Q, suggesting higher employee overall 
satisfaction can significantly improve firm value. In Columns (2) to (5), I explore how 
Tobin’s Q is influenced by average employee satisfaction of Work-life balance, 
Career, Leadership, and Recommend, respectively. Across all columns, the 
coefficient on average employee satisfaction remains positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better. 
[Insert Table 3-5 here] 
I then replicate the same regressions as those employed in Panel A with the 
dependent variable of ROA. The results are shown in Panel B. Similarly, the 
coefficient on average employee satisfaction remains positive and statistically 
significant in the specifications of overall rating, career opportunity, senior leadership, 
and recommend, while the regression of average work-life balance rating becomes 
insignificant.  
To summarize, Table 3-5 provides strong evidence in support of the value 
implications of employee satisfaction. My results are consistent with Edmans (2011) 
and Green et al. (2019) that employee satisfaction is positively associated with firm 
performance. More importantly, combined with the finding that financial constraints 
may reduce employee satisfaction, my study implies that employee satisfaction could 
be an important channel through which financial constraints reduce firm value. Given 
the importance of employee-friendly workplaces for firm performance, my results 
suggest firms should be prudent in their financing choice. Maintaining financial slack 
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(i.e., spare debt capacity and cash reserve) could play an important role in sustaining 
employee satisfaction and consequently influence the firm valuation. 
3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter investigates the effect of financial conditions on employee 
satisfaction. Using over 120,000 employee reviews from Glassdoor, I find an adverse 
impact of financial constraints on employee satisfaction. Decomposing employee 
overall rating, I find lower overall employee satisfaction is mainly driven by worse 
assessments of work-life balance, senior leadership, and career prospects. 
Consequently, unsatisfied employees are less likely to recommend their employer, 
impeding the recruitment of talent in the labor market. Finally, I explore the value 
implications of employee-friendly workplaces. The average overall employee rating, 
as well as various sub-category ratings, is positively associated with firm performance, 
which supports the findings of Edmans (2011) and Green et al. (2019).  
This chapter highlights employee satisfaction is an important channel through 
which financial constraints reduce firm value. Given the pivotal role employee 
satisfaction plays in improving firm performance, my results caution against 
underinvestment in employee-friendly workplaces when financing is tight. By 
contrast, managers should be prudent in their financing choice and hold more financial 





Table 3-1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Glassdoor Rating  
Overall Employee’s overall rating of employer scaled on 1-5 star: five 
(one) is most favorable (unfavorable).   
Glassdoor 
Work-life Employee’s evaluation of his or her work-life balance in this 
company scared on a 1-5 star: five (one) is most favorable 
(unfavorable).   
Glassdoor 
Leadership Employee’s evaluation of employee’s senior management 
scaled on a 1-5 star: five (one) is most favorable (unfavorable).   
Glassdoor 
Career Employee’s evaluation of career development in this company 
scaled on a 1-5 star: five (one) is most favorable (unfavorable).   
Glassdoor 
Recommend Would you recommend your company to a friend? 1-No, 2-Yes Glassdoor 
   
Employee Characteristics  
Age Employees’ age in years Glassdoor 
Education An indicator variable set to one if employees’ highest education 
degree is a bachelor or higher, and zero otherwise. 
Glassdoor 






WW index Constructed following Whited and Wu (2006), as –0.091*[(ib + 
dp)/at] – 0.062*[indicator set to one if dvc + dvp is positive, 
and zero otherwise] + 0.021*[dltt/at]– 0.044*[log(at)] + 
0.102*[average SIC 3-digit industry sales growth] – 









Text-based measure of debt financing constraints Hoberg and 
Maksimovic 
(2015) 
Tax Shock An indicator variable set to one if one state experiences the 







Leverage Total debt over total assets Compustat 
Size The natural logarithm of total sales  Compustat 
Market-to-
Book 
Market value of equity over the book value of equity  Compustat 
ROA Net income over the total sales Compustat 
Tobin Q Market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of 












Table 3-2. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables. Panel A presents the distribution and the 
number of observations of Glassdoor variables for my sample. Panel B shows the correlation matrix. 
Panel C reports the univariate analysis results by constrained (unconstrained). I identify the firms with 
the top (bottom) tercile of the WW index as the constrained (non-constrained) firms. All variables are 
defined in Table 3-1. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 25th Median 75th 
Overall 120,610 3.440 1.162 3.000 4.000 4.000 
Work-life 113,465 3.413 1.236 3.000 4.000 4.000 
Leadership 112,832 3.038 1.275 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Career 113,660 3.254 1.207 2.000 3.000 4.000 
Recommend 101,857 1.680 0.467 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Education 120,610 0.844 0.363 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Age 120,610 33.080 9.728 25.000 31.000 39.000 
Gender 120,610 0.667 0.471 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix  
Overall Rating Work-life Leadership Career Recommend 
Overall  1.000 
    
Work-life 0.575*** 1.000 
   
Leadership 0.738*** 0.536*** 1.000 
  
Career 0.715*** 0.426*** 0.629*** 1.000 
 
Recommend 0.748*** 0.494*** 0.638*** 0.606*** 1.000 


























































Table 3-3. Financial constraints and employee overall rating 
This table reports the panel regression on the effect of financial constraints on employee overall 
satisfaction. The dependent variable is Overall Rating. The variable of interest is FC that is the 
abbreviation of Financial Constraints, measured by WW index in Columns (1), (2), and (5), Equity 
Constraints in Column (3), and Debt Constraints in Column (4). Tax Shock is an indicator variable that 
equals to one if the state of a company incorporated experiences a corporate tax increase in the given 
year, and zero otherwise. The detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3-1. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Overall Rating 
 
WW Index WW Index Equity Constraints Debt Constraints WW 
index* Tax 
shock  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -1.475*** -1.333*** -0.730** -0.599*** -1.435*** 
 
(-4.13) (-3.51) (-2.25) (-2.70) (-2.85) 
FC*Tax shock     -0.286*** 
     (-2.87) 
Tax shock     -0.003 
     (-0.05) 
Gender 
 
0.047*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  
(5.06) (3.13) (3.18) (3.06) 
Education 
 
0.057*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.022 
  
(4.39) (3.51) (3.51) (1.30) 
Age  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
  (-10.90) (-7.86) (-7.81) (-9.07) 
ROA 
 
0.056 -0.018 -0.034 -0.330 
  
(0.29) (-0.06) (-0.13) (-0.98) 
Size 
 
0.034 0.122 0.145* 0.101 
  
(0.55) (1.46) (1.79) (1.06) 
Leverage 
 
0.000 -0.090 -0.071 0.145 
  
(0.00) (-0.66) (-0.49) (0.95) 
Market-to-Book 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  
(-0.51) (-0.89) (-0.44) (-0.43) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 120,610 120,610 77,129 77,129 67,956 







Table 3-4. Financial constraints and employee sub-category ratings 
This table reports the panel regression on the effect of financial constraints on employee sub-categories 
ratings. The dependent variables include Work-life, Leadership, Career, and Recommend in Columns 
(1) to (4), respectively. The variable of interest is FC that is the abbreviation of Financial Constraints, 
measured by the WW index. The detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3-1. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Sub-category ratings  
Work-life  Leadership  Career  Recommend  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
FC -0.907***  -1.074***  -1.361***  -0.316*  
(-2.81)  (-2.74)  (-3.60)  (-1.73) 
Gender 0.069***  0.024**  0.044***  0.015*** 
 (6.14)  (2.34)  (4.58)  (3.97) 
Education 0.076***  0.100***  0.026  0.029*** 
 (4.20)  (6.87)  (1.61)  (4.92) 
Age -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.012***  -0.005*** 
 (-13.13)  (-12.82)  (-12.61)  (-9.68) 
ROA -0.174  0.328*  0.052  0.084 
 (-1.29)  (1.94)  (0.29)  (0.93) 
Size 0.062  0.032  0.089  0.016 
 (1.15)  (0.50)  (1.56)  (0.58) 
Leverage -0.089  -0.075  0.010  0.020 
 (-0.70)  (-0.60)  (0.09)  (0.42) 
Market-to-Book -0.001  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (-0.56)  (0.05)  (-0.02)  (-0.65) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 113,465  112,832  113,660  101,857 







Table 3-5. Employee satisfaction and firm performance 
This table reports the panel regression on the implication of employee satisfaction on firm performance 
at the firm level. The dependent variable is Tobin Q in Panel A and ROA in Panel B, as proxies for firm 
performance. Employee Rating is the firm-year average rating of employee overall satisfaction in 
Column (1), work-life balance in Column (2), senior leadership in Column (3), career opportunity in 
Column (4), and recommend in Column (5). The detailed definitions of all variables are presented in 
Table 3-1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, 
and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Tobin Q  
Tobin Q  
Overall Rating Work-life Leadership Career Recommend  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee Rating 0.144*** 0.087** 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.201**  
(3.28) (2.37) (3.77) (2.62) (2.11) 
Size -0.323** -0.311** -0.322** -0.323** -0.318**  
(-2.45) (-2.34) (-2.43) (-2.45) (-2.36) 
Leverage -0.790** -0.792** -0.771** -0.790** -0.791**  
(-2.55) (-2.56) (-2.49) (-2.55) (-2.53) 
Market-to-Book 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***  
(4.69) (4.65) (4.63) (4.67) (4.65) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,235 3,235 3,235 3,235 3,222 
R-sq 0.144 0.140 0.145 0.142 0.140 
Panel B: ROA  
ROA  
Overall Rating Work-life Leadership Career Recommend  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee Rating 0.015*** 0.008 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.035***  
(3.06) (1.62) (3.45) (2.67) (3.63) 
Size 0.029** 0.031** 0.029** 0.030** 0.029**  
(2.24) (2.33) (2.23) (2.23) (2.21) 
Leverage -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.212***  
(-6.98) (-6.92) (-6.96) (-6.92) (-7.02) 
Market-to-Book 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**  
(2.52) (2.48) (2.40) (2.50) (2.46) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,235 3,235 3,235 3,235 3,222 








Appendix 3-A1. Average number of reviews per firm and year for the nth 
percentile 
This table reports the average number of reviews per firm across years at the different percentile of the 
distribution (5th-95th). 
Year  Percentile  
 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
2008  1 4 7 12.5 40 
2009  9 13 22 40 106 
2010  8 13 19 44 147 
2011  2 5 8 14 49 
2012  8 14 25.5 48 182 
2013  11 21 31 61 237 
2014  14 25 37 72 316 







Appendix 3-A2. Robustness tests: WLS Regression 
This table replicates the baseline results with WLS regression, weighting by the number of reviews per 
firm dividend by the total number of reviews. The dependent variable is Overall Rating. The variable 
of interest is FC that is the abbreviation of Financial Constraints, measured by WW index in Columns 
(1), (2), and (5), Equity Constraints in Column (3), and Debt Constraints in Column (4). Tax Shock is 
an indicator variable that equals to one if the state of a company incorporated experiences a corporate 
tax increase in the given year, and zero otherwise. The detailed definitions of all variables are presented 
in Table 3-1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 Overall Rating 
 
WW Index WW Index Equity Constraints Debt Constraints WW 
index* Tax 
shock  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -1.732*** -2.108** -1.891** -1.146*** -1.586** 
 
(-2.83) (-2.48) (-2.17) (-3.78) (-2.01) 
FC*Tax shock     -0.461*** 
     (-3.18) 
Tax shock     -0.031 
     (-0.31) 
Gender 
 
0.041** 0.033 0.034 0.031 
  
(2.57) (1.58) (1.62) (1.60) 
Education 
 
0.034** 0.020 0.019 -0.019 
  
(2.07) (0.90) (0.85) (-0.95) 
Age  -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
  (-5.30) (-4.86) (-4.71) (-4.99) 
ROA 
 
-0.417 -0.511 -0.282 -0.676 
  
(-1.12) (-0.89) (-0.73) (-1.26) 
Size 
 
-0.053 0.082 0.147 -0.036 
  
(-0.39) (0.70) (1.04) (-0.20) 
Leverage 
 
0.123 0.031 0.181 0.499 
  
(0.47) (0.08) (0.37) (1.40) 
Market-to-Book 
 
-0.004 -0.008* -0.008 -0.007 
  
(-1.31) (-1.69) (-1.44) (-0.98) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 120,610 120,610 77,129 77,129 67,956 







Appendix 3-A3. Robustness tests: Exclude firms with most/least reviews 
This table replicates the baseline results after excluding the top 10 firms with the most and least reviews. 
The dependent variable is Overall Rating. The variable of interest is FC that is the abbreviation of 
Financial Constraints, measured by WW index in Columns (1), (2), and (5), Equity Constraints in 
Column (3), and Debt Constraints in Column (4). Tax Shock is an indicator variable that equals to one 
if the state of a company incorporated experiences a corporate tax increase in the given year, and zero 
otherwise. The detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3-1. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 Overall Rating 
 
WW Index WW Index Equity Constraints Debt Constraints WW 
index* Tax 
shock  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -1.476*** -1.369*** -0.920** -0.485* -1.397** 
 
(-3.29) (-3.03) (-2.38) (-1.75) (-2.51) 
FC*Tax shock     -0.299*** 
     (-2.98) 
Tax shock     -0.002 
     (-0.03) 
Gender 
 
0.044*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
  
(4.10) (2.66) (2.69) (2.78) 
Education 
 
0.050*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.019 
  
(3.39) (2.78) (2.75) (1.00) 
Age  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
  (-8.74) (-6.16) (-6.10) (-7.41) 
ROA 
 
-0.116 -0.284 -0.282 -0.427 
  
(-0.47) (-0.79) (-0.87) (-1.07) 
Size 
 
0.059 0.152 0.177* 0.122 
  
(0.77) (1.39) (1.65) (1.12) 
Leverage 
 
-0.020 -0.172 -0.140 0.080 
  
(-0.16) (-1.06) (-0.80) (0.48) 
Market-to-Book 
 
0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  
(0.08) (-0.59) (-0.06) (-0.64) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 95,496 95,496 59,379 59,379 55,713 







Appendix 3-A4. Robustness tests: Exclude extreme reviews 
This table replicates the baseline results after excluding the reviews with 1 or 5 overall ratings. The 
dependent variable is Overall Rating. The variable of interest is FC that is the abbreviation of Financial 
Constraints, measured by WW index in Columns (1), (2), and (5), Equity Constraints in Column (3), 
and Debt Constraints in Column (4). Tax Shock is an indicator variable that equals to one if the state of 
a company incorporated experiences a corporate tax increase in the given year, and zero otherwise. The 
detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3-1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 Overall Rating 
 
WW Index WW Index Equity Constraints Debt Constraints WW 
index* Tax 
shock  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -0.693*** -0.614** -0.528*** -0.418*** -0.586 
 
(-3.18) (-2.49) (-2.91) (-4.15) (-1.60) 
FC*Tax shock     -0.045 
     (-0.67) 
Tax shock     0.005 
     (0.14) 
Gender 
 
0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 
  
(5.65) (4.56) (4.60) (3.19) 
Education 
 
0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.028** 
  
(4.69) (3.65) (3.65) (2.24) 
Age  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
  (-11.29) (-8.71) (-8.64) (-9.21) 
ROA 
 
0.037 0.045 0.040 -0.112 
  
(0.34) (0.29) (0.30) (-0.60) 
Size 
 
0.019 0.062 0.080* 0.086 
  
(0.55) (1.36) (1.74) (1.60) 
Leverage 
 
-0.012 -0.014 0.003 0.099 
  
(-0.19) (-0.17) (0.04) (0.98) 
Market-to-Book 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  
(-0.84) (-1.60) (-1.13) (-0.81) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 87,885 87,885 57,080 57,080 50,672 







Appendix 3-A5. Robustness tests: Control for employee turnover 
This table replicates the baseline results after controlling for employee turnover. The dependent 
variable is Overall Rating. The variable of interest is FC that is the abbreviation of Financial 
Constraints, measured by WW index in Columns (1), (2), and (5), Equity Constraints in Column (3), 
and Debt Constraints in Column (4). Tax Shock is an indicator variable that equals to one if the state of 
a company incorporated experiences a corporate tax increase in the given fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. Employee turnover is the percentage annual change in the number of employees. The 
detailed definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3-1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 Overall Rating 
 
WW Index WW Index Equity Constraints Debt Constraints WW 
index* Tax 
shock  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -1.382*** -1.272*** -0.752** -0.593*** -1.436*** 
 
(-3.75) (-3.21) (-2.32) (-2.66) (-2.85) 
FC*Tax shock     -0.277*** 
     (-2.75) 
Tax shock     -0.002 
     (-0.04) 
Gender 
 
0.047*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  
(5.04) (3.16) (3.20) (3.05) 
Education 
 
0.057*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.023 
  
(4.42) (3.55) (3.55) (1.36) 
Age  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
  (-10.89) (-7.87) (-7.82) (-9.12) 
ROA 
 
0.048 -0.048 -0.059 -0.329 
  
(0.24) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.98) 
Size 
 
0.028 0.091 0.118 0.090 
  
(0.44) (1.04) (1.39) (0.90) 
Leverage 
 
-0.019 -0.115 -0.094 0.155 
  
(-0.18) (-0.83) (-0.65) (0.99) 
Market-to-Book 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  
(-0.64) (-0.94) (-0.51) (-0.69) 
Emp. turnover 0.048 0.041 0.068 0.062 -0.035 
 (0.95) (0.85) (0.99) (0.89) (-0.42) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 120,050 120,050 76,784 76,784 67,570 





This thesis contains three essays that explore the determinants and 
implications of corporate social and environmental performance. In Chapter 1, I focus 
on a key driver of corporate environmental policies—financial analysts. Using two 
quasi-natural experiments (i.e., brokerage closures and mergers) to capture an 
exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, I find firms are likely to release more toxic 
pollution after analyst loss. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weak 
corporate governance, with less regulatory scrutiny, and incorporated in states where 
stakeholder orientation laws are not enacted. Further analyses show that 
underinvestment in pollution abatement and green innovation, deterioration of 
internal environmental governance mechanisms, and less environmental pressure 
imposed by institutional investors are three potential channels through which financial 
analysts shape corporate environmental policies.  
My evidence is consistent with the external monitoring hypothesis that 
financial analysts play a pivotal role in the monitoring of environmentally harmful 
behavior. Given the negative externalities involved with toxic emissions, my findings 
suggest that increased oversight of corporate environmental policies can generate 
welfare gains for society. 
In Chapter 2, I explore the gender differences in job satisfaction and workplace 
preferences and the implications of such gender gaps. Using Glassdoor employer 
reviews, I find females, on average, are less satisfied at work than males. It is worth 
noting that work-life balance is the most important workplace attribute responsible 
for gender gaps in job satisfaction. Moreover, female and male employees differ 
systematically in workplace preferences. In particular, females care more about work-
life balance relative to males. However, this preference vanishes when they become a 
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mid-level manager. Lastly, I find family-friendly workplaces with lower gender 
satisfaction gaps in work-life balance are beneficial for firm valuation. 
This chapter highlights the gender differences in job satisfaction and 
workplace preferences between males and females, particularly those regarding work-
life balance. Interestingly, this gender difference vanishes at the manager level, 
illustrating the role of selection. This evidence shows that female career progression 
is likely to be constrained if they have to sacrifice their balance between work and 
family, given the fact that females tend to pay more attention to family responsibilities 
as compared to males. As such, I suggest a crucially important role family-
friendlessness plays in female career advancement. 
Chapter 3 documents an adverse impact of financial constraints on employee 
satisfaction. By decomposing employee overall rating, I find the lower employee 
satisfaction in financially constrained firms is largely due to the decreasing employee 
assessments of work-life balance, lower confidence in senior leadership, and worse 
career opportunity. As a result, unsatisfied employees are reluctant to recommend 
their employer to others, reducing the firms’ competitiveness in the labor market. 
Finally, I uncover a positive effect of employee-friendly workplaces on firm 
performance, as satisfied employees are more motivated, productive, and loyal. 
My findings suggest employee satisfaction is an important channel through 
which financial constraints reduce firm value. Firms should be prudent in reducing 
the investments in employee wellbeing in the face of financial constraints, given the 
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